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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
The idealism that engendered the European  Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, later codified in 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, has since been reviewed to adapt to the turbulence that has befall-
en the EU and its neighbourhood. The ENP is now little more than an elegantly crafted fig leaf 
that purports to take a soft power approach to the EU’s outer periphery, argues the author, 
but in effect it inclines more towards Realpolitik. 
By prioritising security interests over liberal values in increasingly transactional partner-
ships, the EU is atomising relations with its neighbouring countries. And without the political 
will and a strategic vision to guide relations with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, the 
ENP remains in suspended animation.
“Blockmans offers a refreshingly accessible and provocative account of the EU’s foreign policy to-
wards its ‘near abroad’. Whether or not one agrees with the book’s conclusion that the ENP is in 
‘suspended animation’, this is a highly thought-provoking, detailed and illuminating analysis.”
 Tobias Schumacher, European Neighbourhood Policy Chairholder, 
 College of Europe, Natolin.
“This book’s critical reflections and deep and comprehensive analysis make it a must-read for all 
those concerned with one of the most important issues facing European policymakers today: the EU’s 
relations with its neighbours.”
 Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for CFSP 
 and Secretary General of NATO. 
“With its in-depth analysis of the challenges facing the EU as it rethinks the policy approach towards 
its neighbours, this book comes out at a critical time. It is required reading for all those concerned 
with the future of a liberal world order.” 
 Eka Tkeshelashvili, President of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies, 
 former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.
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sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe.  
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he European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is in a state of 
suspended animation. Caught between the Lisbon Treaty’s 
high level of ambition to stabilise, democratise and associate 
the countries in its neighbourhood, and the sombre realities in the 
outer periphery, the crisis-ridden EU has been hard-pressed to lift 
the ENP out of this state and revise its policy.  
The 2015 Review infused the ENP with the promise of a 
more realistic vision, a more differentiated approach to relations 
with each of its neighbours and more functional frameworks for 
cooperation. Resilience has become the buzzword for the ‘new’ 
ENP. This reflects the European Union’s desire for stability in the 
countries on its outer borders. By putting security first, the EU is 
trying to balance its interests and principles. But this pragmatic 
approach raises questions about the perceived demotion of 
fundamental rights in the external action of a Union that appears 
ill-equipped in matters of security. Moreover, the policy 
framework of the ENP does not offer the scope to seek concrete 
solutions to the daunting security challenges emanating from the 
EU’s outer periphery. 
It is in the sphere of enhancing economic resilience that the 
EU has traditionally been able to use its clout as a soft power. 
Driven by a desire to establish closer ties with neighbours that 
share its ideals, the EU has struck up a new generation of 
Association Agreements which, at their core, contain provisions to 
create Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs). 
But for ENP partners who do not wish to pursue the preferred 
model of concluding and implementing an AA/DCFTA, the EU 
now offers lighter arrangements to move beyond the status quo. 
The ensuing fragmentation of EU neighbourhood relations casts a 
shadow over the multilateral dimension of the ENP. 
A transactional approach thus seems to have taken hold of 
the ENP, akin to a more hard-nosed EU external action overall and 
T
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applied on a bilateral basis. If this assumption is correct, does it 
still make sense to talk about a separate policy for the 
neighbourhood when it applies the same rationale as that 
prescribed by the EU’s Global Strategy? 
Does the ENP amount to something 
more than the geo-branding of 
‘traditional’ foreign policy? Or is it but a 
framework for an integrated approach 
to the neighbourhood and the promise 
of a bit more funding for those countries that happen to border the 
EU?  
By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this book re-
examines the purportedly unique features of the ENP. It will 
revisit the conceptual basis (chapter 2) and legal geography of 
Article 8 TEU (chapter 3), which obliges the Union to: 
develop a special relationship with neighbouring 
countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and 
good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations 
based on cooperation.  
The research will then assess the toolbox of contractual, economic, 
financial and security instruments at the EU’s disposal to shape 
and implement the European Neighbourhood Policy (chapter 4). 
Central to this investigation is an innovative analysis of the 
flagship instruments intended to structure relations between the 
EU and its neighbours (section 4.1). The focus here will be on the 
eastern neighbours, benefiting from the fact that, at the time of 
writing, the Association Agreements with three of them had been 
(provisionally) applied for more than one year,1 and are said to 
serve as a template for the EU to negotiate future contractual 
                                                        
1  The AA/DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova were provisionally 
applied between 1 September 2014 and 1 July 2016, when they entered 
into full force. That with Ukraine remained provisionally applied (the AA 
part since November 2014, the DCFTA part since 1 January 2016) until 
July 2017, when a solution was found to overcome the stalemate in the 
ratification process created by the negative outcome of a consultative 
referendum in the Netherlands on 6 April 2016. 
Does the ENP amount to 
something more than the 
geo-branding of ‘traditional’ 
foreign policy? 
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arrangements with other neighbouring countries (e.g. Morocco 
and Tunisia). Comparing the breadth and depth of the ‘model’ 
Association Agreement with Ukraine to the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, the study finds that, in 
terms of scope, material substance and timeframes for 
implementation, the new generation of AA/DCFTAs is in many 
aspects more advanced than the SAAs entered into with the pre-
accession states of the Western Balkans. Both in their political and 
trade-related parts and provisions, the Association Agreements 
reveal a higher level of ambition and commitment by the parties to 
‘integrate’ Eastern Partnership countries into the internal market of 
the EU, even without the promise of fully fledged membership, as 
contained in the SAAs. But when ignoring preambular references 
to any type of finalité, one might well mistake the SAA for the less 
integrationist agreement, befitting a less intense type of 
relationship envisaged by the EU within the ENP. This qualitative 
difference is not simply a matter of the new generation of AAs 
having been negotiated more recently, thus reflecting an EU 
bestowed with a host of new competences by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
It is very much the consequence of a political desire expressed 
earlier this decade to associate Ukraine and the other able and 
willing countries of the Eastern Partnership as closely as possible 
to the EU. This would allow them to escape the clutches of an 
autocratic and predatory Russia, which fails to modernise its own 
economy. 
Second, the use of ENP conditionality will also be more 
closely analysed (section 4.2). Here, the focus will be on the 
application of the principle towards the southern neighbours, since 
the so-called ‘more for more, less for less’ philosophy mobilised 
through the ENP was adopted as a response to the outbreak of the 
‘Arab Spring’. The incentive-based (‘more for more’) approach to 
conditionality continues to be relevant, as its inclusion in the 2015 
Review of the ENP shows.2 Thirdly, a particular and supposedly 
                                                        
2  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN(2015) 50 
final, Brussels, 18 November 2015, at 5. 
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successful application of ENP conditionality will be analysed: visa 
liberalisation (section 4.3). To complete the assessment of the EU’s 
toolbox for the ENP, the practice of crisis response and security 
sector reform is examined in an effort to discern the alleged nexus 
between the ENP and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(section 4.4). The question here is which of the policy frameworks 
takes precedence. 
Next we consider the question of which institutional 
arrangements best befit efforts to enhance coherence in ENP 
policymaking and visibility through representation (chapter 5). 
Finally, the concluding observations will be reserved for an overall 




2. THE ENP IS DEAD. LONG LIVE 
THE ENP? 
2.1 The tyranny of geography 
In international relations, political and socio-economic ties are 
largely sorted and regulated by the happenstance of geographical 
location. While more exposure increases the likelihood of better 
relations, proximity does not automatically translate into 
friendship. Dissimilarities in topographic, demographic, economic 
and political factors may impede friendly relations. Such factors 
inform our understanding of the ‘tyranny of geography’.3  This 
notion refers to how the environment has both encouraged and 
prohibited the development of systems of cooperation throughout 
history.  
In geographical terms, Europe is a continent hard to define. 
To the north, south and west, this is relatively easy. The Arctic 
Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean form 
Europe’s natural borders. Most of the non-EU countries on these 
peripheries are considered to belong to the ‘neighbourhood’, even 
if not all of them are covered by the EU policy that goes by that 
name. Iceland and Norway – and, if Brexit materialises, the United 
Kingdom – are cases in point. Europe’s eastern frontier is more 
difficult to discern because Europe and Asia form one single 
landmass. Whereas normative history has somehow accepted that 
Russia – with its Indo-European, Slavic and orthodox roots – is 
historically anchored to Europe, the country is kept at arm’s length 
due to its expansionist tendencies during the last century. 
Conversely, while the legacy of four centuries of bloody rule has 
                                                        
3  See Robert D. Kaplan (2012), The Revenge of Geography, New York: 
Random House. 
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shaped a widely held ‘European’ point of view that denies the 
legitimacy of the Ottoman past, nominally secular but 
overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey has been engaged in accession 
negotiations with the EU for years. While increasingly autocratic 
Turkey is too close for comfort for many, strategic reasons dictate 
that Brussels and Ankara continue their cooperation. The turmoil 
that now afflicts so much of the western half of Eurasia can make it 
hard to see where the EU ends and the neighbourhood begins.4 
Any typology of the European Union’s neighbours is 
therefore determined not just by geography but also by political, 
cultural, socio-economic and security factors and the extent to 
which values are shared. Tellingly, the line “[e]ven in an era of 
globalisation, geography is still important” 5  from the 2003 
European Security Strategy was not recycled in the more 
comprehensive 2016 version of the strategy. The EU Global 
Strategy has for the first time formulated the Union’s interests in 
the world, thereby incorporating the 
values that have inspired its own 
creation, enlargement and 
development, and promoting the 
security of the EU and its citizens. 
This has resulted in the adoption of a 
new leitmotiv for EU external action: 
‘principled pragmatism’, 6  whereby 
the value-based transformative 
agenda of the EU’s external policies, in particular towards the 
neighbourhood, has been replaced by a more hard-nosed 
                                                        
4  See S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski, “The European Union and its 
neighbours: questioning identity and relationships”, in S. Blockmans and 
A. Łazowski (eds), The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal 
of the EU’s Policies of Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration, The Hague: 
Asser Press, 2006, pp. 5-6. 
5 See “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, 12 
December 2003, at 7. 
6  See “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, 
presented to the European Council on 28 June 2016, at 8 and 16. 
Tellingly, the line “[e]ven in an 
era of globalisation, geography 
is still important” from the 
2003 European Security 
Strategy was not recycled in the 
more comprehensive 2016 
version of the strategy. 
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Realpolitik approach that envisages building the ‘resilience’ of third 
countries (i.e. states’ institutions and, in a second instance, their 
societies).7  
Adding to the terminological 
inflation from which the realm of EU 
foreign policy suffers, the concept is 
translated in at least five ways. 8  First, 
more focus on cooperation in security 
sector reform, mainly in areas of conflict 
prevention, border protection/management, counter-terrorism 
and anti-radicalisation policies. Second, greater efforts to support 
inclusive economic and social development, with the creation of 
job opportunities for young people being among the key objectives 
of economic resilience. Third, greater crisis-response capacities by 
deploying the available financial resources in a more flexible 
manner. Fourth, safe and legal mobility on the one hand, and 
tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling on 
the other. And finally, greater attention to working with partners 
on energy security and climate action. 
Resilience is thus a more malleable concept that allows the 
Union to ‘pragmatically’ balance its interests and principles. It 
characterises the pivot towards a more defensive global strategy. 
That change is explained by the weakened position of the crisis-
ridden EU in the world: it is in the European Union’s primordial 
interest that countries on its borders are stable and prevent the 
influx of refugees and economic migrants, the (re-)importation of 
terrorism and organised crime, the fall-out of environmental 
disasters, etc.9 In the words of the EU Global Strategy: 
                                                        
7  Joint Communication from the European Commission and the High 
Representative to the European Parliament and Council, “A Strategic 
Approach to Resilience in the EU’s external Action”, JOIN(2017) 21 final, 
7 June 2017. 
8 JOIN(2017) 21 final. 
9 For a first-hand background analysis of the EUGS, see N. Tocci, Framing 
the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2017. 
‘Principled pragmatism’ 
replaces the value-based 
transformative agenda with 
a more hard-nosed 
Realpolitik approach. 
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My neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my 
own weaknesses. (…) Internal and external security are 
ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a 
parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and 
surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in 
preventing conflict, promoting human security, 
addressing the root causes of instability and working 
towards a safer world.10 
Security comes first. Hence the need for the EU to become a more 
proactive security provider. But prevention is better than cure. 
Extending reform to a Europe wider than that represented by the 
member states of the EU and its candidate countries is the best 
means of strengthening the European order, inter alia because it 
prevents the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe after each 
new enlargement. The emphasis here is on spreading good (not 
just stable) governance, dealing with corruption and the abuse of 
power, supporting economic reform, boosting trade, establishing 
the rule of law and protecting human rights in the neighbouring 
countries. Hence the European Union’s self-assigned 11  task to 
promote a “ring of friends”, 12  a circle of well-governed 
neighbouring countries to the East and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean with whom the EU can enjoy close and cooperative 
relations. 
Sadly though, the ENP 13  has been characterised by half-
hearted promises since its inception in 2003, by weak institutional 
                                                        
10 Ibid., at 7 and 17. 
11 This was also expected by the US, which would like to see a stronger 
EU capable of dealing with its ‘back yard’, allowing Washington to 
‘rebalance’ its relations with Asia Pacific. 
12  The term was coined by Romano Prodi, President of the European 
Commission, in a speech to the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, “A Wider 
Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to Stability”, SPEECH/02/619, 6 
December 2002. The term “ring of friends” is repeated in the 2003 
European Security Strategy, at 8. 
13  The ENP was launched in 2003 with the publication of the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, COM (2003) 104 
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and legal frameworks; sums for aid and technical assistance too 
small to affect real transformation; restrictive measures too soft to 
coerce political change; and competing visions oscillating between 
a ‘one-size-fits-all’, an ‘East vs. South’ and an ‘own merits’-based 
approach.14 The weaknesses of the ENP have been recognised by 
the EU itself in several of its annual strategy papers, published 
both before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.15 
                                                                                                                       
final. The framework was formalised in 2004 by the Communication from 
the Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper”, 
COM (2004) 373 final. For a list of ENP reference documents, see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/index_en.htm. The ENP covers Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, 
Tunisia and Ukraine. 
14 The literature on the ENP is vast in several disciplines. For a systematic 
overview since 2011, see H. Kostanyan (ed.), Assessing European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Perspectives from the literature, Brussels: CEPS and 
London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017. For earlier assessments, see M. 
Emerson, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy or Placebo?”, 
CEPS Working Document No. 215, Brussels, 2004; J. Kelley, “New Wine in 
Old Wineskins: Policy Adaptation in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies 44:29-55, 2006; M. Cremona and 
C. Hillion, “L’Union fait la force? Potential and Limitations of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy as an Integrated EU Foreign and 
Security Policy”, EUI Working Papers in LAW No. 39, European 
University Institute, Florence, 2006; Blockmans and Łazowski (eds), op. 
cit.; R. Balfour and A. Missiroli, “Reassessing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, EPC Issue Paper No. 54, European Policy Centre, 
Brussels, June 2007; M. Cremona, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
More Than a Partnership?”, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 244-299; 
G. Edwards, “The Construction of Ambiguity and the Limits of 
Attraction: Europe and its Neighbourhood Policy”, Journal of European 
Integration 30:45-62, 2008. 
15 Before Lisbon: see, e.g., the communications from the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament, “On strengthening the 
European Neighbourhood Policy”, COM (2006) 726 final; “A Strong 
European Neighbourhood Policy”’, COM (2007) 774 final, at 2: “(…) a 
great deal remains to be done.” In May 2010, the Commission published a 
rather sobering evaluation of ambitions and activities during the first five 
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Efforts to establish closer ties at the 
regional level have not lived up to 
expectations either. The Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM),16 which has been 
troubled by controversy since it 
followed on from the Barcelona Process 
in 2008, was dealt a severe blow by the (inaptly called) Arab 
Spring of early 2011 and is still struggling to recover.17 The Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) has fared only marginally better since its 
creation in 2009.18 It suffered an equally hard shock when Russia –  
                                                                                                                       
years of the ENP in its report “Taking stock of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy”, COM (2010) 207 final. Since Lisbon: see, e.g., the 
joint communications of the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A new 
response to a changing Neighbourhood”, COM(2011) 303 final; and 
“Neighbourhood at the Crossroads: Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2013”, JOIN(2014) 12 final. The 2015 ENP 
Review will be discussed later in extenso. 
16 See the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, 
adopted under the co-presidency of the President of the French Republic 
and the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in the presence of, inter 
alia, the EU, the UN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, the 
African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, and the World Bank, Paris, 13 July 2008. The Joint declaration 
is based on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, “Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean”, COM (2008) 319 final. 
17  See A. Willis, “Mediterranean Union chief resigns as Egypt unrest 
continues”, EU Observer, 27 January 2011. Efforts to resuscitate the UfM 
have not yet proven successful, in spite of the lofty “Declaration adopted 
by the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Union for the Mediterranean in 
Marseille”, EP Press Release, 7 April 2013. See K. Kausch, “The End of the 
(Southern) Neighbourhood”, EuroMeSCo Paper No. 18, April 2013. 
18 The EaP was launched at the Prague Summit in 2009 and is based on 
the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, “Eastern Partnership”, COM (2008) 823/4 final and the 
accompanying Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2974/3, 
 
The weaknesses of the ENP 
have been recognised by the 
EU itself in several of its 
annual strategy papers.  
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the Union’s biggest and (militarily) most powerful neighbour that 
chose to remain outside the ENP19 – forced Ukrainian President 
Viktor Yanukovych to follow the 
example of his Armenian homologue 
by rescinding the negotiations of an 
Association Agreement with the EU in 
November 2013, and used the ensuing 
pro-European revolt as an excuse to 
annex Crimea and invade Donbas. 20 
Whether or not one attributes conflict-
triggering characteristics to the Eastern 
Partnership, the fact remains that this episode has exposed 
shortcomings in the EU’s awareness of the strategic nature of the 
ENP, in whole and in part.21 
2.2 There goes the neighbourhood 
In their 2011 strategy paper on the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the Commission and the High Representative seemed 
intent on seizing the revolutionary momentum in the south to 
reinforce the ENP and to recalibrate relations with the EU’s 
neighbours: 
                                                                                                                       
Brussels, 3 December 2008. For an analysis of relations prior to the 
creation of the EaP, see C. Hillion, “The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy 
towards Eastern Europe”, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds), Law 
and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing 
Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 309-333. 
19  See S. Blockmans, “EU-Russia Relations through the Prism of the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 13:167-187, 2008. 
20  The same logic applies to the Black Sea Synergy, prompted by the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU in 2007. See Communication 
from the Commission “Black Sea Synergy - A new regional cooperation 
initiative”, COM(2007) 160 final; and K. Henderson and C. Weaver, The 
Black Sea Region and EU policy, New York: Ashgate, 2010. 
21 See U. Speck, “How the EU Sleepwalked into a Conflict With Russia”, 
Carnegie Europe, 10 July 2014. 
Whether or not one attributes 
conflict-triggering 
characteristics to the Eastern 
Partnership, shortcomings 
have been exposed in the 
EU’s awareness of the 
strategic nature of the ENP. 
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The Lisbon Treaty has allowed the EU to strengthen the 
delivery of its foreign policy: co-operation with 
neighbouring countries can now be broadened to cover 
the full range of issues in an integrated and more 
effective manner. This was a key driver for initiating a 
review, in consultation with partner countries and other 
stakeholders, of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) in summer 2010. Recent events throughout the 
Southern Mediterranean have made the case for this 
review even more compelling. The EU needs to rise to 
the historical challenges in our neighbourhood.22 
Many illusions about the EU’s ability to play the role of benevolent 
hegemon in the southern neighbourhood have been shed since.23 
The Arab Spring has turned into a long winter of discontent.24 
While early popular uprisings have so far been largely contained 
by a constitutional reform process and government participation of 
the Islamist party in Morocco, the rest of the southern 
Mediterranean rim has seen varying degrees of unrest. 
Algeria has bucked the trend triggered by the Arab Spring 
but the risk of violent implosion is real. The country already saw 
violence in April 2014 ahead of the re-election of Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, who after three consecutive terms in office and in spite 
of frail health continues to preside over the country. In the wake of 
constitutional reforms in 2016, and although there has been little 
significant change in the respect for basic civil liberties, the EU and 
Algeria ‘re-dynamised’ their relationship by adopting “shared” 
                                                        
22 COM (2011) 303 final. 
23 See, e.g., R. Whitman and A. Juncos, “The Arab Spring, the Eurozone 
Crisis and the Neighbourhood: A Region in Flux”, 50 JCMS (2012), pp. 
147- 161; A. Juncos and R. Whitman, “Europe as a Regional Actor: 
Neighbourhood lost?”, 53 JCMS (2015), p. 212; and K. Pomorska and G. 
Noutcheva, “Europe as a Regional Actor: Waning influence in an unstable 
and authoritarian neighbourhood”, 55 JCMS (2017), OI: 
10.1111/jcms.12612. 
24 See S. Biscop, “The ‘Arab Spring’: winter of our discontent?”, European 
Geostrategy, 19 August 2013. 
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Partnership Priorities at the Association Council of March 2017.25 
As such, cooperation on security (i.e. in fighting traffickers and 
jihadist fanatics that continue their activities on the porous borders 
in the south) and energy prevailed over pressure on the 
government to improve its track record on human rights 
protection.26 
Tunisia has been hailed as the Arab Spring’s poster child, a 
pocket of relative normality and a beacon of hope in an otherwise 
depressed and dangerous neighbourhood.27 Despite the country’s 
fragile economy and periodic loss of life in terrorist attacks, the 
adoption of the new constitution in January 2014 enshrines the 
equal rights of men and women and the rule of law – a rare 
example in the Arab world. After three turbulent years the country 
appears to have ushered in a period of progress and better 
government since the revolt 
brought down the dictatorship of 
President Ben Ali. The challenge 
now is to turn hope into delivery, 
while fending off attacks by 
terrorists intent on destabilising the 
country.28 
                                                        
25  “Priorités communes de Partenariat entre la République Algérienne 
Démocratique et Populaire (Algérie) et l'Union européenne (UE) au titre 
de la Politique européenne de voisinage révisée”, UE-AL 3101/17 ADD 1, 
07.03.2017. 
26 See F. Ghilès, “How Will Algeria Reinvent Itself?”, Notes internacionals 
CIDOB No. 74, September 2013; and J. Solana, “Peril and Promise in 
Algeria”, Project Syndicate, 25 February 2016. 
27 The 2015 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the National Dialogue 
Quartet “for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic 
democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011”. See 
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html.  
28 See, e.g., K. Kausch, “Tunisia’s Blessed Scarcity”, FRIDE Commentary 
No. 19, Madrid, October 2014; W. Mühlberger (ed.), “Transformation in 
Tunisia: The First Five Years”, EuroMeSCo Joint Policy Study No. 5, 
January 2017; and G. Faleg, “Fragility in Tunisia: A Test Case for 
Integrated Security and Development Assistance”, EuroMesCo Policy 
Brief No. 72, 12 March 2017. 
Many illusions about the EU’s 
ability to play the role of 
benevolent hegemon in the 
southern neighbourhood have 
been shed since the Arab Spring. 
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Libya, on the other hand, is still teetering on the brink of 
collapse. In the wake of the 2011 civil war which toppled the self-
proclaimed revolutionary ‘Brother Leader’ Muammar Gaddafi, the 
Benghazi region de facto seceded, with huge consequences for oil 
production and thus the fiscal situation of Libya. The lack of 
effective security institutions saw Libya become “the main transit 
country in the Mediterranean for economic migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers (mainly from Africa and more recently also from 
the Middle East) en route to Europe”29 – a tide which the EU Border 
Assistance Mission and EU Naval Force ‘Sophia’ have been unable 
to turn. 30  As the security situation deteriorated and the self-
proclaimed Islamic State was pushed back in Iraq and Syria, Daesh 
formed an offshoot in Libya in November 2014, triggering 
bombing raids by Egypt and the UAE. International diplomatic 
efforts to bring the main competing centres of power (in Tripoli 
and Tobruk) and their backers together in a Government of 
National Accord (GNA) led to the conclusion of a UN-brokered 
Libyan Political Agreement on 16 December 2015. Yet, “tribal and 
local skirmishes continue, politically instigated violence is a daily 
reality and clashes between military brigades outside of the control 
of the state are a frequent occurrence”.31 
Egypt has seen a remarkable display of revolution and 
counterrevolution over the past few years. But numerous events 
have thrown the country back to its darkest days under former 
President Hosni Mubarak, who was released from detention six 
                                                        
29 European Commission, “ENP Package – Libya”, MEMO/14/228, 27 
March 2014.  
30 See S. Blockmans, “New Thrust for the CSDP from the Refugee and 
Migrant Crisis”, CEPS Special Report No. 142, Brussels, July 2016. 
31 European Commission, “ENP Package – Libya”, MEMO/14/228, 27 
March 2014. Unfortunately, this assessment is as valid in 2017 as it was in 
2014. See in this respect also the Joint Communiqué on Libya adopted by 
Algeria, Canada, Chad, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Italy, 
Malta, Morocco, Niger, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, the European Union, United Nations, the League of Arab 
States, and the African Union in the context of the UN General Assembly, 
22 September 2016, UNIQUE ID: 160922_11. 
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years after being overthrown.32  Events such as the army’s coup 
d’état in June 2013; its removal of the country’s first-ever 
democratically elected president; the killing of over 1,000 of his 
Muslim Brotherhood protesters and the sentencing to death of 
hundreds more of them; and its constitutional reform and 
subsequent electoral process, accompanied by the crackdown on 
civil society and media. The EU’s approach to Egypt is back to 
where it was before, in support of the law of the ruler. 
Moving on to the Middle East, the Israeli government 
derailed US Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace negotiations,33 
waged a dirty war on the isolated Gaza strip in the summer of 
2014 and continues to violate international law and UN Security 
Council resolutions with its unchecked settlement building and 
impunity for settler violence against Palestinians. 34  The 
Palestinians themselves are hopelessly divided, with the Fatah-
government of Prime Minister Abbas engaged in a bitter struggle 
for power with the anti-Israel radicals of Hamas, which control 
Gaza. A solution to the generations-old ‘Middle East’ conflict is 
nowhere in sight. Although the Quartet of international mediators 
(which includes the EU) agreed in 2016 on an analysis of the 
situation and recommendations on the way forward to turn the 
two-state solution into reality, 35  the new US-administration of 
President Trump may derail that effort. 
                                                        
32 See S. Blockmans, “Egypt Five Years since Tahrir: Back to Square One”, 
CEPS Neighbourhood Watch No. 123, February 2016. 
33 See M. Lander, “Mideast Frustration, the Sequel”, New York Times, 8 
April 2014. 
34 See, inter alia, the findings of the final session of the Russell Tribunal on 
Palestine, Brussels, 16–17 March 2013 
(www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/full-findings-of-the-final-
session-en); S. Blockmans, “War Crimes and Shifting Borders in the 
Middle East”, CEPS Essay No. 14, Brussels, 11 September 2014; and B. 
Herremans, “The EU’s Aid to the OPT: Reviewing 20 years of state 
building”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 343, Brussels, April 2016. 
35 EEAS, Report of the Middle East Quartet, doc. no. 160701_03_en, 1 July 
2016. 
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Meanwhile, the civil war in Syria has been bleeding out into 
Jordan and Lebanon, which are struggling to cope with a steady 
and continuous wave of refugees.36 The sectarian divisions that 
triggered the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990) are now as deep as 
ever and deadly attacks across the Sunni-Shia divide are on the 
increase.37 After years of fruitless diplomatic efforts, the agreement 
with Iran over its disputed nuclear programme spurred a new 
‘Geneva’ peace process for Syria.38  Two cessations of hostilities 
were agreed in 2016 but broke down again when the Assad regime 
– with Russian air support – launched new assaults on Aleppo and 
flattened and captured the city. It is now widely accepted that the 
only way to reach lasting conflict resolution between the warring 
parties requires external actors 
reconciling interests that go far 
beyond the Syrian conflict.39 
The neighbourhood to the east 
presents a similar, albeit less blood-
stained, mosaic. The Eastern 
Partnership policy has led to a “step 
change” in the EU’s relations with only half of its post-Soviet 
neighbours,40  and has revealed a bottomless chasm in relations 
                                                        
36  See L. Achilli, N. Yassin and M. Erdoğan, “Neighbouring Host-
Countries’ Policies for Syrian Refugees: The Cases of Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Turkey”, IEMed Papers No. 19, January 2017. 
37 See A. Henley, “Religious Authority and Sectarianism in Lebanon”, 
Carnegie Middle East Paper, December 2016. 
38  See S. Blockmans, “Syria: An End to the Hands-off Policy”, CEPS 
Commentary, Brussels, 31 August 2015; and “Can the EU Help Prevent 
Further Conflict in Iraq and Syria?”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 25 
November 2016. 
39 See V. Perthes, “No Order, No Hegemon. The Middle East in Flux”, The 
Security Times, February 2017, at 17; and S. Blockmans, “In Search of a 
Role to Play: the EU and the War in Syria”, European Papers, Vol. 2, 2017, 
No. 1, pp. 9-13. 
40 See the High Representative’s “Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World”, 
doc. 17104/08 (S407/08), 11 December 2008, at 10. See also European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle, 
 
… the only way to reach 
lasting conflict resolution 
requires external actors to 
reconcile interests that go far 
beyond the Syrian conflict. 
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with Russia. The EU’s push to upgrade political, security and 
economic relations with the states on its eastern borders and the 
violent reaction thereto by Russia has come at a high price for the 
countries in-between.41 The result is a region that is more fractured 
than ever before. And yet, the Kremlin’s past and present actions 
to punish and partition Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia),42 
Moldova (Transnistria)43  and Ukraine (Crimea and the eastern 
oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk) 44  have not deterred the 
governments in Tbilisi, Chisinau and Kyiv from their strategic goal 
of moving closer to the EU. Each has signed up to its respective 
Association Agreement (AA) – complete with a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).45 The signing of these 
                                                                                                                       
“European Neighbourhood Policy – Priorities and Directions for 
Change”, Speech at Annual Conference of Polish Ambassadors, Warsaw, 
25 July 2013: “In the East, the priority is a successful Eastern Partnership 
Summit in Vilnius, which would mark a milestone and a ‘point of no 
return’ in anchoring our Eastern European partners to the European 
Union.” 
41  See L. Delcour and H. Kostanyan, “Towards a Fragmented 
Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for 
the area that lies in between”, CEPS Essay No. 17, Brussels, 17 October 
2014. 
42 See T. Dolidze, “Abkhazia Chooses Russia ‘à la carte’”, CEPS Blogpost, 
Brussels, 2 December 2014; and T. Dolidze, “Deliberately Integrated: 
South Ossetia headed for and into Russia”, CEPS Blogpost, Brussels, 23 
March 2015. 
43 See B. Coppieters and M. Emerson, “Conflict Resolution for Moldova 
and Transdniestria through Federalisation?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 25, 
Brussels, August 2002. 
44 See S. Blockmans, “Ukraine, Russia and the Need for More Flexibility in 
EU Foreign Policy-making”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, Brussels, 25 July 
2014; H. Kostanyan and S. Meister, “Ukraine, Russia and the EU: Breaking 
the deadlock in the Minsk process”, CEPS Working Document No. 423, 
Brussels, June 2016; and H. Kostanyan and A. Remizov, “‘The Donbas 
Blockade: Another blow to the Minsk peace process”, CEPS Working 
Document No. 2017/08, Brussels, 2 June 2017. 
45  On the AA/DCFTAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, see M. 
Emerson and V. Movchan (eds), Deepening EU-Ukrainian Relations. What, 
Why and How?, Brussels/Kyiv/London: CEPS/IER/Rowman and 
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agreements in Brussels on 27 June 2014 offered a revanche for the 
flop of the Eastern Partnership Summit at Vilnius in November of 
the year before.46 
The other three EaP countries, however, remain within 
Moscow’s geostrategic orbit. In September 2013, the Armenian 
president pulled his country away from the AA/DCFTA 
negotiating process due to Russian threats, including the 
withdrawal of security guarantees to Armenia in its territorial 
conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. 47  Instead, 
Armenia has half-heartedly opted to join Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU)48 and negotiated a 
so-called ‘Comprehensive and Enhanced Cooperation Agreement’ 
with the EU, a ‘third way’ type of accord that does not reach the 
threshold of the AA/DCFTA but goes further than the Enhanced 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that the EU signed with 
EaEU fellow Kazakhstan in December 2015.49 
                                                                                                                       
Littlefield, 2016; M. Emerson and T. Kovziridze (eds), Deepening EU-
Georgian Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Tbilisi/London: 
CEPS/Reformatics/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016; and M. Emerson and 
D. Cenusa (eds), Deepening EU-Moldovan Relations. What, Why and How?, 
Brussels/Chisinau/London: CEPS/ExpertGrup/Rowman and Littlefield, 
2016. More information at http://www.3dcftas.eu.  
46 See S. Blockmans and H. Kostanyan, “A Post-Mortem of the Vilnius 
Summit”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 3 December 2013; and European 
Council, “Statement at the signing ceremony of the Association 
Agreements with Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine”, Brussels, 
27 June 2014, EUCO 137/14. 
47 See M. Emerson and H. Kostanyan, “Putin’s Grand Design to Destroy 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership and Replace it with a Disastrous 
Neighbourhood Policy of his Own”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 17 
September 2013. 
48  Yerevan requested more than 800 exemptions from the common 
external tariff, the granting of which would render its inclusion in the 
customs union technically implausible. See M. Emerson, “Trade Policy 
Issues in the Wider Europe – that led to war and not yet to peace”, CEPS 
Working Document No. 398, Brussels, 16 July 2014. 
49 See H. Kostanyan, “The Rocky Road to an EU-Armenia Agreement: 
From U-turn to detour”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 3 February 2015; 
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The EaEU, which was officially launched on 1 January 2015, 
has been pitched by Russian President Vladimir Putin as an 
attractive alternative to the integration model offered by the EU to 
the countries in the shared neighbourhood.50  The revolution in 
Ukraine and Moscow’s intensions vis-à-vis Belarus, beyond the 
latter’s integration into the EaEU, has caused nervousness in 
Minsk about the potential of a Belorusskiy Euromaidan 
movement.51 The release of all political prisoners in August 2015, 
followed by presidential elections in an environment free from 
violence, led the Council of the EU to de-list all but four persons 
from its restrictive measures against Belarus.52 There is now an 
opportunity for bilateral relations to develop on a more positive 
agenda, possibly along the ‘third way’ charted by Armenia. 
Autocratically led Azerbaijan, however, remains in a double 
bind. On the one hand, its one-dimensional relationship with the 
energy-thirsty EU cannot be broadened without deep reforms that 
improve its track record on the rule of law and democracy.53 On 
the other hand, Azerbaijan remains bound by the security 
                                                                                                                       
and H. Kostanyan and R. Giragosian, “EU-Armenia Relations: Seizing the 
second chance”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 31 October 2016. The new 
accord was initialled on 22 March 2017. 
50 The Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a Treaty on 
the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on 29 May 2014. See 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/29-05-2014-
1.aspx. On the (in)viability of Putin’s project, see S. Blockmans, H. 
Kostanyan and I. Vorobiov, “Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The 
challenge of integration and unity”, CEPS Special Report No. 75, Brussels, 
14 December 2012. 
51 See C. Grant, “Can the EU Help Belarus to Guard its Independence?”, 
CER Commentary, London, 3 April 2014. 
52  Council of the EU, “Belarus sanctions: EU delists 170 people, 3 
companies; prolongs arms embargo”, Press release 83/16, 25 February 
2016. The legal acts were published in OJ L 52, 27 February 2016 and 
prolonged for a year in February 2017. 
53 See J. Kobzova and L. Alieva, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil”, 
ECFR Policy Memo No. 57, London, May 2012. 
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conundrum it faces in its problematic triangular relationship with 
Armenia and Russia.54 
Apart from the security threats that impose an air of 
permanent instability on the borders of the EU, all EaP countries 
suffer from deficient state institutions, rampant corruption, low 
levels of productivity and meagre rates of investment. This makes 
the majority of them economically uncompetitive.55 Furthermore, 
the democratic governance and human rights situation in most 
countries remains worrisome, especially in Azerbaijan and 
Belarus.56  Even Georgia, currently the best hope for the EU to 
advance its Eastern Partnership doctrine, has been repeatedly 
warned to “ensure that criminal prosecutions are conducted in a 
transparent and impartial manner, free of political motivation, in 
order to avoid any perception of politically motivated justice”57 
and that “a continued commitment to political pluralism and 
freedom of the media is fundamental for the preservation and 
consolidation of democracy”.58 
                                                        
54 See G. Merabishvili, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more 
normative policy?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 329, Brussels, March 2015. See 
also R. Giragosian, “The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict: Ceasing fire is not a 
ceasefire”, LSE Europpblog, London, 11 April 2016. 
55 For data and a more nuanced picture, see F. Gaub and N. Popescu, “The 
EU Neighbours 1995-2015: Shades of Grey”, Chaillot Paper No. 136, EU 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, December 2015. 
56  See A. Austers, I. Bruge and A. Spruds (eds), Dilemmas of 
Europeanisation: Political Choices and Economic Transformations in the Eastern 
Partnership Countries, Riga: LIIA, 2016. On Moldova, see H. Kostanyan, 
“Why Moldova’s European Integration is Failing”, CEPS Commentary, 
Brussels, 3 March 2016; and M. Emerson and D. Cenus ̦a, “President 
Dodon’s visit to Brussels – Contemplating economic suicide”, CEPS 
Policy Insights No. 2017-02, Brussels, 3 February 2017. 
57  See, e.g., European Commission, “ENP Package – Georgia”, 
MEMO/14/224, 27 March 2014. 
58 Statement by the Spokesperson on the decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights on the Rustavi 2 case, EEAS Press release 170309_11, 8 
March 2017. 
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From this tour d’horizon of the European Union’s outer 
periphery, south and east, it becomes clear that most of the 
geographical neighbourhood has seen a steady decline in security 
and stability, good governance and 
economic performance. Instead of the 
proverbial “ring of friends” envisaged 
by the European Commission in 
2003,59 the neighbourhood has turned 
into a “ring of fire”.60  
The disappointing reality has forced European policymakers 
to take a fresh look at how the EU should deal with its 
neighbourhood. Even after the 2015 Review of the ENP, the 
following questions remain: can a convincing strategic narrative be 
developed for the ENP? Does it make sense to put these vastly 
different countries into one or two groups? Has the Eastern 
Partnership been too closely modelled on the Union’s enlargement 
tercess? Are the EaP’s goals achievable without the prospect of EU 
membership? Can the ENP’s value-base be ignored to avoid acute 
instability in autocratically ruled neighbouring countries? How 
does the EU approach political Islam in the neighbourhood, and 
indeed further afield? How can the ENP take account of the 
geopolitical interests of the neighbours of its neighbours? If the EU 
is serious about pursuing its European Neighbourhood Policy, 
then it should find clear and convincing answers to these and 
other questions. To date, it has not. 
2.3  Conceptual flaws 
The Arab Spring forced the first major re-think of the ENP. It did 
not, however, produce much change in the Eurocentric conception 
of the policy, which constituted an early flaw in the ENP that has 
 
                                                        
59 COM (2003) 104 final, at 4. 
60  Charlemagne, “Europe’s Ring of Fire: The European Union’s 
neighbourhood is more troubled than ever”, The Economist, 20 September 
2014. 
… most of the neighbourhood 
has seen a decline in security, 
stability, good governance 
and economic performance.  
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persisted since.61While recognising that the EU alone cannot shape 
events in its neighbourhood, that many other (f)actors are at play 
and that, ultimately, it is up to the neighbours themselves to make 
choices and exercise political will for reform, the Eurocentric ENP 
does not incorporate the strategic interests of the neighbouring 
countries, let alone those of the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours 
(i.e. Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states, 
and the countries of the Sahel).62 It 
is very much an own-interest 
policy driven by the EU’s 
institutional core. This was 
emphatically confirmed in the 
approach adopted by the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy in a 
speech delivered as late as in July 2013, i.e. two months before the 
preparations for the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius started 
to unravel. While stressing the need 
to define a vision for the coexistence and mutual 
enrichment of the regional projects so as not to end up 
with two different sets of rules in the European Union 
economic space and in the [Eurasian] Customs Union 
                                                        
61 The 2011 ENP Strategy Paper (COM(2011) 303 final) did pay ample lip-
service to the “common interests”, “common challenges”, “mutual 
benefit[t]”, “shared objectives”, “shared commitment” and “mutual 
accountability” of the EU and ENP countries, but did not give substance 
to these lofty concepts. 
62 Ibid. The Strategy Paper merely noted the possibility (“can”) to improve 
coordination with “main international partners”, for instance with Russia, 
Turkey and other third countries in the so-called ‘Eastern Partnership 
Information and Co-ordination Group’. Making the case for a more 
strategic approach to the conception of the ENP, see G. Grevi and D. 
Keohane (eds), Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2014: The EU’s 
Extended Neighbourhood, Madrid: FRIDE, 2014; S. Lehne, “Time to Reset 
the European Neighborhood Policy”, Carnegie Europe, February 2014; 
and N. Tocci, “The Neighbourhood Policy is Dead. What’s Next for 
European Foreign Policy Along its Arc of Instability?”, IAI Working 
Paper No. 14, Rome, 16 November 2014. 
The Eurocentric ENP does not 
incorporate the strategic interests 
of the neighbouring countries, let 
alone those of the neighbours of 
the EU’s neighbours. 
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Commissioner Štefan Füle nevertheless proceeded along the 
classic route of framing the overall policy framework of the ENP in 
a Eurocentric way: 
First, the ENP is a strategic policy – very much in the 
European Union’s own interest. 
Second, the ENP is a prime example of the European 
Union’s comprehensive approach to foreign policy – 
using all instruments in a coherent way under the 
umbrella of the ENP – from Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, to political cooperation, trade policy, 
and also sectoral policies such as transport and energy. 
Third, ENP support for reform is based on the 
differentiation of the ‘more for more’ principles; we 
tailor our response to each partner’s needs and ambition 
and we offer a stronger relationship with the European 
Union for those partners that make more progress 
towards reform.63 
The latter point reveals a second conceptual flaw in the ENP. 
‘More for more’ conditionality was hailed by the EU institutions as 
a major innovation of the ENP in 2011. Against all odds, the phrase 
was recycled in the 2015 Review.64 Thereby, the implementation of 
the ENP has been firmly – but falsely – based on methodology 
drawn from the enlargement policy context. From the outset, the 
ENP was designed to off-set the 
potentially negative impact of the 
2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement of the 
European Union, i.e. “to prevent 
the emergence of new dividing 
lines between the enlarged EU and 
                                                        
63  Štefan Füle, “European Neighbourhood Policy – Priorities and 
Directions for Change”, Annual Conference of Polish Ambassadors, 
Warsaw, 25 July 2013. 
64  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN(2015) 50 
final, Brussels, 18 November 2015, at 5. 
The implementation of the ENP 
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based on methodology drawn from 
the enlargement policy context. 
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its neighbours”65  by “sharing everything but the institutions”.66 
The latter phrase encapsulates the original sin of the ENP: latching 
on to the methodology of EU enlargement while denying an 
accession prospect, in particular to those ‘European’ states of the 
Eastern Partnership that could theoretically fulfil all criteria 
mentioned in the EU membership clause.67  The inability of the 
European Union to create an independent vision for ENP 
countries, an alternative to membership attractive enough to 
successfully translate objectives and instruments into action, 
continued to hamper the effectiveness of conditionality – the main 
tool to promote convergence in a toolbox mainly composed of soft 
coordination instruments to persuade the partners of the 
“appropriateness” of the solutions provided by the Union.68 More 
                                                        
65 COM (2004) 373 final, at 3. See already, Tweede Kamer, “De Staat van 
de Europese Unie”, vergaderjaar 2001–2002, 28 005, nr. 1, at 7-26: “Van 
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SPEECH/02/619, Sixth ECSA World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 
2002. Emphasis added. 
67 Cf. Article 49 TEU for the Lisbon Treaty version of the clause. See F. 
Hoffmeister, “Changing Requirements for Membership”, in A. Ott and K. 
Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement – A Commentary on the 
Enlargement Process, The Hague: Asser Press, 2002, pp. 90-102; K. Smith, 
“The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality”, in 
M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003, pp. 105-139; C. Hillion, “The Copenhagen Criteria 
and their Progeny”, in C. Hillion (ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 1-22; S. Blockmans, “Raising the 
Threshold for Further EU Enlargement: Process, Problems and 
Prospects”, in A. Ott and E. Vos (eds), Fifty Years of European Integration: 
Foundations and Perspectives, The Hague: Asser Press, 2009, pp. 203-220; C. 
Hillion, “EU Enlargement”, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 
187-216; and S. Blockmans and H. Kostanyan, “A post-mortem of the 
Vilnius Summit: Not yet a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ for the Eastern 
Partnership”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 3 December 2013. 
68  See G. Meloni, “Is the same toolkit used during enlargement still 
applicable to the Countries of the New Neighbourhood? A problem of 
mismatching between objectives and instruments”, in M. Cremona and G. 
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worryingly, the coercive element which is implicit in the 
application of negative conditionality (‘less for less’) seriously 
undermined the ability of the EU to promote a sense of joint 
ownership of the ENP project.69 In short, the “enlargement lite”70 
approach does not work for countries that do not want or are 
pushed to abandon close association with the EU, or indeed for 
those that are frustrated by the absence of the proverbial carrot of 
future membership. 
The dichotomy in the EU’s approach to eastern ‘European’ 
states, on the one hand, and countries on the southern rim of the 
Mediterranean, on the other, speaks to the 
third flaw in the conception of the ENP, 
namely that of the artificial clustering of 
neighbouring countries that have little 
more in common than a geographic 
proximity to the European Union. 
Arguably, these groupings have been 
assembled to suit political and bureaucratic desires, bypassing 
individual differences as well as sub-regional commonalities (the 
Maghreb, Mashreq, Middle East, Southern Caucasus and Eastern 
Europe). The search for a strong common agenda between the six 
states of the Eastern Partnership is hard enough, let alone between 
the ten southern Mediterranean or, indeed, the 16 ENP countries. 
As with the one-size-fits-all approach, the regional approach to the 
ENP has clearly met with limited results. Rather than structuring 
relations in a static and purely geographical sense, economies of 
scale could be better achieved by following a more dynamic, 
functionalist, sectoral approach – akin to that which lay at the basis 
of the success of the European integration process itself.71 
                                                                                                                       
Meloni (eds), “The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for 
Modernisation?”, EUI Working Papers LAW No. 2007/21. 
69 See Section 4.2. 
70  See N. Popescu and A. Wilson, “The Limits of Enlargement-lite: 
European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood”, ECFR 
Policy Report, London, June 2009. 
71  For ideas in the respect, see S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, 
“Revitalizing the European ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The 
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A fourth and final conceptual flaw of the ENP is that it was 
designed for fair weather, i.e. long-term engagement in a stable 
environment. The ENP’s principal contribution to peace and 
security has been through the promotion of local democracy and 
socio-economic progress, which can only indirectly contribute to a 
more positive climate for peaceful dispute settlement. As we will 
see later in this study, 72  the ENP’s 
instruments are ill-suited to the rapid 
and violent changes that have 
characterised much of the EU’s 
neighbourhood since the conflict in 
Lebanon in 2007 and the Russo-Georgian 
war of August 2008. Indeed, the Union’s 
track record in preventing ‘frozen’ conflicts in the eastern 
neighbourhood from heating up and boiling over, let alone 
resolving them, is mixed at best.73 European security responses to 
the revolutionary upheavals in the southern neighbourhood have 
not been exemplary either.74 Whereas the ENP is “not in itself a 
conflict prevention or settlement mechanism”75 that can be blamed 
for the endogenous and dramatic transformations in some of the 
neighbouring countries, it is nonetheless a policy that is premised 
on a more direct contribution to stability in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. Yet, in spite of lofty objectives laid down in ample 
                                                                                                                       
case for legally binding sectoral multilateralism”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 17, 2012, pp. 577-604. 
72 See below, Section 4.4. 
73  See S. Blockmans, The EU as a Global Peacemaker, University of 
Amsterdam Press, 2014 (http://www.oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-
2024weboratie_Blockmans_-_DEF.pdf). 
74  See, e.g., J. Howorth, “CSDP and NATO Post-Libya: Towards the 
Rubicon?”, Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 35, Brussels, July 2012. 
75 See B. Ferrero-Waldner, “Political reform and sustainable development 
in the South Caucasus: the EU’s approach”, Speech at the Bled Strategic 
Forum ‘Caspian Outlook 2008’, SPEECH/06/477, 28 August 2006; and, 
more generally, B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review 11, 2006, pp. 139-142. 
The ENP’s instruments are 
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speeches and official documents, and notwithstanding the actions 
undertaken by the EU to support the security of ENP partners by 
way of border assistance, rule of law, security sector reform and 
military training missions, the changing realities on the ground 
have shown that, so far, the European Union has not really been 
able to prevent and counter security threats in its neighbourhood,76 
let alone turn vicious circles into virtuous ones. 
2.4 Vision impossible? 
In order to overcome the four conceptual flaws of the ENP, a new 
re-think of the policy is called for. This is not to say that the ENP 
has failed altogether. The standards, instruments and procedures 
that have been put to use in the past could of course be employed 
in an effort to shape relations between the EU and individual 
neighbours in the future. As the Commission and the High 
Representative stated in their 2014 Joint Communication: 
The ENP is a policy of continuous engagement. The 
value of the policy does not lie only in the achievements 
of its individual components (e.g. political 
reform/democratisation, market integration, better 
mobility and people-to-people contacts, and sector 
cooperation). It also anchors countries/societies in 
transition, and even in crisis situations, to the EU, by 
proposing a set of values and standards to guide their 
reform efforts, and generally through the creation of 
networks linking them to the EU and beyond to other 
partners. It is a framework — to work towards, and 
safeguard, democracy, freedom, prosperity and security 
for both the EU and its partners. While this may require 
continuous scrutiny of the appropriateness and 
suitability of the policy and its instruments, there are 
                                                        
76 See M. Smith and M. Webber, “Political Dialogue and Security in the 
European Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of ‘New Partnership 
Perspectives’”, European Foreign Affairs Review 13, 2008, pp. 73-95. 
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compelling reasons for it to remain the framework for the 
EU’s relations with its neighbours for the years to come.77 
Beyond this optimistic self-assessment nevertheless lies the 
twofold question of how the ENP has to be refitted to operate in 
the face of both longstanding and new and acute challenges; and 
whether it still makes sense to talk about a separate policy for the 
neighbourhood if it were to apply the same comprehensive 
approach to the EU’s toolbox as professed for external action in the 
wider sense. 
                                                        
77 JOIN(2014) 12 final, at 17-18. 
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3. ARTICLE 8 OF THE EU TREATY 
3.1 Legal geography 
Unlike trade, development cooperation, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and other strands of the EU external action 
portfolio, neighbourhood relations did not rest on a specific basis 
in EU primary law prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Different instruments from across all three Union pillars 
(Association Agreements, tools pertaining to visa and asylum, 
financial and technical instruments, CFSP measures) were brought 
together in an attempt to develop an integrated structure for broad 
ENP objectives.78 By recycling Article I-57 of the rejected Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced a specific provision on relations between the EU and its 
neighbours. Article 8 TEU stipulates the following: 
1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with 
neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the 
values of the Union and characterised by close and 
peaceful relations based on cooperation. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may 
conclude specific agreements with the countries 
concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal 
rights and obligations as well as the possibility of 
                                                        
78 See, e.g., M. Cremona, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: More 
Than a Partnership?”, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External 
Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 244-299; and B. 
Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: A Paradigm for Coherence, Abingdon: Routledge, 2012. 
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undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall 
be the subject of periodic consultation.79 
The first striking characteristic of the neighbourhood clause is the 
prominent place it occupies in the treaties: Article 8 sits among the 
Common Provisions in Title I of the Treaty on European Union, 
among the values and objectives of the Union, which “colour the 
meaning of the competence it encapsulates, the nature of the policy 
it envisages, as well as its function.”80 The position of Article 8 
TEU suggests that the neighbourhood competence transcends the 
legal dichotomy between the CFSP (embedded within the TEU) 
and non-CFSP powers (enshrined in the TFEU),81  and has the 
potential to strengthen the Union’s ability to shape its 
neighbourhood policy in a holistic fashion, joining up internal and 
external policy aspects into a comprehensive approach towards 
neighbouring countries. Moreover, it could be argued that, 
because of its inclusion in Title I of the TEU and its nature as a lex 
specialis that supports the general mandate of the Union to build 
partnerships with third countries that share its principles and 
values (Art. 21(1) TEU), Article 8 TEU indirectly imposes an 
obligation of intent on the EU institutions “to take account of the 
neighbourhood policy’s objectives when exercising Union 
competences, for instance in elaborating the EU’s transport, 
                                                        
79 In a separate Declaration on Article 8 TEU, the EU makes it clear that it 
is willing to take account of “the particular situation of the small-sized 
countries which maintain specific relations of proximity”. See M. 
Maresceau, “The Relations between the EU and Andorra, San Marino and 
Monaco”, in Dashwood and Maresceau (eds), op. cit., at 270-308. 
80 See C. Hillion, “The EU Neighbourhood Competence under Article 8 
TEU”, SIEPS European Policy Analysis 2013:3, p. 2. 
81 Cf. Article 40 TEU, commented upon by, e.g., P. Eeckhout, External 
Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 168-170. Article 40 TEU is the 
object of a new body of case-law. See Case C-130/10, European Parliament 
v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, paras. 42–82; Case C-
658/11 Parliament v Council (EU agreement with Mauritius), 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025; Case C-263/14, Parliament v Council (Tanzania) 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:435; and Case C-455/14 P, H v. Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:569. 
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energy, environment policies, in the development of the internal 
market and, naturally, in the enlargement process.”82 
That said, the legal geography of Article 8 TEU is rather odd 
when considering best practices of treaty drafting. It is 
disconnected from the ordinary decision-making procedures and 
instruments that belong to the 
supranational realm of external action 
provided by Part V of the TFEU; namely 
those that also characterise the ENP’s 
adjacent EU enlargement policy. Seen 
from that perspective, the 
neighbourhood article seems to be in the ‘wrong’ treaty to make a 
real splash. In the TEU too, the link which previously existed with 
the EU membership clause in the Final Provisions of the TEU (Art. 
49) has been severed. Moreover, the neighbourhood clause is 
divorced from the specific procedures and instruments under Title 
V on the CFSP. Yet, when looking at it through the prism of the 
development of a comprehensive neighbourhood policy, these 
arguments do not seem to outweigh the benefits garnered by 
superimposing the neighbourhood clause over the cracks between 
the treaties. The prima facie constitutional isolation of Article 8 TEU 
in Title I of the TEU might thus have positive practical 
implications for mainstreaming a policy that was and remains 
cross-pillar in nature. However, too much constitutional law might 
also lead to a power struggle over the ENP 83  between the 
institutions. Indeed, the implementation of the new obligation 
towards the neighbourhood might add structural and procedural 
“constraints on the development of a policy which, thus far, had 
been incremental and flexible, thanks notably to the fact that it was 
                                                        
82  See Hillion “The EU Neighbourhood Competence under Article 8 
TEU”, op. cit., p. 2. 
83 Cf. B. de Witte, “Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s 
Foreign Relations?”, in M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008, 
pp. 3-15. 
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forged outside the Treaty framework, on the basis of soft law 
instruments.”84 
The second peculiarity about the neighbourhood article is its 
sketchy wording concerning the result to be achieved in the 
application of the obligation resting upon the EU’s shoulders. The 
langue de bois of political and diplomatic 
rhetoric resonates in the references to the 
creation of “an area of prosperity and 
good neighbourliness”, an amalgam of 
fuzzy concepts that are hard to pin down. A clear definition of the 
term “neighbouring countries” is missing from the article. It is 
only by reasoning a contrario, i.e. by reading both Article 3(5) TEU 
on the Union’s relations with what is called the “wider world” and 
the membership clause of Article 49 TEU that one can deduce that 
Article 8 TEU envisages a relationship with countries on or in the 
vicinity of the European continent that do not wish to or cannot by 
definition become a member of the Union. As such, Article 8 TEU 
lumps a micro-state like Andorra, an EFTA country like 
Switzerland, an EEA member like Norway, a strategic power like 
Russia, an EaP country like Armenia, and an UfM member like 
Lebanon together in the same group, despite the substantial 
differences in (contractual) relations between the EU and each of 
these (clusters of) countries.85 Article 8 TEU is therefore not a legal 
basis exclusive to the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
 
                                                        
84 Ibid., at 3: “(…)  inaction on the part of the Union could lead to possible 
proceedings before the European Court of Justice, the way failures to 
develop common policies were in the past sanctioned by the Court. 
Moreover, the exercise of the EU neighbourhood competence requires 
from both institutions and Member States a higher degree of compliance 
with the measures thereby adopted, and a mutual duty of cooperation to 
ensure the fulfilment of the Union objectives thereof.” Other constraints 
could consist of an application of the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, 
proportionality, and consistency. 
85 See section 4.1. 
The neighbourhood article 
is sketchy in its wording. 
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3.2 Friends or foes? 
Paragraph 1 of Article 8 prescribes that “the Union shall develop a 
special relationship with neighbouring countries”.86 Arguably, this 
mandatory treaty language sets EU relations with neighbouring 
countries apart from relations between the EU and like-minded 
and similarly principled countries farther afield, which the EU is 
merely under the obligation to “seek to develop”, however 
strategic such alliances may be (cf. Art. 21(1) TEU). As such, the 
Treaty of Lisbon sends a strong signal to countries with which the 
EU shares its external borders. The Union is obliged to (“shall”) 
develop a special relationship with its neighbours. The use of the 
singular “relationship” in the treaty provision could – a contrario – 
be interpreted to mean that the EU is not automatically obliged to 
develop special “relations” with all its neighbours. From this 
subtle nuance in terminology flow the pre-conditions for the 
directly applicable obligation of Article 8. The notion of a “special 
relationship” relates to i) the 
establishment of “an area of 
prosperity and good 
neighbourliness”, ii) 
“founded on the values of 
the Union”, iii) 
“characterised by close and 
peaceful relations based on 
cooperation”. In other words, 
the Union is not obliged to construct a peaceful and prosperous 
neighbourhood with those countries that do not share its values.87 
                                                        
86 This section draws on S. Blockmans, “Friend or Foe? Reviewing EU 
Relations with its Neighbours Post Lisbon”, in P. Koutrakos (ed.), The 
European Union’s External Relations A Year After Lisbon, CLEER Working 
Paper No. 2011/3, pp. 113-124. 
87  Others have argued that the provision “impedes the Union from 
entering into a special relationship with neighbouring countries refusing 
to commit themselves to the values of the Union”. See D. Hanf, “The ENP 
in the light of the new ‘neighbourhood clause’ (Article 8 TEU)”, College of 
Europe, Research Paper in Law - Cahiers juridiques No. 2/2011. See also 
P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, “Article 8 TEU: Towards a New 
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those countries. 
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But on the basis of the first sentence of Article 8(1) TEU, one could 
argue that the EU is bound to engage with all neighbouring 
countries; if not with the governments because of their poor record 
in, for instance, fundamental rights protection, then at least with 
civil society organisations in (or outside of) those countries, 
“precisely with a view to asserting [the Union’s] own values”.88 
Like the creation of a “ring of friends”, the establishment of a 
single (“an”) area of prosperity and good neighbourliness 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation 
sounds somewhat utopian and certainly unrealistic in the short- to 
mid-term future. After all, the Union’s neighbourhood is littered 
with actual and potential flash points for conflict between, e.g. (de 
jure) states and secessionist entities and/or de facto states, 89 
governments and terrorist groupings, and (large parts of 
countries’) populations and the undemocratic and repressive 
regimes that govern them. These realities and external pressures 
(e.g. those emerging from countries and regions that lie beyond the 
ring of neighbours) continue to negatively influence bilateral 
relations between the EU and some of its neighbouring states, as 
indeed among neighbouring countries themselves, and impede the 
creation of the single area of peace, 
harmony and understanding that 
the Treaty calls for. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that 
the ENP is – and will continue to 
be for a considerable period– 
suspended between the fuzzy 
                                                                                                                       
Generation of Agreements with the Countries of the European Union?”, 
European Law Review 36, 2011, pp. 688-703. 
88  See Hillion, “The EU Neighbourhood Competence under Article 8 
TEU”, op. cit., pp. 3-4, who argues that “Article 8 TEU is a neighbouring 
state-building policy, involving the whole array of EU instruments.” 
89 See S. Blockmans and R.A. Wessel, “The European Union and Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes in its Neighbourhood: The Emergence of A New 
Regional Security Actor?”, in A. Antoniadis, R. Schütze and E. Spaventa 
(eds), The European Union and Global Emergencies: Law and Policy Aspects, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 73-103. 
The ENP is suspended between 
the finalité of EU-neighbours 
relations as prescribed in Article 
8 TEU and the (geo)political and 
socio-economic realities that 
define such relations. 
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE ENP  35 
finalité of EU-neighbours relations as prescribed in Article 8 TEU 
and the (geo)political and socio-economic realities that define such 
relations. 
Of more practical relevance is the reference in Article 8(1) to 
the values of the Union, reflecting Article 2 TEU, which states that 
the Union “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights”. These are the previously called “shared values” 
listed in the Council Conclusions of June 2003;90 the ones on which 
Article 49 TEU is also based. By dropping the pretence of the 
values being shared by all neighbouring countries, and insisting 
instead that the EU projects its own normative power in the 
neighbourhood, the Lisbon Treaty has brought the objective of 
Article 8 into line with the promotion of the EU’s own interests 
and worldview as professed in Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.91 The 
revised political conditionality that carries the Treaty’s aim of 
establishing a special relationship with neighbouring countries 
reflects a further shift of emphasis away from “shared values” 
towards a “shared commitment to universal values”: 
The new approach must be based on mutual 
accountability and a shared commitment to the universal 
values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.92 
This raises the question of to what extent “the principles which 
have inspired [the Union’s] own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which [the EU] seeks to advance in the wider 
world” (Art. 21(1) TEU; cf. Art. 2 TEU) are universal in nature. 
Leaving discussions about cultural relativism aside, the fact is that 
– in theory – the EU expects partner countries to embrace 
international norms and standards, notably by signing up to both 
                                                        
90  GAERC Conclusions, 16 June 2003, para. 2. See also GAERC 
Conclusions of 14 June 2004, para. 4. 
91 See J. Larik, “Entrenching Global Governance: The EU’s Constitutional 
Objectives Caught Between a Sanguine World View and a Daunting 
Reality”, in B. Van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds), The EU’s 
Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013, pp. 7-22. 
92 COM (2011) 303 final, at 2 and 3. 
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international and regional human rights agreements. 93  This 
approach aims to provide greater support to partners engaged in 
building what the EU rather pompously called “deep democracy – 
the kind that lasts”.94 Whereas this 
phrase seems to have been coined 
to obscure the fact that the EU did 
not have any qualms in dealing 
with less than democratic regimes 
prior to the so-called Arab Spring, 
and suggests that the Union has 
since stepped up its efforts in this 
respect, the Commission and High Representative have been keen 
to emphasise that the EU 
does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe 
for political reform, but [that] it will insist that each 
partner country’s reform process reflect a clear 
commitment to universal values that form the basis of 
[the] renewed approach [to the ENP].95 
And while the intention was to strengthen the two regional 
dimensions of the policy (EaP and UfM) “so that the EU can work 
out consistent regional initiatives in areas such as trade, energy, 
transport or migration and mobility”,96 the Commission and the 
High Representative, supported by the EEAS, have in fact pushed 
more towards an own merits-based approach whereby it is easier 
to distinguish friends from foes. EU support, in the form of 
preferential commitments, is tailored and conditioned accordingly: 
Some partners may want to move further in their 
integration effort, which will entail a greater degree of 
alignment with EU policies and rules leading 
                                                        
93 Ibid., at 5: “Commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms 
through multilateral treaties and bilateral agreements is essential. But 
these commitments are not always matched by action. Ratification of all 
the relevant international and regional instruments and full compliance 
with their provisions, should underpin our partnership.” 
94 Ibid., at 2. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
The EU expects partner countries 
to embrace international norms 
and standards, notably by 
signing up to both international 
and regional human rights 
agreements. 
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progressively to economic integration in the EU Internal 
Market.97 
For countries where reform has not taken place, the EU would 
normally reconsider or even reduce funding.98 
In practice therefore, the Commission and the High 
Representative abandoned the Treaty’s conceptualisation of a 
single, peaceful and prosperous neighbourhood area already in 
2011 and replaced it with a variable geometric model based on a 
set of differentiated relationships largely defined by home-grown 
reform in neighbouring countries. More so than before the entry 
into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Union thereby 
relied on its power of 
attraction, akin to the soft 
power that inspires candidate 
countries to adhere to the 
conditions of EU membership. 
It is unlikely though that the 
Union’s ‘softer’ power in the 
neighbourhood – one that is 
premised on a stake in the internal market but not in the 
institutions – is enough to inspire the reforms that are needed to 
underpin the kind of cooperation on which a single area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness could be established. 
One way explicitly prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty to ‘give 
hands and feet’ to its grand objective of creating that special kind 
of relationship between the EU and its neighbours is through the 
conclusion of “specific agreements” (Art. 8(2) TEU), another fuzzy 
term, which “may [i.e. must not] contain reciprocal rights and 
obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities 
jointly”. The formulation reveals the possibility of differentiation 
in relations with neighbouring countries. While differentiation in 
itself is a good thing, it does have the potential to undermine the 
finalité projected by Article 8(1) TEU: the best pupils in class will 
                                                        
97 Ibid., at 3. 
98 See further section 4.2. 
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acquire a different status in their 
relations with the Union, thereby 
increasing rather than reducing the 
disparities within the region. The 
neighbourhood clause itself thus seems 
to suffer from a structural dichotomy, 
ingraining the tension between a multilateral and a bilateral (i.e. 
own merits-based) approach. 
With respect to Article 8(2) TEU, for the first time the Lisbon 
Treaty establishes a specific legal basis to develop contractual 
relations with neighbouring countries. However, this does not do 
away entirely with the complexities of the pre-Lisbon search for an 
appropriate legal base for agreements with individual ENP 
countries. 99  After all, the specific agreements which the EU 
envisages for Eastern Partnership states and “selected” countries 
from the southern Mediterranean are Association Agreements 
(AAs) built around the establishment of a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).100 The agreements are 
intended to replace the outdated Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs), and update and upgrade some of the existing 
Euro-Med Association Agreements (EMAAs).101 Article 217 TFEU 
provides the specific legal basis for concluding association 
agreements, albeit with third countries belonging to a wider group 
of partners than just the EU’s geographical neighbours. The 
difference between Article 8(2) TEU and Article 217 TFEU is that 
the latter prescribes – in line with the Court’s Demirel judgment – 
that associations established by such agreements involve 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
                                                        
99 See M. Maresceau, “A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements”, in C. 
Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: the EU and its 
Member States in the World, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, pp. 11-29, at 19. 
100 Contractual relations with the ENP countries for which DCFTAs are 
too ambitious may be structured in Agreements on Conformity 
Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAAs). See section 
4.2.2. 
101 See section 4.1. 
The neighbourhood clause 
itself suffers from a tension 
between a multilateral and a 
bilateral approach. 
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE ENP  39 
procedures (cf. Article 218 TFEU). 102  Meanwhile, partnership 
agreements are concluded on the basis of Article 212 TFEU, which 
states that such agreements pursue the objectives of economic, 
financial and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, 
in particular financial assistance, with third countries other than 
developing countries (e.g. Russia, Kazakhstan). In short, 
depending on the interpretation of the scope of objectives, the 
depth of political and economic cooperation, the possibility of 
establishing a visa-free regime, and the extent to which national 
legislation will be harmonised with the EU acquis, one may argue 
over the choice of the legal basis and the procedure of adoption of 
future generation bilateral agreements between the EU and the 
ENP countries. Fortunately, the CJEU now has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate in disputes between the institutions involved in 
establishing specific agreements with neighbouring countries 
based on Article 8(2) TEU. Compared to the pre-Lisbon regime, 
this represents a legal leap forward. 
In view of the legal geography of EU-neighbourhood 
relations and the room for a dynamic interpretation of Article 8(1) 
TEU to accommodate a strategic recalibration of the ENP with the 
end goal envisaged by the Treaty, attention will now turn to the 
“specific agreements” mentioned in Article 8(2) TEU, and indeed 
the other instruments in the 
EU’s ample toolbox to shape 
future relations with countries 
on its borders. As noted 
above,103 the focus will be on 
the eastern neighbours insofar 
as the analysis of the 
Association Agreements is concerned, whereas the use of ENP 
conditionality will be examined mostly through the prism of 
relations with the southern neighbours. 
                                                        
102 Case 12/86, Demirel, ECLI:EU:C:1987:400. 
103 See section 2.4. 
It is unlikely that the Union’s ‘softer’ 
power in the neighbourhood is enough 
to inspire the reforms that are needed 
to underpin a single area of prosperity 




4. THE ENP TOOLBOX 
4.1 Association Agreements 
4.1.1 Europe Agreements for Eastern Partnership 
countries? 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU forged relations 
with its neighbours in the east on the basis of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements. All of the PCAs (except the one with 
Belarus) entered into force in the second half of the 1990s for a 
period of ten years and were automatically renewed each year 
after the expiry of their first period of validity. The southern 
neighbours concluded Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements, designed, inter alia, to lead to the establishment of a 
Euro-Med free trade area of goods, services and capital. 104 
Attaining the latter goal seems more elusive now than ever before. 
In 2004, the PCAs and EMAAs were enveloped into the wider 
European Neighbourhood Policy and accompanied by bilateral 
ENP Action Plans, developed jointly by the EU and each of the 
neighbouring states. 
                                                        
104 The EU and its member states signed an EMAA with Tunisia in July 
1995 (entry into force on 1 March 1998). Between 1996 and 2002 EMAAs 
were signed in the framework of the Barcelona process: with Morocco 
(into force on 1 March 2000), Israel (1 June 2000), with Jordan (1 May 
2002), with Egypt (1 June 2004), with Algeria (1 September 2005), and 
with Lebanon (1 April 2006). An Interim Association Agreement on trade 
and trade-related matters between the EU and the Palestinian Authority 
has been in force since 1 July 1997. At the end of 2004, the text of an 
EMAA with Syria was submitted to the political authorities on both sides, 
but it failed to get final approval and signature on the side of the EU. See 
K. Pieters, The Mediterranean Neighbours and the EU Internal Market: A Legal 
Perspective, The Hague: Asser Press, 2010. 
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Whereas the policy developed to match new realities, the 
static contractual arrangements gradually expired. The 2006 ENP 
Strategy therefore envisaged the updating and upgrading of the 
bilateral agreements.105 The EU expedited its work following the 
inaugural EaP Summit in May 2009 and the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty later that year. For the eastern neighbours, the 
flagship document underpinning each newly defined bilateral 
relationship would be the Association Agreement containing 
DCFTA provisions.106 For the southern neighbours, new DCFTAs 
were intended to update and upgrade the hard core of the existing 
EMAAs.107 
After more than three years of negotiations, Moldova and 
Georgia initialled their respective AAs/DCFTAs with the EU at 
the EaP summit in Vilnius in November 2013. Prior to the summit, 
the Armenian and Ukrainian Presidents, both under intense 
pressure from Russia,108 had unilaterally withdrawn their intention 
to sign similar accords. In response, the Commission and the EEAS 
– allegedly pushed by certain member states – watered down the 
                                                        
105 COM (2006) 726 final, at 4-5. 
106 Negotiations with Ukraine were initiated under the pre-Lisbon regime. 
Negotiation mandates for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova 
were hammered out when the dust of the Lisbon Treaty was still settling, 
a difficult exercise altogether. For assessments of the scoping exercises 
vis-à-vis Ukraine, see C. Hillion, “Mapping-Out the New Contractual 
Relations between the European Union and Its Neighbours: Learning 
from the EU-Ukraine ‘Enhanced Agreement’”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review 12, 2007, pp. 169-182; and R. Petrov, “Legal Basis and Scope of the 
New EU-Ukraine Enhanced Agreement: is there any room for further 
speculation?”, EUI Working Papers MWP 2008/17. 
107  On 14 December 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council authorised the 
Commission to open trade negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and 
Tunisia as soon as the necessary preparatory processes were completed. 
See G. Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the DCFTAs 
with Tunisia and Morocco”, EuroMeSCo Paper No. 28, March 2016. 
108 See M. Emerson and H. Kostanyan, “Putin’s Grand Design to Destroy 
the EU’s Eastern Partnership and Replace it with a Disastrous 
Neighbourhood Policy of his Own”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 17 
September 2013. 
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final declaration of the summit. Whereas an early draft declaration 
acknowledged the sovereign right of each of the six Eastern 
Partnership states to choose the scope of its ambitions and the final 
goal of its relations with the European Union and to decide 
“whether to remain partners in accordance with Article 8 of the 
Treaty of the European Union [TEU] or follow its European 
aspirations in accordance with Article 49 thereof”, 109  the EU 
removed the reference to Article 49 from the final version. 
Whatever there may be of this, the Vilnius summit fell far short of 
being a rite of passage towards full integration with the EU, 
certainly not creating a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ akin to the 2003 
summit where the Western Balkans were offered an EU 
membership prospect.110 
To be sure, the fact that some member states succeeded in 
eliminating Article 49 from the Vilnius summit’s declaration need 
not mean an end to the membership dream of some of the eastern 
neighbours. 111  Indeed, the language employed in the joint 
declaration is malleable enough to allow EaP countries to find 
support from the EU to realise their desire to move beyond 
neighbourhood status: “The participants reaffirm the particular 
role for the Partnership to support those who seek an ever closer 
relationship with the EU. The Association Agreements, including 
                                                        
109 See R. Jozwiak, “Draft EU Summit Text Acknowledges ‘Aspirations’ Of 
Eastern Neighbors”, Radio Free Europe, 31 October 2013 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-neighbors-eastern-
statement/25153908.html). This would have been in line with the wish 
expressed on a number of occasions by the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement and ENP. See, e.g., R. Sadowski, “Commissioner Fule wants 
prospective EU membership to be offered to Eastern European countries”, 
Eastweek, 7 November 2012. 
110 See S. Blockmans and H. Kostanyan, “A Post-mortem of the Vilnius 
Summit: Not yet a ‘Thessaloniki moment’ for the Eastern Partnership”, 
CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 3 December 2013. 
111  A stronger EU membership perspective was contested by several 
member states such as France and the Netherlands. See A. Rettman, “EU 
gives Ukraine enlargement hint”, EU Observer, 10 February 2014. 
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DCFTAs, are a substantial step in this direction”.112 Arguably, the 
phrase “ever closer relationship” can be read in the Thessaloniki 
spirit, in the sense that the Eastern Partnership provides the 
framework for the “European course of the [EaP] countries, all the 
way to their future accession”.113 
Three additional arguments can be made to support this 
claim. Firstly, the statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of 
the European Council, at the signing ceremony of the 
AAs/DCFTAs with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in Brussels on 
27 June 2014 that “these agreements are not the final stage of our 
cooperation”114  was a confirmation of earlier statements by the 
Foreign Affairs Council115 and a careful attempt to say that those 
killed during the Maidan protests, a pro-EU integration movement 
like one the Union had not seen in decades, had not died in vain. 
Yet, the ultimate aim of the Association Agreements was played 
down in the European Council conclusions of December 2016 to 
overcome the hurdle erected in April 2016 by a majority of the 32% 
of Dutch voters who, in a consultative referendum, rejected the 
ratification of the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine. 116  In a “legally 
                                                        
112  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, “Eastern 
Partnership: the way ahead”, Council Press release 17130/13 (Presse 516), 
Vilnius, 29 November 2013. 
113 EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, Declaration, Council Press 
release 10229/03 (Presse 163), Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003. 
114  European Council, “Statement at the signing ceremony of the 
Association Agreements with Georgia, Republic of Moldova and 
Ukraine”, Brussels, 27 June 2014, EUCO 137/14.   
115 See Council of the EU, “Council Conclusions on Ukraine”, 10 February 
2014. 
116 European Council conclusions on Ukraine, 15 December 2016: “[T]he 
aim of association agreements is to support partner countries on their 
path to becoming stable and prosperous democracies, and to reflect the 
strategic and geopolitical importance the European Union attaches to the 
regional context.” For backgrounds and analysis on the Dutch 
referendum, see G. Van der Loo, “The Dutch Referendum on the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement: Legal options for navigating a tricky and 
awkward situation”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 8 April 2016. 
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binding” Decision,117 the Heads of State or Government of the 28 
member states, meeting within the European Council, addressed 
the Dutch concerns “in full conformity with the Association 
Agreement and the EU treaties” and stated that: 
While aiming to establish a close and lasting relationship 
between the parties to the Agreement based on common 
values, the Agreement does not confer on Ukraine the 
status of a candidate country for accession to the Union, 
nor does it constitute a commitment to confer such status 
to Ukraine in the future.118  
In essence, the Decision merely states the obvious, namely that 
there is no automatic link between the AA and candidate country 
status.119 But neither does the Decision exclude Ukraine’s right to 
apply for membership under Article 49 TEU, nor does it frame the 
                                                        
117 The Decision, annexed to the European Council conclusions, would 
only take effect once the Kingdom of the Netherlands had ratified the 
AA/DCFTA and the Union had concluded it, which happened on 30 May 
and 11 July 2017, respectively. See Council Decision (EU) 2017/1248 of 11 
July 2017 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the 
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and 
Ukraine, of the other part, as regards provisions relating to the treatment 
of third-country nationals legally employed as workers in the territory of 
the other party, OJ 2017 L 181/4. 
118 European Council conclusions, EUCO 34/16, 15 December 2016. Much 
to the chagrin of Ukraine, the Netherlands blocked the aspirational text of 
the final communiqué of the bilateral summit of 12-13 July 2017. In his 
remarks to the press after the summit, European Council President 
remedied that flaw by saying: “[F]or me the key sentence of the 
Association Agreement still is that, and I quote, ‘the European Union 
acknowledges the European aspirations of Ukraine and welcomes its 
European choice’.” 
119  On the legal character of the intergovernmental Decision and an 
analysis of its substance, see P. Van Elsuwege, “Towards a Solution for 
the Ratification Conundrum of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement?”, 
Verfassungsblog, 16 December 2016. On the attachment of Ukraine to its 
European identity and the aim to establish closer association with the EU, 
see below, sub-section 4.1.2. 
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EU’s position in that context. The Decision simply does not affect 
such a scenario. 
Secondly, the references in the Vilnius Declaration, the 
European Council statement and the legally binding AA/DCFTA 
with Georgia are to “Eastern European countries”. 120  Whereas 
diplomats have stressed the difference in language employed in 
Article 49 TEU, which allows “any European state” to apply for 
EU membership, in an attempt to deny EaP countries any promise 
of future membership, the emphasis in the EU Treaty is squarely 
on the “European” character of the applicant,121 rather than the 
regional specificity thereof (northern, eastern, southern, western). 
The qualifier “any” in Article 49 underscores this point. Similarly, 
the reference to statehood in Article 49 TEU is not to disqualify 
“countries” from EU membership but to underline that the EU will 
only take in entities that meet the basic conditions of effective 
control of a government over a territory and the people living 
                                                        
120 Van der Loo, Van Elsuwege and Petrov point to the obvious parallels 
between the EU-Ukraine AA and the first sentence of Article 49 TEU 
when “the preamble states that ‘this Agreement shall not prejudice and 
leaves open future developments in EU-Ukraine relations’. In addition, 
the parties explicitly recognise that ‘Ukraine as a European country shares 
a common history and common values with the Member States of the EU 
and is committed to promoting those values’. (…) Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that several provisions reflect the formulation of the 
Copenhagen pre-accession criteria. Political criteria such as stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are not only defined as ‘essential elements’ of the 
AA, they are also an integral part of the established political dialogue and 
cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice. At the economic 
level, the establishment of a DCFTA is regarded as an instrument ‘to 
complete [Ukraine’s] transition into a functioning market economy’. Last 
but not least, the entire agreement is based on Ukraine’s commitment to 
achieve ‘convergence with the EU in political, economic and legal areas’”. 
See G. Van der Loo, P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, “The EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument”, 
EUI Working Papers LAW 2014/09, at 10. 
121  See the European Commission’s rejection of the membership 
application of Morocco in 1987 for not fulfilling the geographical 
condition. 
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thereon, and the recognition by the member states of such entities’ 
independence and sovereignty under Articles 1 and 3 of the 1933 
Montevideo Convention. 
Finally, close inspection and comparison of the AAs with the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), the main 
contractual arrangement for the countries of the Western Balkans, 
in the following sub-sections reveals that although the preamble 
and the political part of the agreements are substantially different, 
the material substance of the DCFTAs and the sectoral cooperation 
exhibit a large number of legally binding commitments. These are, 
for example, rights and obligations; timeframes for the reduction 
of duties; and the uniform application of standards and the 
approximation of legislation, which in parts even exceed those in 
the SAAs, both in scope of coverage and level of enforcement. The 
result is a blurring of the boundaries between the material scope of 
the most prestigious instruments to define the relationship 
between the EU and the pre-accession states, on the one hand, and 
relations between the EU and 
EaP countries, on the other. 
This finding, in itself, raises 
questions about the levels of 
association the Union offers to 
European states that aspire to 
membership. If, indeed, the 
material differences between 
the newest generation of AAs 
and SAAs are marginal, can 
the EU and its member states legitimately maintain the political 
schism between ‘enlargement’ and ‘enlargement lite’ policies 
towards those neighbouring countries that could theoretically 




If the material differences between the 
newest generation of AAs and SAAs 
are marginal, can the EU and its 
member states maintain the political 
schism between ‘enlargement’ and 
‘enlargement lite’ policies towards  
neighbouring countries that could 
meet all EU membership conditions? 
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4.1.1.1 Prelude to a comparative analysis 
Rather than sift through each of the three existing 
AAs/DCFTAs,122  the analysis in the following sub-sections will 
focus on the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA.123 As mentioned before, this 
agreement not only formed the template for the other two AAs, its 
DCFTA was also the object of intense scrutiny in trilateral 
negotiations with Russia. 124  Instead of re-hashing the in-depth 
research already conducted on the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA with 
the aim of placing them in the 
context of the EU’s external 
relations accords, 125  this study 
tries to assess the breadth and 
depth of the agreement in a 
comparative analysis with the 
EU-Serbia SAA.126  As such, this 
study not only reveals the unique 
                                                        
122  For textual commentaries and contextual analysis of each of the 
agreements, see M. Emerson and V. Movchan (eds), Deepening EU-
Ukrainian Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Kyiv/London: 
CEPS/IER/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, M. Emerson and T. Kovziridze 
(eds), Deepening EU-Georgian Relations. What, Why and How?, 
Brussels/Tbilisi/London: CEPS/Reformatics/Rowman and Littlefield, 
2016, and M. Emerson and D. Cenusa (eds), Deepening EU-Moldovan 
Relations. What, Why and How?, Brussels/Chisinau/London: 
CEPS/ExpertGrup/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016. For deeper analyses 
into contentious issue areas covered by the AA/DCFTAs, see the policy 
papers produced in the context of the “3DCFTAs” project at 
http://www.3dcftas.eu. 
123 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the one part, and Ukraine of the other part, OJ 2014 L 161. 
124 See M. Emerson, “2016 Already Puts its Mark on the Economic Map of 
Europe”, CEPS Essay No. 22, Brussels, 8 January 2016, at 4. 
125 See G. Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area: A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration 
Without Membership, Leiden: Brill, 2016.  
126  Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic 
of Serbia, of the other part, OJ 2013 L 278/16. 
This study reveals the unique and 
innovative features of the AAs and 
presents evidence to counter the 
claim that, as neighbouring states, 
the EaP countries cannot have an 
EU membership perspective. 
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and innovative features of the AAs but also presents empirical 
evidence that counters the political claim that, as neighbouring 
states, the EaP countries cannot have an EU membership 
perspective. 
The case selection central to this part of the study is 
motivated by a range of factors that make the comparison of the 
EU-Ukraine AA with the EU-Serbia SAA more suitable than that 
concluded with any other (potential) candidate country. Firstly, 
negotiations of the agreements were launched in the same 
geopolitical and economic timeframe: talks with Serbia 
commenced in October 2005, and those with Ukraine barely 1.5 
years later in March 2007.127  The leaderships of both countries 
share the desire to see their countries accede to the European 
Union.128 Secondly, like Ukraine, Serbia is a strategically located 
country with a major impact on regional stability and cooperation. 
It experienced a similarly bumpy trajectory of territorial instability 
and political development in its transition from authoritarianism 
to democracy. Thirdly, both countries have small economies,129 
                                                        
127 Macedonia negotiated and signed its SAAs much earlier (2000 resp. 
2001) and progress on its pre-accession track has been seriously hampered 
by, inter alia, the name dispute with Greece. Albania (SAA 2003-06) and 
Montenegro (SAA 2005-07) are small states with very differently 
structured economies. Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAA 2005-08) is not a 
functioning state. Kosovo (SAA 2013-15) is not recognised as a sovereign 
state by five EU member states. Turkey has been associated to the EU 
since 1963, has a customs union with it since 1995 and started accession 
negotiations in 2005, which have not led anywhere. 
128  Serbia has been granted candidate country status in 2012. Both 
President Poroshenko and Prime Ministers Yatsenyuk and Groysman 
have said that they would like Ukraine to join the EU. See, e.g., R. 
Balmforth and N. Zinets, “Ukraine president sets 2020 as EU target date, 
defends peace plan”, Reuters, 25 September 2014; “Groysman: Ukraine 
will join EU within 10 years”, Euractiv, 1 July 2016. 
129  In 2014, the GDP value of Serbia represented 0.07% of the world 
economy; that of Ukraine 0.21%; that of Belgium 0.86%; and Poland 
0.88%. Data available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com.   
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comparably low levels of economic and social development130 and 
rule of law.131 Fourthly, Ukraine and Serbia participate in regional 
institutional arrangements that influence their sectoral cooperation 
with the EU. For instance, both Serbia and Ukraine are parties to 
the European Energy Community Treaty (since 2005 and 2011, 
respectively) and the Danube River Protection Convention (since 
2003 and 1994, respectively). 
Of course, there are also differences to consider. Firstly, 
whereas the EU-Serbia SAA was signed in April 2008 – i.e. before 
the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, the Russo-
Georgian war of August 2008 and the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty dragged out talks with Ukraine until June 2014. One 
should, therefore, expect these differences to have impacted on the 
form and substance of the agreements. Secondly, there is the 
asymmetrical status to be considered in the area of trade. Ukraine 
has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 
16 May 2008, whereas membership negotiations with Serbia are 
still underway. Conversely, the trade part of the EU-Serbia SAA, 
which has been provisionally applied since 1 February 2010 by 
way of an Interim Agreement, envisages the creation of an FTA 
within a period of six years after the entry into force of the SAA, 
i.e. by 1 September 2019. The DCFTA part of the EU-Ukraine AA, 
on the other hand, has been provisionally applied since 1 January 
2016 and will be gradually implemented over a transitional period 
of ten years after the entry into force of the AA on 1 September 
2017. Thirdly, the countries differ in size: Ukraine’s territory is 
                                                        
130 Data for 2014 are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD: GDP per capita at nominal values: Serbia - $6,152, 
Ukraine - $3,082. The average GDP per capita for the EU was $30,240, 
with Bulgaria closing the ranks at $ 7,712. 
131 Data for 2014 are available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-
law-index: Serbia ranked 60th out of 102 countries with a score of 0.50; 
Ukraine ranked 70th with a score of 0.48. Bulgaria ranked 45th with 0.55. 
Ukraine scores worse in terms of perceptions of corruption. Data are 
available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014: Serbia ranked 78th 
out of 175 countries with a score of 41; Ukraine ranked 142th with a score 
of 26 (0: highly corrupt; 100: clean). Bulgaria and Romania both ranked 
69th, with a score of 43. 
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seven times bigger than Serbia’s and the former’s population 
exceeds the latter’s by more than six times. 
Despite the differences there are good grounds for a 
comparative study between the EU’s agreements with Ukraine and 
Serbia. The similarities in the countries’ aspirations vis-à-vis the 
EU and their comparable socio-economic indicators outweigh the 
differences in absolute terms, especially for the limited analytical 
purposes outlined above. The comparison will start with an 
analysis of the objectives, general principles and institutional 
provisions of the agreements, including matters of political 
dialogue, dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms, i.e. the 
areas where the AAs and SAAs diverge the most (section 4.1.2). 
What follows is a comparative study of the socio-economic core of 
the agreements (section 4.1.3), including an analysis of the trade-
related commitments, the clauses concerning investment and 
competition policy, and the expected levels of sectoral cooperation. 
4.1.2  Objectives, general principles and institutional 
arrangements 
4.1.2.1 Objectives 
The main objectives of the EU-Ukraine AA and the EU-Serbia SAA 
are comprehensive and very similar in nature. Both types of 
agreements establish an association (Articles 1(1)) whose aim it is 
to, inter alia, provide a framework for political dialogue to enhance 
bilateral relations and create stability in the region (Articles 1(2)). 
Both agreements also aim to strengthen the rule of law; enhance 
cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security (including 
democracy, human rights, minority rights, and fundamental 
freedoms); and contribute to the political, economic and 
institutional stability of each partner country. The latter is 
envisaged by supporting efforts to 
complete the transition of Ukraine 
and Serbia into a functioning market 
economy and developing a free trade 
area by means of progressive 
approximation of their legislation to 
that of the European Union. 
Both types of agreements 
establish an association that 
aims to provide a framework 
for political dialogue to 
enhance bilateral relations and 
create stability in the region. 
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Whereas the substance of the main objectives of the 
agreements is largely the same, the tone in which they are 
expressed is fundamentally different. The EU-Ukraine AA lists the 
aims in a spirit of a mutually beneficial association. The EU-Serbia 
SAA, however, presents the association’s objectives in a much 
more directive manner, i.e. as serving Serbia to up its game in all 
of the abovementioned areas. The differences in approach flow 
from the ultimate declarations of intent laid down in the preamble 
of each of the agreements. The preamble of the SAA with Serbia 
explicitly confirms  
the European Union’s readiness to integrate Serbia to the 
fullest possible extent into the political and economic 
mainstream of Europe and its status as a potential 
candidate for EU membership 
when the criteria are fulfilled.132 The preamble of the EU-Ukraine 
AA, on the other hand, merely notes “the importance Ukraine 
attaches to its European identity” and “welcomes its European 
choice”. The extent of its political association and economic 
integration with the EU, however, is said to be dependent on the 
implementation of the commitments outlined in the agreement. 
4.1.2.2 General principles 
After the objectives, the general principles of the agreements are 
laid down. The Agreement with Serbia stresses that respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and the fight 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitute 
the basis and “essential elements” of the cooperation with the EU 
(Preamble, Articles 2 and 3), the violation of which can provide 
sufficient ground for the suspension of the SAA by either of the 
parties (Article 133). Here too, the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine goes further by stating that “the common values on which 
the European Union is built – namely democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – are (…) 
essential elements of this Agreement,”133 as are the “[p]romotion of 
                                                        
132 See also Art. 17 SAA: “Cooperation with other countries candidate for 
EU accession (…)”. Emphasis added. 
133 Preamble. Emphasis added. 
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respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
inviolability of borders and independence, as well as countering 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials 
and their means of delivery (…)” (Article 2)134, the violation of 
which can lead to the suspension of the agreement (Article 478). 
The insistence in the EU-Ukraine AA on the principles of 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and 
independence is backed up by, inter alia, Article 483 which 
envisages the application of the 
Agreement on the entire 
territory of Ukraine. The EU 
and its member states thus 
stand united with Ukraine in 
the rejection of Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea and 
Moscow’s support for the 
breakaway regions in the 
Donbas. 135  Conversely, the 
territorial application of the EU-Serbia SAA does not extend to 
Kosovo (Article 135, second paragraph). While the secession of 
Kosovo was the result of years of internal colonisation and 
ultimately the war inflicted upon it by Serbia, as well as a decade 
                                                        
134 Articles 2 AA and SAA both confirm the commitment of the parties to 
the respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as defined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of 
Paris for a New Europe, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The SAA also mentions the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe in its preamble and cooperation with the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The AA refers in 
Article 8 to cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
135 It remains to be seen, however, if, when and how the AA’s legal fiction 
of full territorial application will be turned into reality. Perhaps the 
gradual application of the EU-Moldova DCFTA over the territory of 
Transnistria gives rise to hope. See D. Cenusa, “European integration of 
Moldova in 2015: Top five failures and five hopes”, IPN, 28 December 
2015 (http://ipn.md/en/integrare-europeana/73828).  
Article 483 envisages the application 
of the Agreement on the entire 
territory of Ukraine. The EU and its 
member states thus stand united 
with Ukraine in the rejection of 
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea 
and Moscow’s support for the 
breakaway regions in the Donbas. 
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of international governance by the United Nations,136 it is striking 
that Belgrade agreed to this territorial exclusion prior to the 
International Court of Justice’s opinion on the legality under 
international law of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence.137 
Another asymmetry in this regard is that the SAA confirms 
the right of return for refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) and the protection of their property rights (Preamble and 
Article 82), but the AA only refers to the protection of refugees 
under international law in the context of bilateral dialogue on 
asylum issues (Article 16(2)c) and the cooperation in combating 
terrorism (Articles 13 and 23).138 While the legacy of the Balkan 
wars of the 1990s explains the heightened insistence of the EU to 
commit Serbia to resolve refugee and IDP issues, 139  it is 
noteworthy that such references in the EU-Ukraine AA were not 
sharpened up in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea 
and the destabilisation of parts of the Donbas in the spring of 
2014.140 This was primarily due to the EU’s fear that re-opening 
negotiations to reflect post-Maidan developments might have 
brought back Ukraine’s claim for an EU membership prospect 
                                                        
136 The SAA refers to “Kosovo under United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244”. 
137  See ICJ, “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo”, Advisory Opinion, 
22 July 2010, I.C.J. Reports 2010, at 403. 
138 The Preamble and Articles 7, 84 and 87 of the EU-Serbia SAA do not 
create that nexus between combating terrorism and the respect for 
international refugee law. 
139 In the same vein, Articles 5 and 6 SAA stress the need for Serbia to 
engage in good neighbourly relations. See also the discussion on Title III, 
below. 
140  Ukraine-EU Summit, 19 December 2011, Joint Statement, 18835/11 
(Presse 513): “a common understanding on the full text of the Association 
Agreement was reached”. Legal scrubbing of the political part of the AA 
part was closed with its initialling until 30 March 2012, while the 
scrubbing of the more technical DCFTA part of the agreement continued 
until 19 July 2012, when it was initialled. 
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with a vengeance. 141  Then again, on the specific point of the 
protection of rights of IDPs, the negotiators may have considered it 
sufficient that respect for international refugee law was made 
conditional in light of the consequences of the fight against the 
‘terrorist’ separatists in Crimea and Donbas. 
4.1.2.3 Political dialogue 
Both agreements do, however, testify to the ambition to hold 
further regular political dialogue on international issues, taking 
account of the CFSP. But the EU-Ukraine AA again goes further 
when it speaks of “gradual” (Article 7) and “ever-closer 
convergence of bilateral, regional and international positions of 
mutual interest” (Preamble), taking account of the CFSP – 
“including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)”, a 
policy not mentioned in the SAA with (then potential) candidate 
country Serbia. 
Titles II of the AA and the SAA provide the legal bases for 
fora to conduct political dialogue at the ministerial, parliamentary 
and senior official levels. Article 5 of the AA codifies the practice 
of organising a bilateral presidential summit between the EU and 
Ukraine. Such political dialogue not only aims to facilitate the 
alignment of Ukraine’s and Serbia’s foreign and security policies 
with the CFSP.142 Contrary to the agreement with Serbia, Article 6 
of the EU-Ukraine AA also extends political dialogue to the 
obligation which rests on both parties to 
cooperate in order to ensure that their internal policies 
are based on principles common to the Parties, in 
                                                        
141  Van der Loo alludes to the EU’s fear of ‘losing’ the agreement 
altogether; hence the insistence of the Foreign Affairs Councils of 10 and 
20 February 2014, i.e. before President Yanukovych fled the country, on 
signing the agreement “as soon as Ukraine [was] ready”. See G. Van der 
Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area: A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration Without Membership, 
Leiden: Brill, 2016, pp. 116-7. 
142 And not just on a bilateral basis: the agreements also oblige the parties 
to use the contacts through the diplomatic channel in third countries and 
multilateral organisations (UN, OSCE, Council of Europe). 
56  THE ENP TOOLBOX 
 
particular stability and effectiveness of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law, and on respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular as 
referred to in Article 14 of this Agreement.  
As such, Title II of the AA makes inroads in Title III on Justice, 
Freedom and Security, and foresees bilateral political dialogue on 
Ukrainian institutional reform “at all levels in the areas of 
administration in general and law enforcement and the 
administration of justice in particular.” This includes reforms 
aimed at “strengthening the judiciary, improving its efficiency, 
safeguarding its independence and impartiality, and combating 
corruption” (Article 14), discussed below. 
Besides rapprochement to the EU, the political dialogue with 
Serbia is largely focused on encouraging regional integration and 
geared towards meeting the goals identified in the Thessaloniki 
agenda, which guides the countries of the Western Balkans all the 
way to future accession (Article 11(c)).143 In this respect, Title II of 
the SAA flows into Title III on Regional Cooperation. Under this 
heading, the EU commits itself to support cross-border projects 
while Serbia agrees to promote good neighbourly relations and 
fully implement the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA). In this respect, Serbian regional integration has three 
main dimensions. Firstly, Serbia must sign bilateral conventions on 
regional political, economic and justice cooperation with the other 
countries that signed an SAA (Article 15). Secondly, Serbia has to 
pursue cooperation in other fields with the states that are subject to 
the Stabilisation and Association Process (Article 16). And thirdly, 
Serbia commits to conclude conventions with non-SAA candidate 
countries such as Turkey (Article 17). As such, the SAA contains a 
strong emphasis on all-encompassing forms of regional 
cooperation. By linking Serbia up to its neighbours in southeast 
Europe, the agreement aims to create an indissoluble web of 
connections that render borders less important and that will allow 
the Western Balkans to more easily integrate into the EU. 
                                                        
143 Another forum for such dialogue is the EU-Western Balkans Summit 
(Article 13 SAA). 
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By contrast, the EU-Ukraine AA 
lacks a true comprehensive regional 
character and only focuses on cross-
border conflict resolution.144 
4.1.2.4 Justice, Freedom and Security 
As noted above, Title III of the EU-Ukraine AA deals with Justice, 
Freedom and Security. In terms of structure and content, it is very 
similar to Title VII of the EU-Serbia SAA. Both titles cover a broad 
spectrum of issues, including cooperation on migration, asylum 
and border management, movement of persons, the fight against 
terrorism, organised crime and corruption. The Agreement with 
Ukraine also covers judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
matters (Article 24 AA).  
The wording of the provisions on the consolidation of the 
rule of law, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
reinforcement of institutions, such as judiciary, are almost 
identical, with the difference that the EU-Ukraine AA also 
specifically calls for improvements to the functioning of the police. 
Both agreements address the issue of protection of personal data 
and require Serbia and Ukraine to adopt European and 
international standards. 
Although the AA with Ukraine deals with “mobility” (not 
“movement”, as in the SAA) of workers (Article 18), the details are 
left for Ukraine and the individual EU member states to be 
developed by way of bilateral agreements.145 Under the heading 
“movement of persons” (Article 19), the AA speaks of “mobility” 
in relation to short-term movement (visas) in the context of the 
parties’ commitment to fully implement the visa facilitation and 
                                                        
144  Under the heading ‘Regional Stability’, Article 9(1) AA states that 
“[T]he Parties shall intensify their joint efforts to promote stability, 
security and democratic development in their common neighbourhood, 
and in particular to work together for the peaceful settlement of regional 
conflicts.” 
145 Arguably, the term ‘movement of workers’ was avoided in the AA as it 
might have too integrationist a connotation. 
The AA lacks a truly regional 
character and only focuses on 
cross-border conflict resolution. 
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readmission agreements and take gradual steps on the road to visa 
liberalisation. Whereas issues of border management, legal 
migration, control of illegal migration and development of return 
policies are slightly more detailed in the AA with Ukraine 
(compare Article 16 AA with Article 82 SAA), most of these 
provisions in both the agreements deal with these matters in 
summary and declaratory terms. In essence, they rely on 
association agendas, visa liberalisation action plans and anti-
corruption strategies to give ‘hands and feet’ to the treaty 
commitments.  
That said, several of the agreements’ other chapters have a 
direct bearing on the above-mentioned issues. Combating 
corruption is a case in point.146 Not only is it emphasised in the 
bilateral cooperation in the management of public finances and the 
fight against fraud; 147  the fight against corruption is also 
mainstreamed in the trade-related parts of the agreements. Both 
Ukraine and Serbia are obliged to 
gradually approximate their 
legislation to the EU rules on 
competition, state aid and public 
procurement, and are bound to 
introduce institutional 
arrangements that bring their 
domestic licensing systems in sectoral areas of cooperation such as 
transport and veterinary, sanitary and phytosanitary inspections, 
in line with EU standards and thus make it harder for them to be 
captured by narrow, private and criminal interests.148 
                                                        
146 Cf. Articles 20 and 22 AA; and Articles 84 and 86 SAA. 
147 Here too, the AA is more developed. Compare Chapter III of Title V 
and Title VI AA with Articles 46 and 100 SAA. 
148 Also, anticorruption measures form a cornerstone of the VLAP and 
effective implementation of anti-corruption measures is a mandatory 
precondition for the provision of the EU assistance under macro-financial 
assistance programmes. 
Combating fraud and corruption 
is emphasised in the management 
of public finances. It is also 
mainstreamed in the trade-related 
parts of the agreements. 
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4.1.2.5 Institutional arrangements 
In line with standard practice in the association agreements 
concluded by the EU with third states, the AA and the SAA 
establish an Association Council and a Stabilisation and 
Association Council, respectively, composed on the basis of parity. 
These councils have the role of supervising and monitoring the 
implementation of the agreements and are endowed with the 
power to make binding decisions (Articles 463 AA and 121 
SAA).149 Where appropriate, the parties may invite other bodies to 
join. The SAA, for instance, mentions the European Investment 
Bank (Article 120). 
Both councils establish committees and bodies to assist 
them, and meet in different configurations (Articles 464 AA and 
122, SAA), for instance that of trade. Both agreements include a 
similar provision on the establishment of Parliamentary 
Committees (Articles 467 AA and 125 SAA). However, the AA is 
more detailed on the role of this Committee, stating that it may 
request relevant information from the Association Council and 
make recommendations to it. The Association Council is also 
obliged to inform the Parliamentary Committee of relevant 
decisions and recommendations (cf. Article 468 AA). 
One of the major differences in the institutional set-up 
relates to the involvement of civil society: this is set out in the EU-
Ukraine AA whereas the EU-Serbia SAA remains silent on the 
issue. The AA obliges the parties to 
promote regular meetings with 
representatives of civil society to 
inform them and to collect their input 
through establishing a Civil Society 
Platform consisting of the members of 
the European Economic and Social Committee and representatives 
of Ukraine’s civil society (Articles 469-470). 
Another striking difference between the two types of 
agreement is the inclusion in the AA of a monitoring clause 
                                                        
149 The AA also empowers the Association Council to update or amend 
Annexes to the agreement. 
The AA obliges the parties to 
promote meetings with civil 
society representatives to 
collect their input. 
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(Article 473), again absent from the SAA. The provision prescribes 
sophisticated mechanisms (e.g. reporting, on-the-spot missions) to 
monitor the implementation of the AA. 
The agreements’ provisions on access to courts and 
administrative organs, measures related to essential security 
interests and non-discrimination are almost identical. The articles 
on fulfilment of the obligations, dispute settlement and the 
appropriate measures in case of non-fulfilment are also 
remarkably similar. Essentially, both agreements prescribe a classic 
quasi-judicial system of dispute settlement, based on consultations 
within the (Stabilisation and) Association Council (Articles 477 AA 
and 130 SAA). By way of derogation of this procedure, disputes 
concerning the interpretation, implementation, or good faith 
application of trade and trade-related matters of the AA are 
exclusively governed by Chapter 14 of Title IV of the AA. In case 
consultations in the Trade Committee fail, then this Title either 
prescribes an arbitration procedure (Article 306-326) or settlement 
by way of a mediation mechanism (Articles 327-336), depending 
on the matters at hand.150 Protocol 7 to the SAA also provides for 
an arbitration procedure in the case of failure of the Stabilisation 
and Association Council to resolve disputes on trade-related 
matters, but does not envisage a mediation mechanism. 
 
 
                                                        
150 Cf. Article 304: “The provisions of this Chapter apply in respect to any 
dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of 
Title IV of this Agreement except as otherwise expressly provided.” 
Article 327(2): “This Chapter shall apply to any measure falling under the 
scope of Chapter 1 of Title IV of this Agreement (National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods) adversely affecting trade between the Parties.” 
Article 327(3): “This Chapter shall not apply to measures falling under 
Chapter 6 (Establishment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce), 
Chapter 7 (Current Payments and Movement of Capital), Chapter 8 
(Public Procurement), Chapter 9 (Intellectual Property) and Chapter 13 
(Trade and Sustainable Development) of this Agreement. The Trade 
Committee may, after due consideration, decide that this mechanism 
should apply to any of these sectors.” 
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It is clear from the comparative analysis above that in many 
aspects the EU-Ukraine AA is in fact more advanced than the EU-
Serbia SAA, despite the absence of the former’s professed end 
goal, i.e. full integration into the EU. But when ignoring 
preambular references to any type of finalité, as well as acronyms 
and place names related to the 
Western Balkan region, one might 
well have designated the SAA as the 
less integrationist agreement 
befitting a less intense type of 
relationship envisaged by the EU 
within the ENP. This qualitative 
difference in the political part of the agreements is not simply a 
matter of the new AAs having been negotiated more recently, thus 
reflecting an EU endowed with a host of new competences in a 
post-Lisbon context. As we will see from the following 
investigation into the trade-related aspects of the agreements, the 
material substance of the AA also reveals a higher level of 
ambition by the parties to integrate Ukraine faster into the internal 
market of the EU. 
4.1.3 Trade and trade-related aspects 
4.1.3.1 Introduction 
The hard core of the (Stabilisation and) Association Agreements is 
formed by the trade and trade-related provisions. Based on 
previous research of preferential trade agreements,151 this study 
makes a threefold distinction between sets of policy areas and 
matching provisions in the EU-Ukraine AA and the EU-Serbia 
SAA. Firstly, it identifies a number of policy areas covered by the 
agreements that are suitable for comparison. In total, one can 
identify 45 policy areas that are explicitly mentioned in either of 
                                                        
151  See H. Horn, P. Mavroidis and A. Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An 
Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements”, The World 
Economy 33, 2010, pp. 1565-1588. The author is particularly grateful to 
Ievgen Vorobiov for his research assistance on this part of the study. 
The material substance of the 
AA reveals a higher level of 
ambition by the parties to 
integrate Ukraine faster into the 
internal market of the EU. 
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the agreements, although they might not always be shared. For 
instance, a chapter on cooperation on the Danube River was 
included in the EU-Ukraine AA but not in the EU-Serbia SAA, 
even if a much larger stretch of the Danube crosses Serbia. For ease 
of reference, provisions in the same policy area have been merged 
when they did not have the same wording but conveyed the same 
meaning (cf., “safeguard clauses” in the SAA and “safeguard 
measures” in the AA). As Serbia is expected to become a WTO 
member soon, one can adhere to the existing members’ 
commitments under WTO agreements to distinguish policy areas 
in which legally binding commitments build upon those already 
agreed to at the multilateral level (‘WTO+’) and those which deal 
with issues that go beyond the current WTO mandate altogether 
(i.e. ‘WTOx’). One could also operationalise this variable by 
counting the number of EU legislative acts to be implemented by a 
partner country in a particular policy area within a certain period 
of time. As we will see, the details on implementation vary 
between the two agreements, although not always in the way one 
would expect. 
Secondly, the ‘depth’ of the obligations undertaken by the 
EU’s partner countries in legally binding provisions is examined. 
A distinction is made between legal obligations, soft law and non-
legally binding commitments. For instance, wording akin to “the 
Parties shall” denotes the highest form of the legally binding 
nature of provisions, while the phrase “agree to cooperate” does 
not possess this quality. 
Thirdly, the study determines the legal enforceability of the 
provisions in the identified policy areas of the agreements. 
Considering the limitations of academic literature in 
operationalising this concept, it is necessary to introduce a rule of 
thumb similar to that used by the authors of, e.g., the 2011 World 
Trade Report:152 if a commitment is subject to arbitration, i.e. the 
most ‘judicial’ of the dispute settlement mechanisms outlined by 
the respective agreement, then it will be deemed legally 
enforceable. This criterion serves as an enabler to distinguish 
                                                        
152  The report is available at https://www.wto.org/English/res_e/ 
booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf. 
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between ‘harder’ and ‘softer’ commitments within the broader 
category of legally binding provisions. 
4.1.3.2 WTO+ obligations 
In seven policy domains WTO+ commitments are the hallmark of 
both the EU-Ukraine AA and the EU-Serbia SAA: industrial goods, 
agricultural goods, customs administration, trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), export taxes, state aid and 
safeguard mechanisms. As mentioned above, the arrangements for 
implementation of the commitments in these seven fields vary 
between the agreements. 
First of all, the introduction of a full free trade regime in 
industrial goods with Serbia was agreed to take place within a 
period of six years after the entry into force of the SAA, while 
Ukraine’s schedule for reducing or eliminating the bound import 
tariffs is stretched over a period of ten years (Annex 1). Both 
agreements contain standstill provisions that prohibit the increase 
of import duties by either of the parties, except for cases 
authorised under the dispute settlement mechanism. 
Second, we observe a different approach in the regulation of 
trade in agricultural products. Under the EU-Serbia SAA, the FTA 
in agricultural goods is established by a gradual decrease in the 
country’s tariff rates over a six-year period in return for the EU 
abolishing all quantitative restrictions and eliminating import 
tariff rates on all agricultural products upon entry into force of the 
agreement, except under several headings (“EU concessions”). The 
EU-Ukraine AA, however, is more restrictive: a number of crucial 
agricultural imports to the EU are subject to tariff rate quotas, 
which provide for tariff rate increases for the volumes of Ukraine’s 
agricultural exports exceeding specified quotas. 
Third, commitments on customs administration cooperation 
exhibit different levels of depth: while Serbia and the EU are free 
to decide on all practical measures and arrangements necessary for 
the application of Protocol 6 on mutual administrative assistance 
in customs matters (Article 13 of the Protocol), Ukraine is bound 
by strict commitments to implement the EU Customs Code and 
partially approximate its legislation to three other relevant 
regulations within three years of entry into force of the agreement 
(Annex XV). 
64  THE ENP TOOLBOX 
 
Fourth, and in line with the previous point, the legally 
binding commitments stemming from the TRIPS Agreement have 
broader scope and greater depth in the EU-Ukraine AA. In 
accordance with TRIPS, the EU-Serbia SAA establishes the most-
favoured nation (MFN regime in intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection (Article 75(2)). In effect, the SAA charges Serbia with the 
enforcement of TRIPS provisions, despite the fact that the country 
is not a party to TRIPS: “Serbia shall take the necessary measures 
in order to guarantee no later than five years after entry into force 
of this Agreement a level of protection of intellectual, industrial 
and commercial property rights similar to that existing in the 
Community, including effective means of enforcing such rights” 
(Article 75(3)). Also, the SAA introduces some TRIPS provisions in 
the relevant FTA chapters. For instance, Article 33 invokes the 
protection of geographical indications for EU agricultural products 
and foodstuffs (compare Article 22 TRIPS), with detailed lists in 
the Protocols to the SAA. 
In a separate chapter, the EU-Ukraine AA ‘gold-plates’ 
TRIPS provisions: “The provisions of [Chapter 9] shall 
complement and further specify the rights and obligations 
between the Parties under the TRIPS Agreement and other 
international treaties in the field of intellectual property” (Article 
158(1)). As such, certain TRIPS commitments are beefed up in the 
AA: for instance, the minimum duration of trademark protection 
under TRIPS (seven years) has been increased to ten years in the 
AA (Article 200). Also, Ukraine takes on commitments to enforce 
IPR within strict time limits: for instance, its authorities are 
supposed to prevent counterfeit goods from being released to the 
market within three years of the agreement’s entry into force. 
Unlike the EU-Serbia SAA, market access for goods comes with 
more IPR strings attached, as the AA fully covers such TRIPS 
sections as computer programmes, trademark registration, 
geographical indications, industrial designs and patents. 
Moreover, institutional arrangements are set up in the AA to 
ensure compliance with these binding provisions (cf. Article 211 
on the Sub-Committee on Geographical Indications). 
Fifth, several legally binding commitments aim to limit 
competition-distorting practices in bilateral trade. Export duties 
and taxes are explicitly prohibited by both Agreements. Similarly, 
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state aid is prohibited in cases where it distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain firms or goods from either 
of the parties. An inventory of aid schemes has to be submitted by 
both partners: within four years for Serbia and within five years 
for Ukraine. Provisions permitting state aid for restructuring its 
steel industry are included in the SAA (Protocol 5) but not in the 
AA. 
Sixth, precautionary mechanisms are introduced in 
compliance with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, even for 
Serbia, which is not (yet) a member. The implementation of 
safeguard measures is regulated by institutional arrangements set 
out in detail in both agreements: such measures have to be notified 
to the (Stabilisation and) Association Council or, as the case may 
be, to the Trade Committee. Two specific exemptions are granted 
to Ukraine, not to Serbia: firstly, Ukraine is excluded from the EU’s 
application of safeguard measures as long as it meets the definition 
of a “developing country” in the WTO Agreement; secondly, Kyiv 
is allowed to apply safeguard measures to imports of passenger 
cars during a 15-year period after the AA’s entry into force, but not 
in parallel to the use of measures under the WTO Agreement. 
In sum, whereas the scope of FTA coverage appears to be 
broader in the EU-Serbia SAA (notably, with regard to trade in 
agricultural goods), the EU-Ukraine AA contains legally 
enforceable provisions on 
domestic reforms in major 
trade-related policy areas 
(particularly in customs 
administration and IPR) 
which go significantly beyond 
those negotiated by the EU 
with Serbia in the framework 
of the SAA. 
Analysis of another group of WTO+ policy areas such as 
technical barriers to trade (TBT), trade in services and access to 
public procurement reveals the existence of non-binding 
provisions for Serbia yet legally binding provisions for Ukraine. 
Technical barriers to trade are illustrative in this regard. While the 
SAA only contains a general obligation for Serbia to bring its 
legislation into conformity with EU standards within a period of 
Whereas the scope of FTA coverage 
appears to be broader in the EU-Serbia 
SAA, the EU-Ukraine AA contains 
legally enforceable provisions on 
domestic reforms in major trade-related 
policy areas that go beyond those 
negotiated by the EU with Serbia. 
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six years (Article 77), Annex III to the EU-Ukraine AA contains a 
schedule for achieving conformity with 31 technical regulations 
within a period of five years after the entry into force of the 
agreement. Horizontal legislation has to be transposed within the 
first year and the bulk of sectoral regulations for specific categories 
of products within two to three years after entry into force. 
Furthermore, apart from the duty to gradually develop 
cooperation in the sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) domain 
(Article 97), concrete measures are not listed in the SAA. The AA, 
on the other hand, enters into great detail on the bilateral 
cooperation in this field. It provides for the approximation of 
Ukraine’s SPS rules and standards to a host of EU acts within fixed 
timeframes (Article 56 and Annex III), after which the SPS Sub-
Committee is supposed to declare the “recognition of 
equivalence”. The AA establishes a verification process and 
defines the principles of certification for plants and animals. 
Overall, the SPS provisions are much more dirigiste in the AA with 
Ukraine than in Serbia’s SAA. 
The liberalisation of trade in services represents a significant 
part in both agreements, yet with differing sectoral scope and legal 
depth. On the one hand, the SAA proclaims consistency with 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
thereby establishing conditions for liberalising trade in services. 
But, apart from the regime in establishing subsidiaries, the SAA 
lacks legally binding provisions conducive to liberalisation going 
beyond the provisions of the GATS. The AA with Ukraine, on the 
other hand, provides mechanisms for granting mutual access in 
service markets, on the condition of compliance with a range of 
legally binding EU provisions for different sectors of the services 
industry. 
This WTO+ policy area (liberalisation of trade in services) 
merits more detailed analysis. Firstly, both agreements provide for 
the choice between the MFN regime or the national treatment in 
the establishment of subsidiaries and branches, depending on 
whichever is better for the parties. Both agreements contain a 
number of reservations, however, such as special terms for 
providing financial services in Serbia (Annex VI), or the 
prohibition of land sale to foreign firms in Ukraine (Annex XVI-A). 
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Secondly, the agreements’ provisions on the supply of 
services differ in their degree of implementation. The SAA 
declares a progressive liberalisation in service supply between 
Serbia and the EU (Article 59), yet falls short of explicitly linking 
market access to the approximation of legislation (no 
conditionality). Also, special terms are drawn up for trade in 
transport services. Conversely, national treatment in supply of 
services in the AA with Ukraine includes a number of exemptions 
such as business services, financial services, communication, 
education, construction and engineering. Importantly, the EU-
Ukraine AA establishes a sophisticated 
framework for granting access to 
service markets, conditional on the 
implementation of the EU acquis. After 
Ukraine submits a roadmap, the 
European Commission carries out an 
assessment and adopts a decision 
within the AA’s Trade Committee on 
granting Ukrainian service suppliers 
EU market access. As such, Ukraine would, for instance, have to 
implement 58 EU regulations for financial services within eight 
years of the AA’s entry into force, with the bulk of them due in the 
first four years, before gaining access to the EU’s financial service 
market. 
Finally, access to public procurement markets is covered by 
both agreements, yet again with different degrees of legal 
enforceability. The SAA grants Serbian companies access to 
contract award procedures in the EU on the same conditions as for 
EU companies (Article 74), and does not outline the scope and 
schedule for adopting the EU’s legislation regulating procurement 
in the utilities sector. The AA, however, presents a more 
sophisticated and concrete approach altogether: Ukraine’s access 
to specific types of public procurement contracts in the EU hinges 
entirely on Kyiv’s phased approximation of legislation to certain 
EU directives or parts thereof: for instance, in order to supply 
goods to local authorities, Ukraine is expected to first implement 
the basic elements of two directives specified in the Annex of the 
AA. The break-down of the five phases within eight years appears 
in Table 1 below. 
National treatment in supply 
of services in the AA with 
Ukraine includes exemptions 
such as business services, 
financial services, 
communication, education, 
construction and engineering. 
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6 months N/A Compliance 
with “basic 
standards” 
Supplies to central 
government 






Supplies to state, 
regional and local 
authorities 
governed by public 
law 




Supplies for all 
“contracting 
entities” 
6 years 2004/18/EC Remaining ones Service & works for 
all contracting 
authorities 
8 years 2004/17/EC Remaining ones Service & works for 
all entities in the 
utilities sector 
Source: Annex XVII to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. 
Typically, a two-tier control mechanism is provided for in Article 
152 AA. At first, Ukraine publishes a ‘Roadmap for 
approximation’, which is reviewed by the AA’s Trade Committee 
to ascertain compliance with the acquis. If the Roadmap is 
approved, then Ukraine may proceed with implementation and 
only then gain access to public procurement markets in the EU. 
4.1.3.3 WTOx commitments 
Both agreements contain legally binding commitments dealing 
with issues that go beyond the current WTO mandate altogether 
(i.e. ‘WTOx’), in particular in investment protection and 
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competition policy. These will be discussed first. A longer checklist 
of WTOx commitments will then follow. 
The short articles on investment in the SAA and AA are 
almost identical, as the parties take on a binding commitment to 
“ensure the free movement of capital relating to direct investments 
made in companies” abroad and “the liquidation or repatriation of 
these [investments] and of any profit stemming there from” 
(Articles 63 SAA and 145 AA). Hence, the agreements provide for 
a basic level of investment protection in both Serbia and Ukraine, 
one that goes beyond the provisions of the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS). 
As the basis for EU norm promotion in competition policy, 
the SAA and AA share the explicit prohibition of two practices 
deemed incompatible with the terms of the agreements: i) the 
prevention, restriction and distortion of competition by 
undertakings; and ii) abuse of a dominant position by 
undertakings. The AA adds a third prohibition to this list: 
“concentrations between undertakings, which result in 
monopolization or a substantial restriction of competition in the 
market (…) of either Party” (Article 254), particularly salient in 
Ukrainian industries dominated by oligarchs. 
The requirement to establish an independent competition 
authority is included in both agreements. While Serbia is required 
to “establish an operationally independent authority” (Article 73), 
Ukraine is expected to “maintain authorities responsible for and 
appropriately equipped for the effective enforcement of the above-
mentioned competition laws” (Article 255). Again, Ukraine’s 
commitments to institution-building are more specific than 
Serbia’s, in particular with regard to the procedures to be applied 
by a competition authority. Similarly, both agreements mention 
the approximation of laws and enforcement practices to those of 
the EU, yet with varying degrees of specificity. The SAA does not 
contain explicit schedules and only stipulates that the 
“approximation […] shall gradually extend to all the elements of 
the Community acquis referred to in this Agreement by the end of 
the transitional period” (Article 72). The AA, however, is more 
prescriptive in terms of the number of regulations and is stricter in 
the time limits (three years) within which Ukraine is expected to 
approximate its competition laws and enforcement practices 
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(Article 256). Hence, Ukraine has to fully comply with the core EU 
acquis on competition within a time period half that allocated to 
Serbia, in spite of Kyiv’s poorer administrative capacities and 
possibly bigger problem of veto holders’ resistance to change in 
this policy area. 
Further, both the SAA and AA stipulate that Serbia and 
Ukraine have to “adjust” state monopolies of a commercial 
character in order to prevent discriminatory measures “regarding 
the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed” in 
the EU and its partners (Articles 43 SAA and 258 AA). The 
timetables for such adjustment vary: within three years for Serbia 
and within five years for Ukraine, possibly because such 
commercial state monopolies (in, e.g., telecoms and rail transport) 
are significantly larger in Ukraine. 
Finally, provisions in this WTOx policy area bear a 
particularly high degree of enforceability. Except for the duty on 
the approximation of law (Article 256), all of the provisions of the 
EU-Ukraine are eligible for parties’ recourse to the agreement’s 
dispute settlement mechanism (incl. arbitration). The SAA contains 
no explicit mention of either a dispute settlement mechanism in 
this policy area, or any exemptions from it.153 
A comparative analysis of the agreements reveals that 12 
WTOx provisions are legally binding for Ukraine under the AA 
but not binding for Serbia or are omitted in the SAA. These 
provisions are mostly concentrated in sectoral policy areas, most 
notably movement of capital, energy, transport and environment. 
Each is discussed in turn. 
The AA chapter on movement of capital prohibits 
restrictions of current account payments between the EU and 
Ukraine. The chapter requires Ukraine to approximate its law to 
six provisions of the TFEU on the movement of capital (Articles 63-
                                                        
153 Given that the EU cannot use the WTO’s DSM vis-à-vis Serbia, one 
would assume that the use of the general dispute settlement mechanism 
under the SAA (i.e. via the quasi-judicial Stabilisation and Association 
Council) in competition-related matters would not be a particularly 
efficient vehicle for the EU to determine trade-related issues after the 
entry into force of the free trade area. 
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66) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Article 75) 
within a period of four years. The review mechanism by the Trade 
Committee is enshrined in Article 147. 
Energy issues are covered in a separate chapter of the AA, 
whereas both the SAA and the AA refer to compliance with the 
Energy Community Treaty (ECT), to which Serbia and Ukraine are 
signatories. The AA goes much further, though, and reiterates that 
Ukraine has to approximate its law to the EU’s acquis on electricity, 
gas, oil, energy efficiency and nuclear energy (see Figure 1 below). 
A number of practices, such as dual pricing, customs duties and 
quantitative restrictions on energy sources are banned by the AA. 
Importantly, energy is subject to the dispute settlement mechanism 
of the AA, which strengthens the legal enforceability of these 
provisions. Yet it is useful to bear in mind that, according to 
Article 278 AA, the provisions of the ECT prevail in case of conflict 
with the AA. 
Unlike the declaratory statements on “cooperation in the 
environmental field” in the SAA, the AA requires Ukraine to 
implement 50 EU regulations on environment within a period of 
ten years, most of them to be adopted within the first six years of 
the Agreement’s entry into force. A similar pattern is observed in 
the provisions on transport: while the SAA is limited to a general 
declaration, the AA provides for Ukraine’s approximation of 
legislation to 51 EU regulations within the first eight years of the 
Agreement’s entry into force (see Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1. Expected dynamics of Ukraine’s approximation to EU 
regulations in three policy areas 
 
Note: The horizontal axis stands for years after entry into force, the vertical 
one measures the number of regulations to be implemented. 
Source: CEPS. 
In other WTOx areas, the AA focuses heavily on Ukraine’s reforms 
to improve the regulatory environment for business undertakings. 
Firstly, the AA’s provisions on employment and social policy aim 
at the systematic alignment of Ukraine’s labour legislation to the 
existing EU regulations. This stands in contrast to the SAA, which 
only invokes an intention to “progressively harmonise” Serbia’s 
law with EU regulations on working conditions. The AA, however, 
explicitly requires Ukraine to approximate its law to EU standards 
and practices set out in 40 regulations, within a period of ten years 
of the AA’s entry into force, with regulatory acts on labour law 
and anti-discrimination due in the first four years (see Table 2 
below). 154  Further, the AA Chapter on ‘Company Law and 
Corporate Governance’ provides for Ukraine’s implementation of 
14 EU regulations within four years of its entry into force. By 
                                                        
154  Then again, the provisions on Ukraine’s intention to implement 
standards of International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions appear 
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comparison, the EU-Serbia SAA contains no legally binding 
provisions in this policy area. Similarly, the AA provision on 
“gradual approximation to the [EU] taxation structure” is 
translated into Ukraine’s commitment to implement six Council 
directives on indirect taxation within a two-to-five year period of 
the AA’s entry into force. 
The remaining WTOx policy areas contain fewer legally 
binding provisions for Ukraine. Then again, they are barely 
covered by the SAA at all. The AA requires Ukraine to implement 
15 EU regulations on consumer protection and nine regulations 
concerning public health within three years of the AA’s entry into 
force, as well as one audiovisual policy directive. In terms of anti-
corruption measures, the AA sections on financial cooperation 
contain Ukraine’s commitment to implement the anti-fraud 
provisions of the 1995 EU Convention on Protection of EC 
financial interests and its two protocols within five years. By 
contrast, the SAA contains only declaratory statements on Serbia’s 
alignment with EU standards on consumer protection and has no 
provisions whatsoever on public health or the fight against 
corruption. 
Table 2. Comparison of SAA and AA provisions on law approximation in 
the 11 WTOx areas 
Policy Area SAA, Serbia AA, Ukraine 
Movement of 
Capital 
Serbia to adjust “its 
legislation concerning 
the acquisition of real 
estate” (Art. 63.3) within 
4 years 
Ukraine to approximate law to 
TFEU Articles on capital flow 
freedom to be applied within 4 
years (Art. 147) 
Energy None: Art. 109: 
“cooperation” on 
integrating Serbia into 
EU energy markets 
Approximation to EU 
regulations on electricity, gas, 
oil, energy efficiency and 
nuclear in a 2-step process. 
Environment The Parties vouch to 
“develop and strengthen 
their cooperation in the 
[…] field” (Art. 111) 
Approximate Ukraine’s 
legislation to 50 EU 
regulations within 10 years 
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Transport Cooperation to focus on 
“priority areas related to 
the Community acquis in 
the field of transport” 
and aim at supporting 
“multi-modal 
infrastructures in 
connection with the 
main Trans-European 
networks” (Art. 108) 
Approximation to the EU 
acquis, including on: 
▪ Road transport: 13 
regulations within 3-7 years; 
▪ Railway: 13 regulations 
within 8 years; 
▪ Maritime transport: 20 




Serbia to “progressively 
harmonise its legislation 
to that of the 
Community in the fields 
of working conditions, 
notably on health and 
safety at work, and 
equal opportunities." 
(Art. 79) 
Ukraine to implement EU 
standards and practices on:  
▪ Labour law: 7 regulations 
within 3-4 years; 
▪ Anti-discrimination: 6 
regulations within 3-4 years 








Internal Control and 
External Audit to focus 
on acquis (Art. 92) 
▪ 10 EU regulations on 
company law & governance; 
▪ 4 regulations on annual and 
consolidated accounts of 
companies. 
Taxation Reform of Serbia’s fiscal 
system declared (Art 
100) 
6 Council Directives on 
indirect taxation to be 
implemented within 2-5 years 
Consumer 
Protection 
Parties “shall cooperate 
in order to align the 
standards of consumer 
protection in Serbia” 
(Art 78) 
Approximation to 15 EU 
regulations within 3 years, 
while avoiding “trade 
barriers” 




Declare to “cooperate” 
(Art. 104) 
1 directive within 2 years 
Anti-
Corruption 
None Provisions of the 1995 EU 
Convention on protection of 
EC financial interests and its 2 
protocols within 5 years 
Source: CEPS. 
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE ENP  75 
Provisions on agriculture and rural development are rather 
shallow in both agreements. The SAA prescribes agricultural 
cooperation between the EU and Serbia in general and soft legal 
terms (Article 97).155 The AA with Ukraine contains an indicative 
list of 59 regulations on quality policy and marketing standards for 
plants and animal products, but does not prescribe specific 
schedules for implementing them. The legal enforceability of these 
AA commitments thus remains rather weak. 
In a typical example of ‘legal inflation’ of the preferential 
trade agreements,156 the AA and SAA contain a number of WTOx 
policy areas with non-legally binding provisions. These 19 areas 
mostly cover sectoral policies based on shared or supporting 
competences for which there is less EU-wide regulation: macro-
economic cooperation; public finances; industrial and enterprise 
policies; fisheries; science and technology; information society; 
statistics; personal data protection; space; mining and metals; 
tourism; civil society cooperation; regional policies; education; 
training and youth; culture sports and the Danube River. 
Provisions in these policy areas are limited to declaratory 
statements on “cooperation” with no approximation of legislation 
or recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism to enforce their 
implementation. 
Overall, WTOx provisions in the AA have a distinct twofold 
quality: while each of the policy areas establishes (often numerous) 
legally binding commitments for Ukraine, only some domains 
(competition, energy) are covered by the sophisticated dispute 
settlement mechanism in the EU-Ukraine AA to embolden their 
legal enforceability, whereas other areas might suffer from 
insufficient enforcement, because for many provisions the EU’s 
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism appears rather 
limited. 
                                                        
155 The 2011 World Trade Report also ascribes a legally binding nature to 
this provision in the SAA. 
156  See H. Horn, P. Mavroidis and A. Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An 
Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements”, The World 
Economy 33, 2010, pp. 1565-1588. 
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4.1.4  Similar agreements, different rewards 
The comparative analysis of the EU-Ukraine AA with the EU-
Serbia AA has revealed a more nuanced picture than what is 
commonly believed. Whereas the EU’s political discourse is 
carefully directed towards a denial of a membership perspective 
for EaP countries, the breadth and depth of Ukraine’s ‘model’ 
Association Agreement, both in its political part (cf. section 4.1.2) 
and its provisions regulating the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (cf. section 4.1.3), indicate that the contractual 
relationship offered by the EU to an EaP member like Ukraine is in 
fact largely similar to – and in many parts more advanced than – 
that provided for in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with a candidate country like Serbia. 
The EU uses a template with the same legal basis, a similar 
structure and comparable substance to shape its relations with 
candidates and three Eastern Partnership countries (Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia). The 
main political goal of the 
association to the EU is to seek 
alignment with the Union’s 
foreign and security policies. 
The main difference is that the 
SAA pushes regional 
cooperation much more than the 
AA does. The commitments vis-
à-vis justice, freedom and 
security are similar, sometimes even identical in structure and 
substance. The EU uses the same template for the chapters on the 
rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; protection of personal data; border management, 
asylum and migration; money laundering and terrorism financing; 
cooperation in the fight against illegal drugs, the fight against 
crime and corruption; and cooperation in combating terrorism. 
However, on the issue of migration the AA with Ukraine is both 
more restrictive and ‘modern’. It details, among other things, 
preventive measures. 
The DCFTA and the sectoral cooperation provided for in the 
AA with Ukraine exhibit a number of legally binding 
commitments that exceed those in the SAA with Serbia in terms of 
WTOx provisions in the AA have a 
twofold quality: while each policy 
area establishes legally binding 
commitments, only some domains 
(competition, energy) are covered by 
the sophisticated dispute settlement 
mechanism to embolden their legal 
enforceability. 
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scope, speed of legal approximation and level of enforcement. 
Ukraine’s commitments in most WTO+ policy areas (TBT, customs 
administration, IPR and trade in services) outweigh those 
enshrined in the SAA for Serbia, which is (at least in theory) 
reciprocated by wider and faster access to the EU market in 
industrial goods. Importantly, some WTOx policy areas 
(competition, energy) are covered by the sophisticated dispute 
settlement mechanism in the EU-Ukraine AA to embolden their 
legal enforceability, whereas such arrangements are missing in the 
SAA. Other provisions of WTOx policy areas (environment, 
transport, employment, etc.) prescribe the transposition of the EU’s 
acquis into Ukraine’s legislation according to strict schedules set 
out in the AA’s annexes. 
The EU-Ukraine AA has been said to represent an 
innovative legal instrument in shaping the EU’s relations with 
third countries that do not have or do not seek a membership 
prospect, different from the Swiss model, the European Economic 
Area (EEA) or CEFTA. 157  Yet, an in-depth legal comparison 
between the AA and the SAA 
reveals that – au fond – Ukraine has 
reason to believe that it is more than 
just a neighbour of the EU, even if it 
currently does not have an EU 
membership perspective. 
                                                        
157 See G. Van der Loo, P. Van Elsuwege and R. Petrov, “The EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement: Assessment of an Innovative Legal Instrument”, 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/09. The AA/DCFTA model even serves 
as a source of inspiration for the future framework agreement between 
the EU and the UK post-Brexit. See M. Emerson, “After the UK’s Brexit 
White Paper: What’s the next move towards a CFTA?”, CEPS Policy 
Insights No. 2017/07, Brussels, 27 February 2017. 
An in-depth legal comparison 
between the AA and the SAA 
reveals that Ukraine has reason 
to believe that it is more than 
just a neighbour of the EU, even 
if it currently does not have an 
EU membership perspective. 
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4.2 EU conditionality: Plus ça change… 
4.2.1 … plus c’est la même chose? 
As mentioned before, the revolutionary upheaval in the southern 
Mediterranean, and the disparate reforms in the Eastern 
Partnership countries, pushed the EU to revise its approach to the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011.158 While EU institutions 
and member states were caught completely by surprise by the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring in December 2010, a comprehensive 
discussion on the future of the ENP by the Council had – 
coincidentally – already been planned for the first half of 2011.159 
In March, the European Commission and the High Representative 
presented some ideas on a new “partnership for democracy and 
shared prosperity” with the southern Mediterranean.160  In May 
2011, they published a full review of the ENP.161 Presented as a 
strategic response to the sea change brought about by the revolts 
in the southern neighbourhood, the joint communication declared 
that: 
                                                        
158 This section builds on S. Blockmans, “The ENP and ‘More for More’ 
Conditionality: plus que ça change…”, in G. Fernandez Arribas, K. Pieters 
and T. Takács, (eds), The European Union’s relations with the Southern-
Mediterranean in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, CLEER Working Paper 
No. 2013/3, 53-60. 
159 See Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, 27 July 2010, para 1. 
160  Joint Communication to the European Council, the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, “A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”, COM(2011) 200 
final, 8 March 2011, Brussels. 
161  European Commission and High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood”, COM(2011) 303 final, 25 May 2011, Brussels. 
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The new approach must be based on mutual 
accountability and a shared commitment to the universal 
values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.162 
Apart from the emphasis on the shared commitment to 
“universal”– i.e. not just EU – values, the ‘new approach’ to the 
ENP reiterated the priority areas of democracy promotion, 
reinforcing the rule of law, improving the respect of human rights, 
judicial reform, administrative capacity-building, fighting 
corruption and economic modernisation, but placed them more 
firmly on the footing provided for by the principle of 
conditionality: the more (and faster) neighbouring countries 
progress in implementing internal reforms, the more (and faster) 
support they receive from the EU. The main tool to apply this 
‘more for more’ principle would be the new European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI),163  “increasingly policy-driven 
and provid[ing] for increased differentiation, more flexibility, 
stricter conditionality and incentives for best performers, reflecting 
the ambition of each partnership”.164 On top of this, “enhanced 
support [was projected] in various forms, including increased 
funding for social and economic development, larger programmes 
for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), 165  greater market 
access, increased EIB financing in support of investments; and 
greater facilitation of mobility.”166 The revised ENP also foresaw 
                                                        
162 COM (2011) 303 final, at 2 and 3. Note the stress on the universality of 
the values (to be) adhered to, i.e. not the EU character thereof as 
prescribed by Article 8 TEU. 
163 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood 
Instrument, OJ 2014 L 77/27. 
164 COM (2011) 303 final, at 20. 
165 A new Comprehensive Institution Building Programme aimed to fast-
track institution-building and reform in a limited number of key areas 
linked to the envisaged AAs and DCFTAs. Funded through the ENPI 
budget (2011-2013), €167 million was earmarked for this instrument. 
166 It has rightly been argued that, for all the welcome focus on democratic 
reform, the ‘more for more’ principle would make life more difficult for 
the governments of post-revolutionary countries like Tunisia. After all, 
the EU declared its intention to use more conditionality on the transitional 
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that these preferential commitments would be tailored to the needs 
of each country and to the regional context. 167 
After the proclamation of the new approach to the ENP in 
reaction to the Arab uprisings, the Union allocated hundreds of 
millions of euro in new grants for the southern neighbourhood, in 
particular through the SPRING programme (Support for 
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive 
Growth) which provided 
additional funding to southern 
countries showing commitment to 
reform. 168  Under the multiannual 
financial framework for 2014-20, 
the SPRING programme was 
replaced by the ‘Umbrella’ 
programme, which falls under the ENI.169 Yet the sums of money 
mustered on top of the ENI (and its predecessor)170 have proved to 
                                                                                                                       
governments than on the dictators who preceded them. See R. Balfour, 
cited in T. Vogel, “A reflection on old, failed neighbourhood policies”, 
European Voice, 26 May 2011. See also K. Raik, “Between Conditionality 
and Engagement: Revisiting the EU’s Democracy Promotion in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood”, FIIA Briefing Paper No. 80, April 2011. 
167  See, e.g., Joint Staff Working Document, “Implementation of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in 2012 Regional Report: Eastern 
Partnership”, SWD(2013) 85 final, 20 March 2013. 
168 Tunisia was the first beneficiary, with €20 million allocated to it in 
2011, €80 million in 2012 and €55 million in 2013. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/tunisia/in
dex_en.htm. Other countries too received funding, e.g., €90 million for 
President Mursi’s Egypt to support the government’s socio-economic 
reform programme; €70 million to Jordan (to support the electoral 
process, to assist in reforming the justice system, to support efforts 
targeting public finance management, education and social security, and 
to help develop the private sector and foster job creation), in tranches of 
30 and 40 million, with the second tranche linked to progress achieved in 
terms of democratic reform. For these and other details, see “EU’s 
response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of-Play after Two Years”, Press 
release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013. 
169  All ENI programming documents can be found at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/financing-the-
 
The sums of money mustered on 
top of the ENI are too small an 
incentive to secure a successful 
transition from authoritarianism 
to democratic rule in the southern 
Mediterranean. 
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be too small an incentive to bolster the change needed to secure a 
successful transition from authoritarianism to democratic rule in 
the southern Mediterranean.171 Evidence has been provided by the 
European Court of Auditors (ECA) in a number of country-specific 
and thematic reports on EU spending in ENP, either partly or 
wholly funded via the ENI.172 
Re-branding the ENP’s incentive-based principle of 
conditionality as ‘more for more’ could not disguise the fact that 
                                                                                                                       
enp/index_en.htm. Again, Tunisia was the first recipient, with €50 
million in 2014 and €71.8 million in 2015. 
170 The ENI is worth €15.4 billion from 2014-20. The overall allocation for 
its predecessor, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI), amounted to almost €12 billion for 2007-13. This 
represented an increase of 32%, in real terms, compared with the amount 
available over the period 2000-06 for its predecessors, the MEDA and 
TACIS programmes. 
171 This observation takes account of the sums generated through the EU-
induced Task Forces for Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt, preferential loans 
granted by the EIB, and other collateral funding mechanisms. 
172 In June 2013, in a special report on EU Cooperation with Egypt in the 
Field of Governance, the ECA wrote that the new approach to the ENP 
had not yet been applied. See http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ 
ECADocuments/SR13_04/SR13_04_EN.PDF. In December 2013, in its 
Special Report on EU financial support for the Palestinian Authority, the 
ECA noted that the Commission had pledged to tie funding to recipient 
countries’ progress on reforms (‘more for more’) but had not yet applied 
this to the occupied Palestinian territories. See 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/NewsItem.aspx?nid=4383. An 
ECA special report published in March 2016 assessed EU external 
migration spending in neighbourhood countries until 2014 and found that 
project objectives were often set in general terms, which made it difficult 
to assess results. Of 23 migrant readmission and return projects assessed 
by the Court, five relating to readmission were assessed as “rather small 
and [...] limited in their results and effectiveness”. See 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=35674. An 
ECA special report published in September 2016 on EU assistance for 
strengthening public administration in Moldova concluded that EU funds 
had had limited impact. See http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/ 
DocItem.aspx?did=37235. 
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the EU aligned the ENP’s main steering mechanism with that 
employed in the enlargement context. Yet, unlike the pre-accession 
strategy for aspirant members, the 2011 review of the ENP did not 
set out which precise cooperation and association prospects the EU 
might provide to the agents of reform in return for a cleaner 
human rights record, legal approximation, administrative shake-
ups and tightening belts. The EU essentially promised more of the 
same, thus reincarnating a weak pledge that – barring a few 
exceptions – has not been reciprocated by commitments of the 
region’s leaders to democracy, the rule of law or political 
reforms.173 
That said, the revised ENP did offer one major innovation by 
indicating more clearly than ever before that the EU would make 
use of “targeted sanctions and other policy measures” (e.g. 
restructure or even reduce financial aid and sectoral support) for 
those governments of neighbouring countries engaged in 
violations of human rights and democracy standards, or which 
delay, impede or abandon reform plans.174 With the development 
of the principle of ‘less for less’, the EU implicitly declared an end 
to the days that it would simply acquiesce to a retreat on reforms 
by ENP partners. However, six years after its introduction, the EU 
has precious little impact to show in terms of implementing the 
                                                        
173 See T. Schumacher, “The European Union and Democracy Promotion: 
Readjusting to the Arab Spring”, in L. Saki (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the 
Arab Spring: Rethinking Democracy, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 559-573. 
For a practical illustration, see P. Pawlak and X. Kurowska, “EU foreign 
policy: more for more, or more of the same?”, EU Observer, 5 October 
2011: “Rather than paying respect to 'more for more' the EU has again 
turned a blind eye to lack of reform in the region by promising more 
financial support and deeper political cooperation. The EU's $9 billion 
offer to Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, in exchange for 
freeing political prisoners and holding free and fair elections (which do 
not require him to step down) is surprising, to say the least, and is an 
unfortunate reminder of the mistakes the EU has made in the southern 
Mediterranean. This suggests that the EU has not learnt from the Arab 
Spring and will continue to repeat the same mistakes it has made in the 
past.” 
174 COM (2011) 303 final, at 3. 
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ENP’s variant of negative conditionality, either in the eastern 
neighbourhood (e.g. Belarus, Azerbaijan),175  or in the southern 
Mediterranean (e.g. Algeria, Egypt).176 One cannot be sure that the 
recent changes in Belarus are a 
direct result of the EU’s policy of 
conditionality. 177  In its 
application, the so-called ‘new 
approach’ to the ENP of 2011 
was rather a continuation of the 
EU’s inability and – in some cases – lack of political will to exert 
effective influence on (quasi-)authoritarian regimes to establish 
and maintain democratic reforms.178 
Politics aside, design is partly to blame for this. Both the 
Joint Communication of 8 March 2011 and the May 2011 strategy 
paper read more “like blueprints for an assistance programme”179 
                                                        
175  Whereas the EU has upheld and strengthened its support to civil 
society organisations operating in or outside of these countries (cf. the 
launch of the European Dialogue on Modernisation, JOIN (2012) 14 final, 
15 May 2012, at 4), it has also been said to apply double standards in its 
negative conditionality. Whereas the Belarusian regime has been the 
subject of a whole raft of EU sanctions, Azerbaijan’s authoritarian 
leadership has felt little negative impact from the EU’s approach. The 
Union’s main interest in the region continues to be stability of energy 
supplies and security. The Aliyev regime has allowed European energy 
companies to explore its hydrocarbon riches and supported Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan transit projects, thus bypassing Russia. 
176  There was a total absence of references to ‘less for less’ in the 
Commission’s ‘EU's response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after 
Two Years’, Press release A 70/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013. 
177 Cf. section 2.2. 
178  See, more generally, J. Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: 
Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
179 See T. Schumacher, “New Neighbors, Old Formulas? The ENP One 
Year After the Start of the Arab Spring”, in A. Garcia Schmidt and J. Fritz-
Vannahme (eds), The Arab Spring: One Year After Transformation Dynamics, 
Prospects for Democratization and the Future of Arab-European Cooperation, 
Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, pp. 87-104, at 90.  
Six years after its introduction, the 
EU has precious little impact to show 
in terms of implementing the ENP’s 
variant of negative conditionality. 
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than strategic documents that offer a coherent approach to a 
clearly defined reform agenda designed to foster “deep 
democracy” – yet another new label to distinguish the supposedly 
novel approach from the EU’s hapless efforts to promote 
democracy prior to the Arab revolts. 180  Going by its path 
dependency in the formulation of external relations,181 it is hardly 
surprising that, in the revised ENP, the Union again proceeded 
from the assumption that governments in the southern 
Mediterranean were ready to embark on a path of reform 
accompanied by EU assistance.182 The 2011 approach to the ENP 
failed to acknowledge the complexity of the transition processes in 
the Arab Mediterranean, the impact of the simmering conflicts 
between secular and religious movements, or the wide variety of 
other drivers for change in each of the countries concerned.183 This 
lesson took a while to sink in. Whereas the 2011 strategy paper still 
contained an unjustified assumption that the Tunisian 
                                                        
180 According to the May 2011 Joint Communication, the notion of ‘deep 
democracy’ includes “free and fair elections; freedom of association, 
expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law 
administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting 
against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including 
the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and 
security forces”. In February 2012, High Representative Ashton and 
European Commissioner Füle sent an unpublished letter to EU Foreign 
Ministers on the operation of conditionality that added “the respect of 
other human rights” to this shopping list. In subsequent documents 
supporting the ENP, the concept of ‘deep democracy’ was used 
interchangeably with concepts such as democratisation, democratic 
transformation, and transition. 
181 See, e.g., T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human 
Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
182 See Schumacher, op. cit.; and E. Adler and B. Crawford, “Normative 
Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, in E. Adler, F. Bicchi, B. Crawford and 
R. Del Sarto (eds), The Convergence of Civilizations; Constructing the 
Mediterranean Region, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. 
183 See Schumacher (2012), op. cit., at 91. 
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development model could be projected to the other countries in 
the region, the 2012 ENP strategy paper’s references to the 
changed internal power structures in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and 
Libya show that the Commission and the European External 
Action Service had learned to distinguish the countries’ different 
pathways to transition.184 The 2014 ENP strategy paper did not 
mention the incentive-based approach at all, which could have 
been interpreted as a signal by the outgoing Commission that it 
would prefer to keep its hands free in distributing funds more 
quickly to respond to rapidly changing needs of partner countries, 
thus better serving the EU’s (geo)political interests, rather than 
getting caught in its own web of spending rules.185  
And yet the 2015 Review of the ENP produced by the new 
European Commission and High Representative paid lip service to 
the policy’s signature concept of conditionality while at the same 
time proposing the exploration of alternative mechanisms in cases 
where ‘more for more’ does not achieve the desired results: 
The incentive-based approach (“More for More”) has 
been successful in supporting reforms in the fields of 
good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights, where there is a commitment by partners to such 
reforms. However, it has not proven a sufficiently strong 
incentive to create a commitment to reform, where there 
is not the political will. In these cases, the EU will explore 
more effective ways to make its case for fundamental 
reforms with partners, including through engagement 
with civil, economic and social actors.186 
Another structural shortcoming of the revised neighbourhood 
framework to be mentioned in this context relates to what has 
already been noted in passing, i.e. that the ENP’s key documents 
still apply the diplomatic langue de bois which characterised the 
‘old’ policy. For instance, whereas the ill-defined term ‘deep 
                                                        
184 See T. Schumacher, “The European Union and Democracy Promotion: 
Readjusting to the Arab Spring”, in L. Saki (ed.), Routledge Handbook of the 
Arab Spring: Rethinking Democracy, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 559-573. 
185 See further section 4.4. 
186 JOIN (2015) 50 final, 18 November 2015, at 5. 
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democracy’ was not retained in the 2015 ENP Review, the 
philosophy of it lives on in the EU’s pursuit of “deeper 
engagement with civil society and social partners” and “deeper 
relations (…) based on shared values”.187  
Moreover, the EU’s mechanisms to assess whether the 
situation in neighbouring countries matches the revised 
terminology, or is apt for the application thereof, represent a 
return to the status quo ante primarily donor-driven aid policies 
based on programmatic priorities and levels of absorption 
capacity.188 As such, the EU continues to rely on the same kind of 
instruments as before, even if it chooses to change the labels to 
reflect a sense of ‘joint ownership’ in the definition thereof. This 
applies to the joint documents that were discussed over the course 
of 2016 to determine the shape of 
bilateral relations on the basis of 
the recommendations contained 
in the 2015 ENP Review. These 
‘Partnership Priorities’ call for 
reform efforts at the micro level 
but suffer from the same terminological vagueness and lack of 
legal bite as their parent document.189 This ‘new’ ENP instrument 
                                                        
187 Ibid., at 3 and 4. See also in the context of migration and mobility, at 15. 
188 A parallel logic as applied back in 2012 by N. Gros-Verheyde, “Quand 
le «more and more» devient un «peu plus» c’est tout!”, Bruxelles2, 8 July 
2012: “Sous couvert de préciser quelques termes et déplacer quelques 
mots, on place en fait la barre «démocratique» beaucoup plus bas. 
L’incitation différenciée liée aux critères d’avancée dans les réformes, en 
particulier à l’approfondissement de la construction démocratique, fait 
ainsi place aux seuls critères, classiques, d’absorption et aux priorités 
«définies d’un commun accord». L’incitation démocratique est renvoyée à 
un soutien «additionnel».” 
189 See, e.g., Decision No 1/2016 of the EU-Lebanon Association Council 
agreeing on EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities, UE-RL 3001/16, 11 
November 2016; Annex to the Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
Union position within the Association Council set up by the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, with regard to the 
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thus “stands in the tradition of bilateral action plans (…) 
representing nothing more than a vague and incomplete 
catalog[ue] of reforms”.190  To some extent this observation also 
applies to the DCFTAs, which at a basic level differentiate between 
neighbouring countries191  but otherwise serve the EU’s interest 
and push model characteristics, irrespective of the differing 
conditions in partner countries. Arguably, this “confirms 
accusations of duplicity levelled against the ENP over the 
years”.192 
Finally, as Witney and Dworkin have argued, the success of 
political reforms and democratic transformation in neighbouring 
countries is inextricably linked to improving the micro- and 
macro-economic situation, i.e. people’s living conditions. In view 
of the prevailing socio-economic problems in almost all Arab 
Mediterranean states, a concern about the consistent 
implementation of the ENP would therefore pertain to the 
potential systematic application of ‘less for less’ conditionality, 
even if the principle goes under a different name. Given that the 
reduction or cancellation of external support negatively impacts 
social welfare, it is worth limiting or excluding the application of 
                                                                                                                       
adoption of EU- Jordan Partnership Priorities and annexed Compact, 
JOIN(2016) 41 final ANNEX 1, 19 September 2016; and Priorités 
communes de Partenariat entre la République Algérienne Démocratique 
et Populaire (Algérie) et l'Union européenne (UE) au titre de la Politique 
européenne de voisinage révisée, UE-AL 3101/17 ADD 1, 7 March 2017. 
190 Schumacher (2012), op. cit., at 91. This observation was as true in 2012 
as it is now. 
191  For instance, when compared to the EU-Ukraine AA (analysed in 
section 4.1), neither the EU-Georgia AA nor the EU-Moldova AA includes 
a non-discrimination clause for the treatment and mobility of workers (cf. 
Articles 17-18 EU-Ukraine AA). Similarly, these agreements do not 
foresee approximation clauses in the area of competition and “internal 
market treatment” in the area of establishment. Furthermore, the 
provisions on energy and IPR are less detailed in their DCFTAs. Also, 
legal approximation schedules differ, partially depending on the 
eagerness of EaP countries to take on EU commitments, with Moldova 
rushing ahead in an effort to boost its chances for accession. 
192 Schumacher (2012), op. cit., at 92-3. 
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negative ENP conditionality from those economic and social 
sectors that are most affected by structural (e.g. urban vs. rural; 
tourist coastal regions vs. agrarian interior) discrepancies: 
transport, energy, communication, distribution of water, and 
health care. Indeed, the logic of ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ 
could be more deftly evoked in those non-negotiable sectors in 
which reforms primarily affect the (abuse of the) power monopoly 
of a ruling authoritarian regime: political accountability, 
independence of the judiciary and freedom of expression.193 
Whether positive and negative conditionality can ultimately 
produce a leveraging effect and inspire the wholesale reform 
desired by the EU is, to a considerable extent, dependent on the 
prospects offered by the Union to neighbouring states. Whereas 
the eastern neighbours have reason to hope that they may one day 
apply for EU membership, the southern neighbours have no such 
prospect as they are not considered ‘European’ in the sense of 
Article 49 TEU. Thus, the EU has to do more to develop its 
strategic commitment to the south if it wants the ENP to steer any 
reform momentum (revolutionary or otherwise) in the direction of 
the end goal spelled out in Article 8 TEU, i.e. the creation of “an 
area of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness, founded on the 
values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on cooperation”. 
                                                        
193 See N. Witney and A. Dworkin, “A Power Audit of EU-North Africa 
Relations”, ECFR Report, September 2012, at 58: Excluding certain socio-
economic and humanitarian areas from the application of ‘less for less’ 
may prevent potential veto players from exploiting socio-economic 
hardship to block those transformation processes already underway. The 
application of negative conditionality is expendable in these areas, not 
only because it would generate more socio-economic problems and 
contradictions without necessarily generating greater political and 
societal influence over local transition processes, but also because the 
basic socio-economic deficiencies are comparable in all Arab 
Mediterranean neighbouring states. 
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4.2.2  Differentiation and (sub-)regional integration 
In light of the above, and in line with the publication in March 
2015 of the traditional ENP package and a consultation paper that 
recognised past failures and called for fresh ideas to inject sense 
into the policy,194 it comes as no surprise that the 2015 ENP Review 
has abandoned the enlargement methodology in managing the 
EU’s relations with its neighbours. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the post-Lisbon AAs are in many respects more advanced than the 
SAAs with pre-accession countries, 195  new working methods 
proposed by the European Commission and the High 
Representative include the abolition of the annual package of 
country reports to measure progress (or lack thereof) in reforms 
aimed at approximating to the EU model.196 Instead, reporting has 
become more tailor-made to the nature and working calendar of 
each relationship. The three DCFTA countries belonging to the 
Eastern Partnership were the first to receive their (ir)regular 
reports.197 It is striking that these reports are shorter and more 
neutral in tone than the previous annual reports produced in the 
framework of the ENP. This betrays a less prescriptive approach 
by the European Commission and the EEAS. This is even more so 
for the ‘Partnership Priorities’ agreed to with the southern 
neighbours, even if these documents are likely to serve as 
checklists for future (ir)regular reports. 198  In addition to the 
country-specific reporting, regular thematic reports will track 
                                                        
194  The 2015 ENP package is available at http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ 
documents/progress-reports/index_en.htm; Joint Consultation Paper, 
“Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN (2015) 6 final, 4 
March 2015. 
195 See section 4.1. 
196 JOIN (2015) 50 final. 
197  See Joint Staff Working Document, “Association Implementation 
Report on Georgia”, SWD(2016) 423 final, 25 November 2016; Joint Staff 
Working Document, “Association Implementation Report on Ukraine”, 
SWD(2016) 446 final 9 December 2016; and Joint Staff Working Document, 
“Association Implementation Report on Moldova”, SWD(2017) 110 final, 
10 March 2017. 
198 See section 4.2.1. 
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developments in the neighbourhood, for instance on the rule of 
law, fundamental rights and gender equality. 
The ENP’s ‘more for more’ conditionality approach 
introduced in 2011 lay the basis for a stronger differentiation 
between neighbouring countries, one not based on geographic 
criteria but on merit in individual performances, allowing each 
partner country to develop its links with the EU as far as its own 
aspirations, needs and capacities allow. Ironically, this approach 
contained a strong driver to steer the EU further away from its 
constitutional obligation to create the single area of peace and 
prosperity that Article 8 TEU calls for. 
The proposed basis for effective implementation of the ‘new’ 
ENP is increased differentiation and greater mutual ownership. 
The 2015 ENP Review recognises that “not all partners aspire to 
comply with EU rules and standards” and reflects “the wishes of 
each country concerning the nature and scope of its partnership 
with the EU”. 199  Rather than insisting on a one-size-fits-all 
approach based on the EU’s own values, the Union is instead 
offering to refocus relations with its neighbours, seeking “more 
effective ways” to promote “universal values” such as democracy, 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and to 
address the political priorities regarded by both sides as the basis 
of the partnership. As such, the 
‘new’ ENP further debases the 
obligation contained in Article 8 
TEU to build a “special 
relationship with neighbouring 
countries (...) founded on the 
values of the Union”. While the 
EU may insist that adherence to 
universal values is a step towards the longer term goal prescribed 
by Article 8, autocratic rulers in Baku, Cairo and Minsk must have 
secretly welcomed the 2015 Review of the ENP because it caters for 
a less ideological and more transactional relationship with the EU. 
Oil-rich Azerbaijan is the first to benefit from the EU’s new 
Realpolitik: on 14 November 2016, the Council adopted a mandate 
                                                        
199 JOIN (2015) 50 final, at 2. 
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for the European Commission and the High Representative to 
negotiate, on behalf of the EU and its member states, a 
‘comprehensive agreement’ with Azerbaijan to replace the 
outdated PCA from 1996 and offer a “renewed basis for political 
dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation”.200 
For partners who do not wish to pursue the preferred model 
of concluding and implementing an AA/DCFTA, “the EU will 
offer more flexibility where possible, with lighter options, going 
beyond existing preferential or non-preferential trade agreements” 
(e.g. Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance, 
which allow for free movement of industrial products in specific 
sectors).201 This approach is believed to “contribute to the long-
term goal of a wider area of economic prosperity based on [WTO] 
rules and sovereign choices throughout Europe and beyond”.202 
Whereas neighbouring countries have little more in common 
than their geographical proximity to the EU, the Union should 
beware not to swing the ‘one-size-fits-all’ ENP of yesteryear to the 
other extreme of the spectrum tomorrow. The implementation of 
the ‘new’ ENP risks overemphasising bilateral relationships, 
potentially leading to an 
atomisation of EU neighbourhood 
relations and the erosion of 
multilateral frameworks. 
That said, the ‘new’ ENP 
does envisage strengthening the 
Eastern Partnership and the Union 
for the Mediterranean because of 
the desire expressed by neighbouring countries and member states 
alike to keep these multilateral frameworks for dialogue.203 Israel, 
                                                        
200  Council, “EU to launch negotiations on a new agreement with 
Azerbaijan”, Press release 655/16, 14 November 2016. 
201 Ibid., at 8. One could think of an ACAA with Egypt for textiles and 
certain agri-food products. 
202 The implicit reference here is to the possibility of striking up relations 
with the Eurasian Economic Union, once it becomes WTO-compliant. 
203  See, e.g., H. Kostanyan and B. Vandecasteele, “The EuroNest 
Parliamentary Assembly: The European Parliament as a Socializer of its 
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for instance, values the UfM – a glorified framework for project-
based cooperation 204  – since it provides one of the few 
international fora for dialogue on practical matters with the 
Palestinians. While there is some merit in keeping such platforms 
and mechanisms, their impact should not be overemphasised. In 
this respect, it is telling that the 2015 Review of the ENP offered 
precious little extra to beef up the UfM. The EU merely committed 
itself to “give priority, wherever suitable, to the UfM in its regional 
cooperation efforts”.205 
Rather than placing undue weight on existing mechanisms 
that promote limited cross-border projects, but no true regional 
approach to cooperation, the EU institutions included a more 
laudable proposal in their 2015 Review of the ENP, i.e. to develop 
“cross-cutting partnerships” between actors from the public and 
private sectors in the EU, individual member states, accession 
countries such as Turkey, other third countries and international 
organisations to support growth, employment and economic 
modernisation in the neighbourhood. 206  By way of ‘thematic 
frameworks’ on issues such as energy, transport and migration, 
sub-, trans- and interregional connections and interdependencies 
could thus be mobilised in a more functional fashion. Indeed, there 
is merit in clustering neighbouring countries so as to tackle (sub-
/inter-)regional challenges (e.g. illegal migration, security of 
supplies of natural resources like water, oil and gas) and to tap 
                                                                                                                       
Counterparts in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood?”, EU Diplomacy Paper 
No. 5, 2013; H. Kostanyan, “The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern 
Partnership: Four Years on Progress, Challenges and Prospects”, CEPS 
Special Report, Brussels, 2014; R. Youngs, “The European Endowment for 
Democracy, Two Years On”, Carnegie Europe, September 2015; and I. 
Petrova and K. Raube, “Euronest: What Drives Inter-Parliamentary 
Cooperation in the Eastern Partnership?”, European Foreign Affairs Review 
21, 2016, pp. 35–56. 
204 See A. Blanc Altemir and E. Ortiz Hernandez, “The Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM): A critical approach”, Paix et Sécurité Internationales, 
No. 2, 2014, pp. 47-64. 
205 JOIN (2015) 50 final, at 18. 
206 JOIN (2015) 50 final, at 10. 
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into transnational opportunities (e.g., integrated transport and 
agriculture policies).207  
Whereas extending economic integration has been the EU’s 
method of choice to reinforce the ENP, slogans such as 
“everything but the institutions” and “a stake in the internal 
market” have in the past decade proved too vague and 
bureaucratic to rally support from the people on the streets of 
Algiers and Tunis, Amman and Beirut, or to inspire governing 
elites to engage in difficult and politically costly legal, 
administrative and economic reform. One way of resolving this 
lack of incentive is by offering neighbouring countries a real 
prospect of regional integration. Inspired by projects such as the 
Energy Community Treaty, the European Common Aviation Area 
and the Transport Community Treaty, and building on the lessons 
learnt in their preparation and application, the EU should 
explicitly inject “legally binding sectoral multilateralism” into the 
ENP as a means to provide a tangible perspective of real long-term 
benefits from EU cooperation to Mediterranean partners.208 The 
strong symbolism of such well-
defined multilateral projects would 
enhance the political profile of EU 
relations with the southern 
neighbourhood where the Union 
for the Mediterranean has faltered. 
While there is no silver bullet for 
EU engagement with these 
countries, the accession of Ukraine and Moldova to the Energy 
Community Treaty has already illustrated the potential of this 
approach in the Eastern Partnership, even if there is room for 
much more in that framework too.209 
                                                        
207 See, in this respect S. Blockmans and B. Van Vooren, “Revitalizing the 
European ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The case for legally 
binding sectoral multilateralism”, European Foreign Affairs Review 17, 2012, 
pp. 577-604. 
208 Ibid. 
209  As noted in section 4.1, the new Association Agreements hardly 
mention the duty of regional (political and/or economic) cooperation, 
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4.3 Visa liberalisation 
Visa liberalisation is an area of reform where the European Union 
holds considerable leverage over governments of neighbouring 
countries. It could steer some of their reform processes towards EU 
demands before extending the ultimate benefits of visa-free travel. 
Lessons learnt from the experiences of the countries of the Western 
Balkans, which completed the process a few years ago, are being 
put to use in the application of the ENP’s incentive-based 
approach to the visa liberation processes with Eastern Partnership 
countries. 
Following up on the conclusions of the 2011 EaP summit in 
Warsaw, the EU institutions adopted three major documents in 
May 2012. Central to the package, the European Commission and 
the High Representative issued ‘A Roadmap to the Autumn 2013 
Summit’ at Vilnius.210 That Roadmap covered both the bilateral 
and multilateral dimensions of the Eastern Partnership and was 
guided by the EU’s principles of joint ownership, differentiation 
and conditionality. 211  The bilateral dimension comprised three 
central aims of the EU: i) forging new and deeper contractual 
relations between the EU and partner countries; ii) sector-specific 
cooperation that facilitates the participation of partner countries in 
EU programmes and agencies; and iii) supporting the mobility of 
citizens and visa liberalisation in a well-managed and secure 
environment, whereby the mobility of citizens in the partner 
countries would be promoted through visa facilitation and 
                                                                                                                       
certainly when compared to the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
concluded with the countries of the Western Balkans. 
210 JOIN (2012) 13 final, 15 May 2012. 
211 See Joint Staff Working Document “The Eastern Partnership Roadmap 
2012-2013: the multilateral dimension”, SWD (2012) 108 final, 15 May 
2012. Divided into 6 areas of aims the document points out specific 
objectives and projects precise EU support for each in order to meet the 
desired outcome: A. Democracy, good governance and stability, B. 
Economic integration and convergence with EU policies, C. Energy 
security, D. Contacts between people, E. Interaction with other 
stakeholders, F. Horizontal cooperation. 
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readmission agreements as a first step, with a visa-free regime as a 
final goal. 
Visa liberalisation has become one of the centrepieces of the 
EU’s foreign policy towards the countries on its outer periphery. 
Holding out a prospect of visa-free travel proves a powerful 
incentive to encourage reforms in neighbouring states, whose 
citizens want to shop, study, visit 
and work in the EU. The Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan (VLAP) 
is the central document tracking the 
benchmarked process and making 
progress conditional upon far-
reaching reforms in four areas (‘blocks’) of justice and home 
affairs: i) documents security; 212  ii) irregular immigration, 
including readmission; 213  iii) public security and order; 214  iv) 
external relations and fundamental rights.215 Each block is divided 
                                                        
212 The first block of visa liberalisation focuses on personal documents and 
the protection against forging. Issuing biometric passports enables access 
for the EaP states to the Lost and stolen Passport database and maximises 
the reach of Interpol. Until the end of 2015, progress of each of the six EaP 
countries could be tracked here: http://monitoring.visa-free-europe.eu/. 
213  The second block reflects the progress made on border issues and 
migration and comprises three subgroups: i) border management, 
specifically focusing on establishing anti-corruption trainings and ethical 
code for officials, plus proper infrastructure; ii) migration management, 
which requires monitoring mechanisms which detect illegal migration; 
and iii) asylum policy, which aims to implement an appropriate legal 
framework for asylum-seekers. 
214 Preventing and fighting terrorism or organised crime, and delivering 
proper cooperation between EaP countries and the EU shape the main 
objectives of Block 3. Specifically, the subgroup on preventing and 
fighting organised crime, terrorism and corruption requires efforts to 
implement recommendations made by the UN, Council of Europe and 
GRECO. A further subgroup regarding judicial and law enforcement 
outlines the objective of implementing a legal framework and cooperation 
with Europol and Eurojust. 
215 Block 4 measures the individual rights of citizens and foreigners in two 
subgroups. The first subgroup aims at an effective in-state freedom of 
movement enshrined in a legal framework and correctly implemented. 
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into a legislative policy framework and effective implementation. 
Apart from regional or thematic instruments (e.g. ENI), the eastern 
neighbourhood benefits from additional financial support from, 
for instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The additional support aims to strengthen 
the common migration, asylum and border policies, as the EaP 
countries are met with high implementation costs in order to fulfil 
the necessary benchmarks. Monitoring is based on existing criteria 
listed in the VLAPs prepared by the European Commission and 
member states. The assessment of each country is performed by 
way of a questionnaire, developed and filled out by officials from 
the EaP state concerned. The Commission and member states 
perform their own reality check by collecting information from a 
variety of sources, including official data of relevant public 
institutions and authorities, reports by international organisations 
(UN, GRECO, …), NGOs and independent experts.216 
Moldova has enjoyed visa-free travel since April 2014.217 
Implementing the necessary reforms was relatively painless (at 
least when compared to Georgia and Ukraine) because 
approximately 15% of the population holds dual citizenship with 
Romanian passports.218 Ukraine, which made gradual progress in 
all four domains, saw its advance stunted in autumn 2013, due to 
the political and security turmoil. The post-Maidan government 
                                                                                                                       
The second subgroup focuses on citizens’ rights and defines clear 
benchmarks in adopting and implementing an anti-discrimination law 
and National Human Rights Action Plan and furthermore requires the 
ratification of relevant international documents. 
216  See http://eastbook.eu/en/2012/11/country-en/poland-en/launch-
of-the-eastern-partnership-visa-liberalisation-index/  
217 See Council, “Visa liberalisation for Moldova”, Press release 7645/14, 
14 March 2014; and Regulation (EU) No 259/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ 2014 L 
105/9. 
218 The author would like to thank Nicu Popescu for highlighting this 
point. 
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made big strides in meeting the VLAP criteria since it came to 
power, helped by the flexible interpretation given by the European 
Commission to some of them (in particular to take account of the 
fact that Kyiv is not in control of the management of parts of its 
internationally recognised borders). The Commission 
recommended in April 2016 that Ukraine be offered visa-free 
travel, but the Council took almost an entire year to follow 
through. In its negotiating position agreed in November 2016, 
COREPER took the view that the instrument for visa liberalisation 
should not enter into force before the entry into force of a revised 
suspension mechanism. The Council adopted the Regulation on 
the suspension mechanism on 27 February 2017,219 paving the way 
for a vote in the European Parliament and subsequent adoption by 
the Council of the visa waiver system for Ukrainian citizens.220 On 
that same 27 February, the Council adopted a regulation on visa 
liberalisation for Georgians travelling to the EU for a period of 90 
days in any 180-day period. 221  Meanwhile, Armenia has 
                                                        
219 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement 
(revision of the suspension mechanism), PE-CONS 58/16, 15 February 
2017. 
220 Council, “Visas: Council confirms agreement on visa liberalisation for 
Ukrainians”, Press release 98/17, 2 March 2017. Low-cost airline Ryanair 
was quick to follow suit. See V. Verbyany, “Ryanair Pushes East With 
First Flights From Untapped Ukraine”, Bloomberg, 15 March 2017. See 
Regulation (EU) 2017/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 May 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing 
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement (Ukraine), OJ 2017 L 133 (entry into force on 11 June 2017). 
221 See Council, “Visas: Council adopts regulation on visa liberalisation for 
Georgians”, Press release 88/17 27 February 2017; and Regulation (EU) 
2017/372 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1 March 2017 
amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external 
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement 
(Georgia), OJ 2017 L 61/7 (entry into force on 28 March 2017). 
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progressed on the track of visa facilitation, whereas Azerbaijan 
and Belarus lag behind due to the lack of political will of the 
authoritarian regimes to reform. 
From the foregoing it can be deduced that visa 
liberalisation/facilitation between the European Union and the 
Eastern Partnership countries is simultaneously a technical and a 
highly political process. As visa policy acts as a safeguard against 
unlimited and unwanted migration as well as transborder 
organised crime, a visa-free regime is granted to countries that are 
deemed safe and well-governed, ensuring security and public 
order, and are not considered a potential source of undocumented 
economic migrants or asylum seekers. At the same time, visa 
liberalisation is conditional upon meeting a number of criteria in 
the realm of fundamental rights. Without respect for the latter, the 
visa liberalisation process cannot be completed. This visa policy 
has worked reasonably well, with Ukraine being the second 
biggest recipient of Schengen visas in the world (after Russia), and 
Belarus the fourth (ahead of Turkey).222   
4.4 Security sector support 
4.4.1 Too little, too late? 
Already back in June 2003, the Council noted the importance of 
“shared responsibility for conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution” among ENP partners and the EU.223 In a 15-item list of 
‘incentives’ to implement ENP goals, it prioritised more effective 
political dialogue and cooperation, intensified cooperation to 
prevent and combat common security threats, and greater 
cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management.224 The 
                                                        
222 See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-
and-visas/visa-policy#stats. See also F. Gaub and N. Popescu, “The EU 
Neighbours 1995-2015: Shades of Grey”, Chaillot Paper No. 136, 
December 2015. 
223  GAERC, Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003, Press Release No. 
10369/03 (Presse 166), at 33. 
224 Ibid. 
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Commission’s 2004 ENP Strategy Paper noted a similar ambition 
and added specific areas of activity beyond political dialogue, 
namely “the possible involvement of partner countries in aspects 
of CFSP and [C]SDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the 
exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible 
participation in EU-led crisis management operations.”225 The ENP 
Action Plans established ‘new partnership perspectives’ over a 
broad range of activities, including a commitment by 
neighbouring countries to “certain essential aspects of the EU’s 
external action, including … the fight against terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as 
efforts to achieve conflict resolution”.226 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, a 
former Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP, 
observed that these partnership perspectives would serve to both 
strengthen democratic governance in partner states and promote 
“our common foreign policy priorities, like making multilateral 
institutions more effective, and in addressing our common security 
threats”.227 
The case of Georgia is exemplary for both the potential of 
and the limits to a nexus between CFSP/CSDP and the ENP, for it 
was both a subject of and contributor to the EU’s implementation 
of activities in the foreign and security realm. It was at the 
receiving end of the mediation efforts conducted by French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy in his capacity as holder of the rotating 
Presidency of the Council after the Russo-Georgian war of August 
2008 – a war which the Commission’s ENP staff in DG RELEX 
                                                        
225  See COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12 May 2004, under “A more 
effective political dialogue”. 
226  See Communication from the Commission to the Council on the 
Commission proposals for Action Plans under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), COM (2004) 795 final, Brussels, 9 December 
2004. The Action Plans are ‘benchmarked roadmaps’ aimed at introducing 
reforms needed to bring the neighbours closer to the EU. 
227 B. Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: bringing 
our neighbours closer”, speech at the 10th Euro-Mediterranean Economic 
Transition Conference ‘Giving the Neighbours a stake in the EU internal 
market’, Brussels, SPEECH/06/346, 6 June 2006. 
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could – in spite of the apparent risks – not prevent, in part because 
of the unpredictability of the actors in the conflict, in part due to 
silos between the structures of the Commission and the Council. 
Sarkozy brokered a Six-Point Agreement concluded by the parties 
on 12 August 2008, which spearheaded the deployment of an EU 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM Georgia) along the occupation lines 
of the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.228 
As a contributor to the CFSP/CSDP, Georgia has been 
aligning its foreign policy positions to the CFSP declarations since 
2011. In 2014 Tbilisi aligned its position to 47% of the CFSP 
declarations. In 2015, Georgia joined 221 statements released by 
the EU in different international organisations.229 Under the terms 
of its Association Agreement, Georgia 
has committed itself to continuing 
cooperation in crisis management and 
conflict prevention with a view to 
eliminating security threats to the EU, 
based on shared values and interests.230 
Georgia is one of the most active non-
member state partners in the CSDP. It contributed to the 
Immediate Reaction Team of the EU’s Military Advisory Mission 
in the Central African Republic with 241 personnel, and to the EU 
Training Mission in Mali. Georgia’s role in the former mission was 
acknowledged by European Council President Donald Tusk: 
“Georgia’s participation, as the second largest contingent in the 
operation, has been essential to its success (…). Together, we are 
achieving something very important in a spirit of both global and 
                                                        
228  See M. Emerson and T. Kovziridze (eds), Deepening EU–Georgian 
Relations. What, why and how?, Brussels/Tbilisi/London: 
CEPS/Reformatics/Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, p. 26. 
229  Information available at http://www.eu-nato.gov.ge/sites/default/ 
files/AA%20NAP%202015%20Summary.pdf.  
230  Contrary to the agreements with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU-
Georgia Association Agreement explicitly refers to “the principle of host 
nation consent on stationing foreign armed forces” on Georgian territory 
(cf. EUMM Georgia). 
The case of Georgia in 2008 
is exemplary for both the 
potential of and the limits to 
a nexus between 
CFSP/CSDP and the ENP. 
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European solidarity and cooperation”. 231  In 2015, Georgia also 
deployed a representative to the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Donbas 
have again highlighted the incapacity of the ENP to deal with hard 
security issues in neighbouring states,232 even if the hybrid EEAS 
should be able to respond in a comprehensive manner to the ‘civ-
mil’ elements that constitute ‘hybrid warfare’. 233  Such efforts 
should start by activating the ‘Crisis Platform’ to coordinate EU 
and national capabilities in response to crises of all types. In the 
wake of the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over 
eastern Ukraine, this mechanism failed.234 The EU has admitted the 
need to “further reflect on better ways to prevent crises and 
respond to fast-changing situations, by adapting its decision-
making procedures and, if appropriate, using additional policy 
instruments”.235 Member states, for their part, should show more 
solidarity with their fellow Council members and reach out more 
                                                        
231 See “Meeting with Georgian troops deployed under the EUFOR CAR 
CSDP Mission”, available at http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/ 
video/shotlist/meeting-with-georgian-troops-deployed-under-the-eufor-
car-csdp-mission.  
232 To be fair, most western services were caught off guard. See House of 
Lords, European Union Committee, “The EU and Russia: before and 
beyond the crisis in Ukraine”, 6th Report of Session 2014–15, February 
2015 
(https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeuco
m/115/115.pdf, at 25-26). 
233  The EEAS incorporates both ENP units that link up to the 
Commission’s DG NEAR and crisis management bodies like the EU 
Military Staff and the EU Intelligence Analysis and Situation Centre 
(INTCEN) that cooperate with the member states. 
234 For reasons unknown to the author. 
235 JOIN(2014) 12 final, at 17-18. One wonders whether those additional 
instruments could be taken from the ENP toolbox, e.g. ENI funding to 
improve intelligence sharing between Ukrainian law enforcement bodies 
and - by extension - the EU. 
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proactively to the EEAS as a hub to coordinate collective crisis 
response.236 
The latter lament touches upon a fundamental issue: the real 
test of the EU’s effectiveness in preventing and defusing security 
threats in the neighbourhood and in responding to crises and post-
conflict rehabilitation comes at the level of cohesion among its own 
member states.237 When the biggest member states pursue their 
own selfish interests in bilateral deals with countries such as 
Russia, which defines relations with the ‘shared’ neighbourhood as 
a zero-sum game for ‘spheres of influence’, and when smaller 
member states stubbornly block decisions defining EU positions 
and actions to draw attention 
to their own concerns, 
strategic competitors will 
divide and rule the Union. 
Internal decision-making 
procedures in CFSP/CSDP 
that require unanimity allow 
any one member state to block any proposal carried by the others. 
They also have the potential to put the EU’s conflict prevention, 
crisis management and dispute settlement efforts out of sync with 
the conflicts’ own dynamics.238 As other international actors step 
into the fray, the EU will remain condemned to paying the bills for 
security sector support ex post facto, an altogether more expensive 
exercise than conflict prevention. Arguably, a European Union that 
unites around clearly defined objectives will stand a much better 
chance of playing a stabilising role in the neighbourhood and 
                                                        
236 In the given case in support of the Netherlands, which lost more than 
200 citizens on board the plane but had to rely on forensic cooperation 
with Australia, which despatched a team to Ukraine to investigate the 
death of its own compatriots on board. 
237 See J. Batora, S. Blockmans et al., “Best Practices in EU Crisis Response 
and Policy Implementation”, EUNPACK paper, 30 September 2016; and 
H. Dijkstra, P. Petrov and E. Mahr, “Reacting to Conflict: Civilian 
Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE”, EU-CIVCAP paper, 2 November 
2016. 
238 See, e.g., B. Coppieters, “The EU and Georgia: Time Perspectives in 
Conflict Resolution”, EUISS Occasional Paper No. 70, 2007. 
The EU’s effectiveness in preventing 
and defusing security threats and in 
responding to crises and post-conflict 
rehabilitation comes at the level of 
cohesion among its own member states. 
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being taken seriously as an honest broker to settle disputes on its 
borders. In this respect, the adoption of the 2015 ENP Review, the 
2016 EU Global Strategy, the 2016-17 Action Plan to take the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises 
forward,239 and the 2017 Joint Communication on Resilience (see 
Chapter 1), are steps in the right direction. But the proof of the 
pudding will be in the eating.240 
In spite of the lofty objectives and the security sector support 
actions undertaken in the neighbourhood since the early days of 
the ENP (see Table 3, below), the changing realities on the ground 
have shown that, so far, the EU has not been able to achieve a great 
deal to prevent and counter security threats in its 
neighbourhood.241 Admittedly, that is a tall order. It is telling that 
the lack of high-end involvement at EU-level stands in sharp 
contrast to the fact that member states have been active outside of 
the EU institutional framework, for instance in support of air 
strikes against Daesh in Syria carried out by France when it 
triggered the mutual assistance clause of Article 42(7) TEU in 
reaction to the terrorist attacks in Paris of November 2015.242 
                                                        
239  Joint Staff Working Document, “Taking forward the EU's 
Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises - Action Plan 
2016-17”, SWD(2016) 254 final, Brussels, 18 July 2016. 
240 Arguably, the legal bases exist already to speed up CFSP decision-
making processes, e.g. by moving member states towards qualified 
majority voting or constructive abstention, but the use of these mecha-
nisms requires the political will at the level of the European Council. See 
S. Blockmans, “Ukraine, Russia and the Need for more Flexibility in EU 
Foreign Policy-making”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, Brussels, 25 July 2014; 
and “EU Global Strategy Expert Opinion No. 25”, Towards an EU Global 
Strategy – Consulting the Experts, Paris: EUISS, 2016, pp. 57-58. 
241 See M. Smith and M. Webber, “Political Dialogue and Security in the 
European Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of ‘New Partnership 
Perspectives’”, European Foreign Affairs Review 13, 2008, pp. 73-95. 
242 See C. Hillion and S. Blockmans, “Europe’s Self-Defence: Tous pour un 
et un pour tous? ”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels, 20 November 2015. 
France’s operations Serval in Mali (2013-4) and Barkhane in the “G5 Sahel” 
(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger; since August 2014) 
serve the neighbours of the EU’s neighbouring countries. 
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Table 3. CSDP missions and operations in the neighbourhood 
CIVILIAN MISSIONS Theatre Period Remarks 
EU border assistance 
missions 
Moldova/ 
Ukraine since 2005 ~100 int’l staff 
 Rafah since 2005 ~2 int’l staff 
 
Libya since 2013 
Operating from 
Tunisia since 
08/2014 ~40 staff 
EU police mission Palestinian Territories since 2006 ~70 int’l staff 
EU rule of law mission Georgia 2004-2005 ~10 int’l staff 




Georgia 2005-2011 ~13 int’l staff 
EU civilian security 
sector reform Ukraine since 2014 ~80 int’l staff 
MILITARY 
OPERATIONS    
EUFOR Libya April-Nov. 2011 
Never 
operationalised 
EU naval force South Mediterranean since 2015 
Contributions 
from 24 member 
states 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
One of the dimensions that has been conspicuously absent from 
the EU’s tools employed in the geographical neighbourhood in the 
first decade of the ENP is hard security, i.e. military CSDP. But 
things are changing. The refugee and migrant crisis has given a 
new thrust to the development of CSDP in the neighbourhood and 
is therefore worth exploring.243 
                                                        
243 The next section draws on S. Blockmans, “New Thrust for the CSDP 
from the Refugee and Migrant Crisis”, CEPS Special Report No. 142, 
Brussels, July 2016. 
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4.4.2  New thrust for the CSDP in the neighbourhood 
Although southern ‘frontline’ states of the EU have been coping 
with refugee and migrant flows for years, they have largely 
shouldered the burden on their own, despite temporary surges in 
numbers (e.g. in 2005 with the ‘assault’ on the border fences at 
Ceuta and Melilla) and calls for a common response. It is the 
dramatic increase in the numbers of people seeking refuge from 
wars in the Middle East244 which spurred economic migrants from 
farther afield to follow and try their luck in finding a better life in 
Europe that has provoked an EU-wide reaction. The refugee crisis 
has mostly materialised over two migratory routes: through the 
south-central Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.245 The run on 
‘fortress Europe’ has created a crisis in terms of EU member states’ 
border management and – above all – a humanitarian disaster of 
proportions not seen since World War II.246 
The public outcry and unprecedented levels of political and 
media attention given to the appalling experiences and troubling 
images of asylum-seekers arriving in the EU have put huge 
pressure on the Union, collectively, to show that it can manage the 
crisis. The response of individual member states, the EU’s 
institutions and external border control agency FRONTEX, and 
that of NATO, has been meritorious given the traditional 
boundaries between external and homeland security. Yet the EU’s 
policy responses, both internally and in cooperation with third 
countries, have so far lacked the ‘comprehensive approach’ the EU 
professes to employ in its strategic actions. EU institutions and 
member states have in practice given priority to security-driven 
concerns. The focus on border controls, return and readmission 
and combating smuggling have (by and large) prevailed over 
                                                        
244 Eurostat figures for 2014 show more than 600,000 asylum applications 
(almost 200,000 more than the highest figures in the previous 15 years), 
whereas 2015 broke all records with almost 1.4 million applications. 
245  For an overview of routes: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-
routes/migratory-routes-map/. 
246 One should keep both aspects in mind when using the term ‘refugee 
and migrant crisis’. 
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ensuring full compliance with fundamental rights and 
humanitarian principles. This, as has been argued elsewhere, 
“constitutes one of the Achilles heels of the current European 
Agenda on Migration”.247 Indeed, it has triggered criticism about 
the “militarisation of a humanitarian crisis” in the 
neighbourhood.248 
Nevertheless, the European Agenda adopts a holistic 
approach to migration that aims to respond to the immediate need 
to save lives and address emergency situations, and to tackle the 
‘root causes’ of irregular migration and fight traffickers. Indeed, it 
is only in conjunction with an effective internal strategy to 
safeguard the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that 
the EU’s external action, including that under the CSDP, can work. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that the Council Decision to 
launch EUNAVFOR MED, one of the most emblematic responses 
of the EU to the refugee crisis, states that the CSDP naval operation 
will cooperate closely and coordinate activities with AFSJ actors 
such as Frontex and Europol and conclude arrangements to that 
end.249 At the same time, the High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy (HR), who is also Vice-President of the European 
Commission (VP), has spearheaded EU efforts to establish 
partnerships with, inter alia, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
                                                        
247  See S. Carrera, S. Blockmans, D. Gros and E. Guild, “The EU’s 
Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking stock and setting policy 
priorities”, CEPS Essay No. 20, Brussels, 16 December 2015; and S. 
Carrera, “The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the 
Southern Mediterranean: Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to 
Migration”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels, June 
2011. 
248  As reported by A. Rettman, “Nato to join EU warships in Libya 
migrant operation”, EU Observer, 10 July 2016. 
249 Article 8(3) of Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015, OJ 
2015 L 122/31. More generally, working arrangements between the EEAS, 
Frontex and Europol had already been signed. For an overview of 
institutional linkages, see M. Savary, “Box 2: Strengthening Ties between 
CSDP and FSJ”, in T. Tardy (ed.), Recasting EU Civilian Crisis Management, 
EUISS Issue Report No. 31, January 2017. 
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(UNHCR) and other members of the UN family, as well as 
regional partners (such as the African Union and the ‘G5’ of the 
Sahel: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso) to tackle 
some of the causes of fragility in the regions of origin, namely 
poverty, unemployment and conflict, and to decide on joint 
approaches to stemming migratory flows and fighting human 
traffickers. One noteworthy European Commission initiative from 
June 2016 was intended to replicate the infamous but effective EU-
Turkey deal250 and make development aid to Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria and Senegal conditional on their acceptance to help stop 
people heading for Europe.251 These so-called ‘migration compacts’ 
would not be restricted to Africa but would also extend to 
Lebanon, Jordan and other parts of the Middle East.252  In the 
margins of the G5 Sahel meeting in Brussels on 17 June 2016, the 
HR/VP also launched an EU-facilitated dialogue between Libya, 
Chad and Niger on border management.253  
                                                        
250 See by S. Carrera and E. Guild, “EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees 
is fraught with legal and procedural challenges”, CEPS Commentary, 
Brussels, 10 March 2016. 
251 See Foreign Affairs Conclusions on the Sahel of 20 June 2016. With the 
backing of all member states to the negotiation of partnership frameworks 
the HR/VP started on 17 June 2016 with migration compacts with two of 
the G5 Sahel countries: Mali and Niger. She was asked by Commission 
President Juncker to form a specific project team on this with 
Commissioners and Vice-Presidents. In addition, the implementation of 
the Trust Fund for Africa established at the Valletta Summit had reached 
a total amount of €2.3 billion of EU funds by the end of June 2016 and a 
start had been made with the financing of projects. For the Sahel, about 
€530 million worth of projects were being funded, among others security 
and border management projects to ensure more effective territorial 
control and to better tackle more illicit flows and trafficking. 
252 As reported by E. Zalan, “EU to make aid conditional on help with 
migrants”, EU Observer, 7 June 2016; and N. Nielsen, “EU development 
aid to finance armies in Africa”, EU Observer, 5 July 2016. 
253 In this context, see also S. Carrera and E. Guild, “Offshore Processing 
of Asylum Applications: Out of Sight, out of mind?”, CEPS Commentary, 
Brussels, 27 January 2017. 
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While recognising existing efforts, but also the deficiencies in 
the multi-sector approach of the EU, this study considers how the 
Common Security and Defence Policy has developed in the 
neighbourhood as a result of the ongoing refugee and migrant 
crisis. The origins of the EU’s military response to the crisis went 
back 18 months before a CSDP operation was officially launched, 
off the coast of Lampedusa. In November 2013, Italian Foreign 
Affairs Minister Emma Bonino and Defence Minister Mario Mauro 
asked former High Representative Catherine Ashton for various 
measures, including the establishment of a naval rescue operation 
and the fight against traffickers, the strengthening of Frontex, and 
a discussion with third countries on migration. The options 
developed were military, civilian and diplomatic. Italy and Greece 
agreed to act together, but their push towards other member states 
failed. Most refused to fund the Italian-run rescue operation ‘Mare 
Nostrum’ and the European Council of December 2013 ended 
without result. Rome and Athens did not give up, however, and 
supported by Malta, Spain and Bulgaria, they demanded more 
European solidarity. They had to wait for more than one year. 
In response to the rise in fatalities at sea since February 2015, 
HR Federica Mogherini, who in her capacity as Vice-President is 
responsible for the Commissioners’ Group on External Action 
(CGEA),254 declared ‘migration’ a key domain of intervention:  
We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming 
weeks and months; we need to be able to give a strong 
political and operational response. As I have announced 
today during the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an 
extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners' Group on 
External Action in the coming days in order to discuss 
with the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and 
Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our 
policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on 
migration on the agenda of the Foreign Affairs Council 
                                                        
254  See S. Blockmans and S. Russack, “The Commissioners’ Group on 
External Action — Key political facilitator”, CEPS Special Report No. 125, 
Brussels, 17 December 2015. The CGEA includes Commissioner 
Avramopoulos (DG HOME) in the broader cluster. 
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soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the 
rescue of migrants at sea, the protection of asylum-
seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger 
exercise of shared responsibility.255  
On the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Council in March 2015 (the 
first in ten years to discuss ‘migration’), an extraordinary meeting 
of Foreign and Interior Ministers was organised on April 20th. This 
first-ever joint ministerial meeting prepared the first ‘special’ 
European Council meeting on the refugee crisis on April 23rd, 
after the single-most deadly shipwreck in the Mediterranean 
claimed more than 900 lives. Mogherini has played an 
instrumental role in keeping the external dimension of the refugee 
crisis on the agenda ever since. 
Whereas “the need to manage migration properly” (and 
strengthen ‘Triton’, the Frontex Operation in the south-central 
Mediterranean and the EU’s support to the countries of origin and 
transit) had already been recognised by EU Heads of State or 
Government in 2014, European Council President Donald Tusk 
tried to respond to the concerns expressed by a growing chorus of 
EU leaders by coordinating a more concerted effort at the highest 
political level. He assigned the EEAS’s former Executive Secretary 
General Pierre Vimont as his point man for the Valetta Summit 
process and has kept refugee and migration issues on the agenda 
of every regular European Council summit since. In parallel, the 
CSDP track was developed. It is in this context that the EU 
congratulated itself on the unanimity and speed with which a 
decision was taken, on June 22nd, to launch a common military 
response — two months after the abovementioned shipwreck. 
Seen through the narrow prism of the CSDP, the time 
needed to move from the political initiative to conceive the 
operation, to identify capabilities, to build consensus for activation 
by Council decision and start deployment has indeed been 
remarkably short, even compared to previous fast EU 
deployments in Congo in 2003 (Operation Artemis) and Georgia in 
2008 (a civilian monitoring mission). Force generation, the usual 
headache in mounting EU operations (witness Chad in 2008), took 
                                                        
255 See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm.  
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only one month to be agreed upon, in line with the initial intention 
to finalise planning by the Foreign Affairs Council in June 2015. 
The CSDP military operation in the south-central Mediterranean 
was given a mandate to “identify, capture and dispose of vessels 
as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by 
migrant smugglers or traffickers”.256 
The price the EU paid for the speed to deploy its new naval 
force deployment in the Mediterranean – EUNAVFOR MED – was 
the criticism it drew from international partners  and the general 
public when plans for a ‘boat-sinking’ operation were unveiled, 
raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and ‘collateral 
damage’ as a result of putting migrants in the cross-fire. 257 
Mogherini was on the defensive, stating time and again that the 
targets are not migrants but “those who are making money on 
their lives and too often on their deaths”.258 For the first time in 
years, the EU was criticised for overreacting rather than for its 
absence from crises. 
Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lay less in clumsy 
public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated 
objectives and the absence of a clear 
strategy and mandate under 
international law. It thus created 
both operational and political risks 
for the member states involved in 
the operation. Phase 1 of the 
operation (surveillance and 
assessment), began with no legal 
mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3 (seek and destroy), 
whose military planning and outcomes were undetermined. 
Despite these limitations, the naval force nevertheless marked a 
                                                        
256 Article 1(1) of Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015, OJ 
2015 L 122/31. 
257 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon travelled to Brussels on 27 May 
2015 to raise his concerns at the European Parliament. 
258 Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini 
on the Council decision to launch the naval operation EUNAVFOR Med, 
Luxembourg, 22 June 2015. 
EUNAVFOR MED has raised 
fears about ‘collateral damage’ 
and putting migrants at risk. 
Unusually, the EU was criticised 
for overreacting rather than for 
its absence from crises. 
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turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it meant that 
the Union was finally addressing the threats to security and the 
humanitarian tragedies in the south-central Mediterranean. 
The operational model of EUNAVFOR MED was largely 
inspired by the EU’s Naval Force Operation Atalanta off the Horn 
of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. Deployed since 2008, 
Atalanta has allowed the EU to acquire valuable know-how in 
maritime security, namely in deterring and disrupting acts of 
piracy and armed robbery, not just on the high seas but also ashore 
(cf. the helicopter gunship attacks to destroy pirates’ logistical 
bases on the coast). This operational experience helped the EU to 
plan for EUNAVFOR MED, which is embedded in the idea of a 
holistic approach to migration. At the outset of the surge in June 
2015, its force strength comprised nine surface units (warships), 
one submarine, three fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, five 
helicopters and one drone operating under the national flag of 14 
member states (Belgium Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK).259 
In many respects, EUNAVFOR MED is the trickiest CSDP 
operation in years. As mentioned above, public diplomacy has 
clearly lagged behind its inception process. But the real blind spots 
of the operation had to do with its strategy, legal mandate and 
operational practicalities. Phase 1 did not need a UN Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution because surveillance is executed in 
international waters and airspace. But beyond this point there was 
little indication of what EU forces should do during phases 2 and 
3; which means and budget should be used to carry out these 
tasks; and what conditions would have to be met for the Council to 
decide on the transition beyond phase 1, into Libyan territories. 
Success was not assured, either. Attacking traffickers and 
destroying their means might lead to counter-attacks by the 
militias that protect these resources and benefit from or organise 
                                                        
259  See EEAS (2016) 126, 27 January 2016, https://wikileaks.org/eu-
military-refugees/EEAS-2016-126. For an update on the operation’s 
strength, see https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/ 
eunavfor-med/3790/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia_en. 
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trafficking in one way or another. Indeed, the EU would have to 
calibrate its military activities, particularly when moving within 
Libyan territorial waters or ashore, to avoid destabilising a 
political process by ‘collateral damage’, by disrupting legitimate 
economic activity or by creating a perception of having taken 
sides.260 
These considerations led to protracted discussions with 
Russia and China on the language of a UN Security Council 
resolution. Russia, in particular, insisted on a watertight mandate 
to prevent a repetition of what it considered to be an abuse by 
western nations of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to impose 
a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. The discussions in the Security 
Council revolved, inter alia, around the word “disposal” (read: 
sinking) of vessels and related assets, “before use”, and the legal 
definitions of “traffickers” and “smugglers”, who, unlike pirates, 
fall outside the scope of classic international law. Ultimately, 
Operation EUNAVFOR MED was granted an international legal 
mandate by way of UNSC Resolution 2240 on 9th October 2015. 
This resolution authorises states and regional organisations to 
intercept, inspect, seize and dispose (i.e. destroy) vessels on the 
high seas off the coast of Libya for a period of one year, but only 
when they have “reasonable grounds to believe” that these vessels, 
inflatable boats, rafts and dinghies are being used for smuggling 
and human trafficking from Libya.  
Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the 
Resolution effectively details the circumstances under which the 
use of force may be used, all in keeping with the protection of 
migrants’ rights, international human rights obligations, 
                                                        
260  Illustrative in this respect is the report of 25 January 2016 by the 
Operation Commander, Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino of the Italian 
Navy, for the EU Military Committee and the Political and Security 
Committee. It gives refugee flow statistics and outlines the performed and 
planned operation phases (1, 2A, 2B and 3), the corresponding activities of 
the joint EU forces operating in the Mediterranean and the future 
strategies for the operation. See EEAS, “EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA - 
Six Monthly Report 22 June-31 December 2015”, EEAS(2016) 126, 27 
January 2016 (https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS-2016-
126).  
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international refugee law and the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. In short, UNSC Resolution 2240 lays down a set of 
standards that may well complicate the practical running of the 
operation, especially when confronted on the high seas with 
smugglers who show a callous disregard for the well-being of their 
‘clients’. To be sure, UNSC Resolution 2240 does not authorise 
EUNAVFOR MED to act within the territorial and internal waters 
of Libya, let alone on Libyan territory, as projected by the Decision 
adopted by the Council of the EU.261 
The alternative legal justification for the implementation of 
phases 2 and 3 of EUNAVFOR MED was for the EU to act on the 
invitation of the legitimate government of Libya. However, with 
two power centres vying for dominance, any strategy that hinged 
on the invitation of one of the rivalling parties (i.e. that of the 
internationally recognised ‘government’ in Tobruk) risked irking 
the other (i.e. the Islamist ‘government’ in Tripoli). The EU’s 
operation therefore carried serious political risks and might even 
have ended in impasse. For this reason the EU actively supported 
the efforts of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy (first 
Bernardino de Léon, then Martin Kobler and Ghassan Salameh) to 
mediate an agreement for the formation of a unity government in 
Libya. Efforts to bring the competing parliaments and their 
backers together in a ‘Government of National Accord’ were 
further supported in an Italo-American process that led to the 
adoption of the Rome Communiqué of 13 December 2015. This 
formed the basis of the UN-brokered ‘Libyan Political Agreement’ 
reached at Skhirat on 16 December that, in turn, was unanimously 
endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2259 of December 23rd. The first 
meeting of the cabinet of the Government of National Accord took 
place on 2 January 2016 in Tunis but it was not until 30 March 2016 
that key members arrived in Tripoli. 
In the meantime, the practice of fighting traffickers had led 
to the re-baptism of EUNAVFOR MED as ‘Operation Sophia’, after 
the name given to the baby born on the ship that rescued her 
                                                        
261 See part (ii) of phase 2 as well as phase 3 of the Operation, in Art. 
2(2)(b) and (c) of Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP. 
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mother on 22nd August 2015 off the coast of Libya.262  Shortly 
afterwards, on 7 October 2015, EUNAVFOR MED ‘Sophia’ entered 
its second phase. According to the information presented on the 
website of the EEAS at the end of May 2016 (but since removed), 
the Operation contributed to saving more than 14,800 people in its 
first year of deployment, while 71 people had been reported to the 
Italian authorities as possible smugglers and 127 vessels had been 
“removed” from the reach of illegal organisations.263 
On 20 June 2016 the Council decided to extend the mandate 
of Operation Sophia for one year and expand it to two additional 
tasks: training Libyan coastguards and contributing to the 
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas. These 
extra tasks were suggested by HR/VP Mogherini to the 
Government of National Accord Libya, 264  which requested EU 
support one month later.265 This was subsequently unanimously 
endorsed by the UNSC in Resolution 2292 on 14 June 2016. The 
latter is, indeed, a very strong signal of international support for 
the EU’s role in the Mediterranean in tackling the smuggler 
networks, something that France and the UK, in particular, had 
been insisting on for a long time. 266  Thus, Operation Sophia 
matured from its surveillance and rescue phase into a proper 
Chapter VII operation, contributing to the enforcement of the arms 
embargo imposed by the UN Security Council. The last time the 
                                                        
262  See Council Conclusions on Migration, 12 October 2015, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures.  
263 On file with the author. 
264 Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini 
at the press conference on Libya, Luxembourg, 18 April 2016; and 
Ministerial Meeting for Libya Joint Communique, Vienna, 16 May 2016. 
265 See Statement by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini on Libya, Brussels, 22 
May 2016. 
266 See N. Gros-Verheyde, “L’opération Sophia devient une ‘vraie’ mission 
de présence en mer”, Bruxelles2.com, 20 June 2016. The German 
government was less insistent, as it has to obtain a new mandate by the 
Bundestag. According to some, the UNSC Resolution also constituted an 
implicit Russian snub to NATO, which was active in the Libyan air and 
maritime space in 2011. 
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EU member states carried out such an operation was in the 
Adriatic Sea under the cover of the Western European Union in the 
context of the wars in former Yugoslavia (1992-93). That operation 
was carried out in cooperation with NATO.267 
Around the Horn of Africa, EUNAVFOR Atalanta had 
already demonstrated the EU’s capacity to act as an effective crisis 
responder, as part of a more holistic and strategic approach to the 
Sahel region. EUNAVFOR MED is following the same model and 
has signalled the beginning of a more proactive European 
engagement to restore stability in the southern neighbourhood. 
When visiting one of the vessels participating in Operation Sophia 
in April 2017, the High Representative told the press that the 
mission had contributed to saving more than 35,000 people since 
the start of its activities, while more than 100 people had been 
reported to the Italian authorities as possible smugglers.268 
There have been critical voices throughout the conduct of 
EUNAVFOR MED, however. The Operation has been dubbed by 
Libyan coastguard officials and others as a de facto ‘taxi service’ 
for irregular migrants. 269  Rather than destroying the business 
model used by human traffickers, Operation Sophia has been 
denounced for facilitating the ‘work’ of smugglers; rather than 
sending 500 or more people aboard more sea-worthy, larger 
vessels capable of reaching the middle of the Mediterranean, they 
used inflatable dinghies in the knowledge they would be picked 
up just outside Libya’s territorial waters 12 miles off the coast. This 
has not only raised questions about whether Operation Sophia has 
had the desired impact on the flow of irregular migrants (which 
                                                        
267  See S. Blockmans, Tough Love: The EU’s relations with the Western 
Balkans, The Hague: Asser Press, 2007, p. 178. 
268  See Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
Mogherini during the visit at EUNAVFOR MED Sophia vessel ITS San 
Giusto, La Valletta, Press release 170426_31, 26 April 2017. The naval 
ships had been successful in destroying more than 450 boats used in 
smuggling operations. 
269  See O. Guerin, “Nameless dead of the Mediterranean wash up on 
Libyan shore”, BBC News, 28 July 2016. 
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reached a peak of 181,436 in 2016)270  it has also led to severe 
criticism about the responsibility of EUNAVFOR MED for the 
increase in the number of tragic deaths at sea. 
In July 2017, the UK House of Lords published a damning 
report in which it concluded that EUNAVFOR MED had failed in 
its mission to disrupt the business of people-smuggling and that 
the unintended consequences of the EU Naval Force’s tactics to 
tackle people-smuggling had resulted in more deaths of refugees 
and migrants at sea.271 The number of recorded casualties on the 
central Mediterranean route rose by 42% to more than 4,500 people 
drowning in 2016, compared with 3,175 in 2015.272 
The uncertainties and risks surrounding the launch of 
Operation Sophia were the by-product of ten years of strategic 
inertia by the EU in the Mediterranean basin. But in the 
dramatically altered security climate since 2015, action could no 
longer be deferred. Waiting until all the elements fell into place to 
execute a detailed Mediterranean operation could have posed a far 
greater risk to human life. A more assertive European presence in 
the Mediterranean was badly needed, as civilian missions 
deployed by individual member states, through Frontex 
operations and an EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya,273 had 
proved ineffective. Whereas Operation Sophia has failed to meet 
the objective of disrupting the business model of people-
smuggling across the central Mediterranean route, its 
humanitarian activities are nevertheless crucial to saving lives. The 
House of Lords, too, found that EUNAVFOR MED should 
therefore continue its search and rescue work, provided it adapt its 
methods, in particular by employing non-military vessels. 
                                                        
270  Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, “Migration on the Central Mediterranean route: 
Managing flows, saving lives”, JOIN(2017) 4 final, 25 January 2017. 
271 House of Lords, European Union Committee, “Operation Sophia: A 
failed mission”, 2nd report of Session 2017-19, HL Paper 5, 11 July 2017. 
272 Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2017, Warsaw, February 2017, at 8. 
273 Council Decision 2013/233/CFSP of 22 May 2013 on the European 
Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya 
(EUBAM Libya), OJ L 138, 24 May 2013, at 5. 
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It is striking to note that the EU’s response to the refugee 
and migrant crisis has moved completely outside of the ENP 
framework, in particular because the latter offers no particular 
added value to the operationalisation of the CSDP. Instead, the 
measures taken are indicative of a growing AFSJ-CSDP nexus. Not 
only has the existing civilian crisis management of Frontex 
morphed into the military realm of Operation Sophia,274  plans 
have also matured to forge a semi-
militarised European Border and 
Coast Guard (EBCG). 275  As a 
result, we witness the convergence 
of objectives, mandates and 
operations pursued by EU actors 
hitherto confined to either internal 
or external security, whereas their legal bases, decision-making 
procedures, budgetary modalities and staffing arrangements 
remain distinct. This evolution shows the propensity of the EU 
collectively, i.e. institutions and member states alike, to adapt to 
new circumstances rather than getting stuck in old paradigms.276 It 
                                                        
274 See R. Parkes, “Frontex as Crisis Manager”, in Tardy (ed.), op. cit., pp. 
49-57. 
275 See S. Carrera, S. Blockmans et al., “The European Border and Coast 
Guard: Addressing migration and asylum challenges in the 
Mediterranean?”, CEPS Task Force Report, Brussels, 1 February 2017. 
Based on Article 77.2(b) and (d) and Article 79.2(c) TFEU, the EBCG was 
developed in the shape of a regulation adopted under the ordinary 
legislative procedure. Endorsed in first reading by the European 
Parliament on 6th July 2016, i.e. barely half a year after the Commission 
tabled its proposal, the EU was swift in delivering on its commitments. 
But the need for speed has in this case resulted in less resolute legislative 
action than anticipated. See Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European 
Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation 2016/399 and 
repealing Regulations No 863/2007 and No 2007/2004 and Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ 2016, L 251/1. 
276 See T. Tardy, “Civilian Crisis Management: Towards a new paradigm”, 
EUISS Brief No. 23, July 2016. 
The EU’s civ-mil response to the 
refugee and migrant crisis is now 
outside of the ENP framework; the 
latter offers no added value to the 
operationalisation of the CSDP. 
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is testament to the idea that no medium-to-small EU member state 
can address today’s security challenges on its own.277  
As the Common Security and Defence Policy moves closer to 
the EU’s internal security activities, questions about the limits 
posed by the Lisbon Treaty on territorial defence (cf. Article 42.7 
TEU) and intra-EU solidarity (Article 222 TFEU) will come into 
sharper focus.278 Simultaneously, AFSJ actors are being lured ‘out-
of-area’, as shown in the competences attributed to the new EBCG 
to conduct operations in third countries and in the cooperation 
between Frontex and NATO in the Aegean, a maritime area where 
— because of political idiosyncrasies in bilateral relations with 
Turkey — working through the North Atlantic Alliance trumps the 
deployment of a CSDP mission.279  Cross-fertilisation of lessons 
learnt in the hitherto separate spheres of the AFSJ and the CSDP 
would benefit not only strategic analysis, planning and conduct of 
operations,280  but also the design, development and training of 
civil-military capabilities (e.g. EBCG-EDA). It is time, therefore, to 
move the comprehensive approach to EU external action up a 
                                                        
277 See “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global 
Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”, June 
2016. 
278  See S. Blockmans, “L’Union fait la force: Making the most of the 
Solidarity Clause (Art. 222 TFEU)”, in I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats 
and Crises, Brill Publishers, 2014, pp. 111-135. 
279 But for how much longer? See S. Blockmans and S. Yilmaz, “Turkey 
and the Codification of Autocracy”, CEPS Policy Insights No. 2017-10, 
Brussels, 10 March 2017. 
280 See, e.g., the Joint Staff Working Paper, “Strengthening Ties Between 
CSDP and FSJ Actors”, SEC(2011)560 and the creation of a CIVCOM-COSI 
Support Group; the working arrangements between the EEAS and AFSJ 
agencies like EUROPOL and FRONTEX, annexed in the EEAS Working 
Document, “Strengthening Ties between CSDP and FSJ: Road Map 
implementation - Fourth annual progress report”, EEAS(2015) 1422, 26 
October 2015; and Joint Communication of the European Commission 
and the High Representative to the European Parliament and the Council, 
“Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework for supporting Security 
Sector Reform”, JOIN(2016) 31 final, 5 July 2016.  
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notch and involve elements and actors of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice on a more structural basis. It is only then that 
the blurred boundaries between internal and external security will 
become a continuum and enable a more effective handling of the 
security crises confronting the European Union. This is 
particularly relevant for states on either side of the external border 
of the EU. Arguably, the CGEA would be a good venue to discuss 
such issues from a more strategic and long-term perspective, also 
because this Group involves the European Commissioner for 
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. 
4.5 Is the policy as good as the tools? 
The use of the EU’s ample ENP toolbox reveals a highly 
differentiated pattern. This finding applies to the realities of 
striking up contractual relations, applying the principle of 
conditionality and liberalising visa regimes as much as it does to 
security sector support. With regard to the latter, it is clear from 
our analysis that the policy framework of the ENP does not 
represent the prism through which to 
seek concrete solutions to the daunting 
security challenges emanating from the 
European Union’s outer periphery. 
Attempts to address the root causes of 
conflict and migration by supporting 
the development and growth of the 
poorest areas in the neighbourhood and beyond remain dependent 
on whether the EU (institutions and member states collectively) 
and its partners can muster the extra resources and political will to 
work together to implement the measures that are recommended 
in the 2015 ENP Review.281  Here too, the EU’s performance is 
rather erratic. 
On a more conceptual level, the tendency to differentiate 
relations under the new ENP carries the risk of counteracting the 
treaty-based objective of Article 8 TEU which the EU has pursued 
                                                        
281 See, e.g., J. Apap and E. Pichon, “Building resilience with the EU's 
southern neighbourhood”, EPRS At a Glance, June 2016.  
The policy framework of the 
ENP does not offer concrete 
solutions to the security 
challenges coming from the 
EU’s outer periphery.  
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for the last decade i.e. that of transforming the neighbourhood into 
one area of peace and prosperity built on democratic principles. If 
a recalibration were needed of how the EU employs its toolbox to 
protect its interests and advance its values in a ‘pragmatic’ way, 
i.e. by building resilient neighbouring states (and, subsidiarily, 
societies), then the Union might as well shed the pretence of 
conducting a policy specific to its neighbourhood. All it would be 
doing is conducting foreign policy in the classical sense. 
This observation sours when we consider that, after all the 
talk about the perceived need to take the interests of countries 
such as Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia into account when 
defining relations with the ‘in-betweens’, the attention paid in the 
2015 ENP Review to the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ falls below 
expectations. The main message in the joint communication is that 
the new ENP “will seek to involve other regional actors, beyond 
the neighbourhood, where appropriate, in addressing regional 
challenges”.282 Bilateral relations with Russia can only materialise 
“when conditions allow”;283 with regard to Iran “as [soon as] the 
recent [nuclear] deal is implemented”.284 China’s ‘Belt and Road’ 
initiative has to be read between the 
lines, even if it is gaining traction in 
some Eastern Partnership states (e.g. 
Georgia).285 In its effort to strike a more 
pragmatic tone, the 2015 ENP Review 
nevertheless fails to recognise 
significant realities. Without a clear 
                                                        
282 JOIN (2015) 50 final, 18 November 2015, at 3. 
283 Cf. the open-ended nature of the five guiding principles of the EU’s 
policy towards Russia, laid down in the Foreign Affairs Council 
conclusions of 14 March 2016. 
284 Arguably, that time has come. See S. Blockmans and A. Viaud, “EU 
Diplomacy and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Staying power?”, CEPS Policy 
Insights, Brussels, 14 July 2017. 
285 See the contributions to A. Amighini (ed.), China’s Belt and Road: A 
Game Changer?, Milan: ISPI, 2017; and T. Kovziridze, “Georgia-China 
FTA: A side effect of the EU-Georgia DCFTA?”, 3DCFTAs Working 
Paper, 3 July 2017. 
With no clear picture of how 
the EU should relate to the 
neighbours of its neighbours, 
the ‘new’ ENP cannot define 
a strategic basis for the 
countries on its borders. 
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picture of how the EU should relate to the neighbours of its 
neighbours, the ‘new’ ENP cannot (hope to) define a solid strategic 
basis for the individual countries on its borders. In this respect, the 




5. INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATIONS: 
IN SEARCH OF COHERENCE 
he success of the EU institutions in addressing challenges 
and seizing opportunities in the neighbourhood, and indeed 
further afield, is aided by the constant revision of EU 
strategies, structures and working methods, and the focused 
support of and provision of resources by the member states. 
Arguably, without these elements, EU foreign policy founders. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has had a double significance for the 
organisation of the EU’s relations with its neighbours. Besides the 
introduction of a specific legal base in the form of Article 8 TEU, 
the Treaty’s changes to the governance structures of EU external 
action286 also impacted on the management and development of 
the ENP. The European Council, which has graduated to the full 
status of ‘institution’, has taken on a more active role in shaping 
neighbourhood relations. It has dealt with the neighbourhood in 
quasi-perpetual crisis mode since 2011.287  
                                                        
286  See, generally, J. Wouters, D. Coppens and B. De Meester, “The 
European Union’s External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty”, in S. Griller 
and J. Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty: EU constitutionalism without a 
Constitutional Treaty?, Vienna: Springer, 2008, pp. 143-203; J.-C. Piris, The 
Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010, pp. 238-256; P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, 
Politics and Treaty Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 379-
387; P. Van Elsuwege, “EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar 
Structure: In Search of a new Balance between Delimitation and 
Consistency”, Common Market Law Review 47, 2010, p. 987. 
287 See, e.g., European Council Conclusions, EUCO 147/14, 16 July 2014. 
Its President – who, at his level and in that capacity, ensures the external 
representation of the Union on CFSP issues (Art. 15(6) TEU) – has 
regularly spoken out on issues pertaining to the neighbourhood. See, e.g., 
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In the context of this study, the most significant of these 
changes relate – directly and indirectly – to the task of the High 
Representative to assist the Council and the Commission in 
ensuring coherence between the different areas of the Union’s 
external action and between these and other EU policies.288 In an 
effort to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of EU 
external action, 289  the Lisbon Treaty merged the position of 
Commissioner for External Relations with that of High 
Representative for the CFSP into the hybrid post of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
/ Vice-President of the Commission. The HR/VP would be 
supported by a European External Action Service (EEAS), 
composed of staff transferred from the European Commission’s 
DG External Relations (RELEX), DG Development and network of 
external delegations, from the Council General Secretariat’s DG 
External Relations, and from member states’ diplomatic services. 
In a pre-Lisbon move, European Commission President-elect 
José Manuel Barroso tried to prevent the Commission from losing 
all institutional control over the hitherto DG RELEX-driven 
European Neighbourhood Policy. When unveiling his new team of 
Commissioners in November 2009,290 Barroso indicated by way of 
                                                                                                                       
Statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 
on the EU's Eastern Partnership, PCE 049/11, 23 February 2011; his video 
message ‘We want to turn this Arab Spring into a true new beginning’, 
PCE 062/11, 10 March 2011; and more recently, on the occasion of the 
signing ceremony of the political provisions of the Association Agreement 
between the EU and Ukraine, PR PCE 61, 21 March 2014; and on the 
downing of a Ukrainian military aircraft, PR PCE 119, 14 June 2014. 
288 See Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU. The European Parliament and 
the rotating Presidency of the Council also remain active on ENP-related 
matters. 
289 See Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, 
Effectiveness and Visibility’, COM (2006) 278 final; the pre-Lisbon Draft IGC 
Mandate, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of 22-23 June 2007; and 
the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the 
Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP (2008). 
290  See Article 17(6)(b) TEU, which states that the President of the 
Commission shall “decide on the internal organisation of the 
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a simple asterisk that a new Commissioner for ‘Enlargement and 
European Neighbourhood Policy’ would exercise his functions “in 
close cooperation with the High Representative/Vice-President in 
accordance with the Treaties.” 291  The HR’s ‘Vice-Presidential’ 
powers were thus effectively curtailed, as the responsibility for the 
ENP was detached from the portfolio of the Commissioner of 
External Relations and added to that of new Commissioner for 
Enlargement. The decision to re-shuffle portfolios was not 
accompanied by a written explanation. Instead, Barroso asked 
Commissioner-designate Štefan Füle 
to develop credible and attractive alternatives to 
membership for those neighbouring countries that will 
not become members. That is why an effective European 
Neighbourhood Policy is so important, and why I believe 
that it deserves the extra attention which could be offered 
by close cooperation between you and the High 
Representative/Vice-President.292 
The latter addition is important from the point of coherence. 
Because DG RELEX’s staff was destined to transfer en bloc to the 
future EEAS, the new Commissioner would have to rely on 
members of cabinet to liaise with ‘his’ ENP staff on the other side 
of the Rond Point Schuman.293 In the course of his hearing in the 
                                                                                                                       
Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a 
collegiate body”. 
291 Press release IP/09/1837 of 27 November 2009. The requirement of 
close cooperation was repeated in the Mission Letter of the same date 
from President Barroso to Commissioner-designate Stefan Füle. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm. 
292 Mission Letter to Stefan Füle, at 2. 
293 A quick glance at the EEAS’ organisational chart of June 2017 shows 
that, together, two geographical Managing Directorates (MD) incorporate 
six units that deal with aspects of the ENP. Under MD-EURCA ‘Europe 
and Central Asia’, Division EURCA-EAST ‘Russia, Eastern Partnership; 
Central Asia, Regional Cooperation and OSCE’, the following units have 
been created: ‘Eastern Partnership, regional cooperation and OSCE’ and 
‘Eastern Partnership, bilateral’. Under MD-MENA ‘Middle East and 
North Africa’ exist the following units: ‘MENA 1 – Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, 
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European Parliament on 12 January 2010, Füle paid lip service to 
the idea that his actions would significantly assist the HR/VP, by 
declaring that the two of them would work together for the 
common good of EU-neighbours relations. 294  In practice, this 
cooperation was reflected in the references to the joint parenthood 
(i.e. European Commission and High Representative) of new ENP 
policy documents.295 
The requirement of close cooperation with the HR/VP and 
the condition to work closely with the EEAS (as provided in the 
Mission Letter) was later formalised in a Note from the 
Commission President in which he established clusters of 
Commissioners responsible for certain themes, including external 
                                                                                                                       
Jordan’, ‘MENA 2 – Israel, occupied Palestinian territories and MEPP’, 
MENA 3 ‘Maghreb’ and MENA 5 ‘Strategy and instruments of the ENP’. 
294  Opening statement of Štefan Füle, Commissioner-Designate for 
Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, European Parliament, 
12 January 2010, at 3. The speech is available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/static/commissioners/speech
es/fule_speeches_en.pdf. At the hearing, Füle underlined that he would 
be solely accountable to the European Parliament, whilst the High 
Representative would answer to both Parliament and member states. He 
signalled that, as a Commissioner, he would attach more importance to 
substance than procedures when it came to both enlargement and 
neighbourhood policy. Füle thereby gave more leeway to the creeping 
intergovernmentalisation of enlargement and ENP, at least more than his 
boss was prepared to accept prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. See Füle, “I’ll make enlargement more political”, EurActiv.com, 14 
January 2010. 
295 See, e.g., European Commission and High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the 
European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern 
Mediterranean”, COM (2011) 200 final; and European Commission and 
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament,  the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, “A new response to a changing 
Neighbourhood”, COM (2011) 303 final. 
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relations. 296  HR/VP Catherine Ashton convened the Group a 
number of times but each time she was sidelined by Barroso, who 
would insist on chairing the meeting. It is said that the gatherings 
had a rather formalistic character and added no value to the 
normal inter-service consultation processes in the Commission, let 
alone to the goal of joining up the Commission’s strands of EU 
external action with those managed by the Council and the EEAS. 
The practice of convening the Group was quietly abandoned for 
the remainder of the Barroso II Commission (2009-14). The high 
number of ‘line’ Commissioners and Directorates (33 DGs and 11 
Services) made effective internal coordination difficult. The ‘flat’ 
internal organisation of the College increased the tendency to 
negotiate dossiers between the President and the respective 
Commissioner(s) on a bilateral basis rather than through 
discussions within clusters or the entire College. Few decisions 
were ever put to a vote, despite the controversy generated by some 
of them. This practice was counterproductive in terms of 
collegiality and favoured a silo approach to policymaking. In fact, 
this practice stood in stark contrast to the Lisbon Treaty’s spirit of 
a more holistic and integrated approach to dealing with increasing 
interdependencies between policy areas. 
To address these shortcomings, Barroso’s successor, Jean-
Claude Juncker, rearranged the structure of the College to respond 
to the political guidelines presented by the Commission President-
designate to the European Parliament in July 2014. Stressing the 
“need to be more effective in bringing together the tools of 
Europe’s external action” Juncker expressed his expectation that 
the next High Representative would: 
                                                        
296 Information Note from the President, “Commissioners groups”, SEC 
(2010) 475 final, in which the VP was tasked to chair the group of 
Commissioners responsible for ‘External relations’, a group further 
composed of the Commissioners responsible for trade, development 
cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response, enlargement and ENP, 
economic and monetary affairs. The Note also said that “the President can 
decide to attend any meeting, which he will then chair”. Thus, Barroso 
assigned himself the final responsibility to ensure coherence of external 
policies within the Commission, while the day-to-day coordination was 
entrusted to VP Catherine Ashton. 
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combine national and European tools, and all the tools 
available in the Commission, in a more effective way 
than in the past. He or she must act in concert with our 
European Commissioners for Trade, Development and 
Humanitarian Aid as well as for Neighbourhood Policy. 
This will require the High Representative to more fully 
play his/her role within the College of Commissioners.297 
In his Mission Letter of 1 November 2014 to HR/VP-designate 
Federica Mogherini (and each of the other Commissioners), 
Juncker reiterated his expectation that she would play her role as 
Vice-President to the full.298 To underline her role as VP Mogherini 
took the symbolic decision to install her office and cabinet in the 
Commission’s Berlaymont building; to appoint an experienced 
hand at the Commission as her chef de cabinet; and to recruit half of 
her cabinet from Commission staff. The suggestion that, in case of 
need, Commissioner for ‘Enlargement Negotiations and European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ Johannes Hahn and other Commissioners 
could deputise for her “in areas related to Commission 
competence” 299  also points in this direction, as indeed to the 
Juncker Commission’s flexibility in re-organising its own 
structures to match priorities.300 This need not imply, however, 
that  the  ENP  is  now  exclusively  governed  by  the  ‘community  
                                                        
297 J.-C. Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, 
Fairness and Democratic Change”, 15 July 2014. 
298  Juncker’s Mission Letter to Mogherini is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission
_letters/mogherini_en.pdf. 
299 Ibid., at 4. 
300 See also Communication from the President to the Commission, “The 
Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019”, C(2014) 9004, 
11 November 2014. The principle of collegiality, which governs decision-
making in the Commission (Article 17(6) TEU), guarantees the equal 
participation of all the Commissioners and the collective responsibility for 
the decisions taken. As a general rule, the President does not place a new 
initiative on the agenda of the College “unless this is recommended to 
[him] by one of the Vice-Presidents on the basis of sound arguments and 
a clear narrative that is coherent with the priority projects of the Political 
Guidelines”. See, e.g., Mission Letter to Mogherini, at 2. A strong bond to 
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method’. In fact, now that neighbourhood issues have become 
Chefsache, i.e. top priority for the European Council, supported by 
the HR/VP and her politically guided deputy in the Commission 
responsible for neighbourhood relations (who relies on staff 
moved from the Commission to the EEAS) we are witnessing the 
creeping intergovernmentalisation of the ENP.301 This ought not, 
in theory at least, to prejudge 
the Union’s political orientation 
towards its neighbours, nor the 
effectiveness of its actions. Yet, 
in the face of the instability on 
the EU’s outer periphery, 
centrifugal and centripetal 
forces will continue to push or 
pull the ENP in one direction or 
the other, irrespective of the direction shown on the Treaty’s 
strategic compass. 
With the dual aim of achieving greater coherence in EU 
foreign policymaking and greater efficiency in the consistency and 
effectiveness of its implementation, President Juncker reanimated 
the Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA). 302  In 
concrete terms, Juncker instructed Mogherini to guide the work of 
the Commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations (Johannes Hahn), International 
Cooperation and Development (Neven Mimica), Humanitarian 
Aid and Crisis Management (Christos Stylianides), and Trade 
(Cecilia Malmström). Commissioners who do not belong to this 
core cluster but who are nevertheless concerned by the items on 
the Group’s agenda are also invited, in particular Dimitris 
                                                                                                                       
the College is also ensured by Mogherini’s obligation to regularly report 
back to Juncker and to the whole College about “geopolitical 
developments”. Ibid, at 4. 
301 Cf. C. Hillion, “The Creeping Nationalisation of the EU Enlargement 
Policy”, SIEPS Report 2010:6. 
302 Decision of the President of the European Commission on the Creation 
of a Commissioners’ Group on External Action, C(2014) 9003, 11 
November 2014. 
We are witnessing the creeping inter-
governmentalisation of the ENP. 
Centrifugal and centripetal forces 
will continue to push or pull the 
ENP in one direction or the other, 
irrespective of the direction shown on 
the Treaty’s strategic compass. 
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Avramopoulos (Migration and Home Affairs), Miguel Arias 
Cañete (Climate Action and Energy), and Violeta Bulc (Transport), 
who belong to her broader cluster. Due to the blurring of 
boundaries between internal and external policy areas, the fact that 
the CGEA meets on a regular basis and caters for real political 
debates between Commissioners, the Group’s meeting has at times 
ballooned in size, especially as each of them normally comes with 
his or her Director-General. 
The CGEA does not have the power to adopt official 
decisions and does not replace the standard procedure of decision-
making within the Commission. Since the Group follows a four-
week interval, it is less suitable to discuss short-term matters and 
crisis management but is better designed to work on more 
structural issues and long-term trends. Hence, the agenda usually 
comprises three items of either a geographical or thematic nature. 
Examples related to the neighbourhood include the Strategy for 
Syria and Iraq; the situation in Ukraine; Eastern partners; 
economic diplomacy; capacity-building (train & equip); cultural 
diplomacy; responsible supply chains; and an action plan for 
human rights and migration. 
The CGEA is supported by a joint secretariat, which is led by 
the Head of Unit ‘International Dimension’ of the Secretariat-
General of the Commission and the Head of Division ‘Policy 
Coordination’ of the EEAS. The joint secretariat assists the cabinets 
of Mogherini and Juncker in establishing the agenda for the 
upcoming meetings of the CGEA. 
The CGEA facilitates political discussion on EU external 
action across the entire Commission. It forces the services to 
abandon their silo mentalities, share information and create 
linkages to give ‘hands and feet’ to a more comprehensive 
approach to EU external action. As such, the Commissioners’ 
Group serves to ‘deconflict’, both between the Directorates General 
of the Commission and with the EEAS. As the logical counterpart 
of the Foreign Affairs Council, the Commissioners’ Group enables 
the HRVP to play her role to the full and deliver on her duty to 
assist the Council and the Commission to ensure consistency in EU 
external action (Article 21(3) TEU). Mogherini acts as a coordinator 
to mobilise instruments, budget and expertise managed by the 
Commission and to capitalise on a political consensus reached in 
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the Council.303 A concrete example concerns the adoption by the 
Commission of a legislative proposal offering additional 
temporary access for Tunisian olive oil to the EU market to help 
support Tunisia’s recovery in the wake of the terrorist attack of 26 
June 2015 in Sousse, which had prompted a reaction from the FAC 
on 20 July 2015 on the need to further assist Tunisia in its political 
and economic transition, in a concrete and targeted manner. 
Whereas the ENP structures devised post-Lisbon are in 
principle a good example for more comprehensive and coherent 
EU external action and carry within them the potential for further 
‘deputisation’ of the HR/VP on ENP matters across the 
institutional divide, 304  practical 
experiences so far have also 
revealed the need for extra 
inter-institutional coordination 
mecha-nisms to paper over the 
cracks between the focal points 
of ENP governance.305  A close 
                                                        
303 Conversely, Mogherini is in a position to induce political will among 
member states by showing that the tools managed by the Commission can 
be put at the Union’s disposal in order to boost effective foreign policy. A 
good example of this go-getting attitude is the cascade of actions she set 
off in response to a spike in the refugee crisis in February 2015. See 
Blockmans and Russack, op. cit., at 10-11. 
304 For a different view, see C. Hillion, “The EU Mandate to Develop a 
‘Special Relationship’ with its (Southern) Neighbours”, in G. Fernandez 
Arribas, K. Pieters and T. Takács (eds), The European Union’s Relations with 
the Southern-Mediterranean in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring, CLEER 
Working Paper No. 2013/3, pp. 11-17, at 16: “Often presented as a 
template for cohesive and coherent EU external action, the ENP is thus 
less well-integrated post-Lisbon, than it was under the previous 
dispensation.” 
305  See, e.g., “HR/VP Catherine Ashton sets up Task Force for the 
Southern Mediterranean”, A 226/11, Brussels, 7 June 2011. The Task Force 
brings together expertise from the EEAS, the European Commission, the 
EIB, the EBRD and other international financial institutions to act as a 
focal point for assistance to countries in North Africa which are going 
through political transformation. 
Whereas post-Lisbon ENP structures 
are a good example for more coherent 
EU external action, practice shows 
the need for extra inter-institutional 
coordination to paper over the cracks 
in ENP governance. 
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reading of Articles 3(1) and 2(1) of the Council Decision 
establishing the EEAS points out that the Service shall support and 
work in cooperation with, inter alia, the services of the 
Commission, “without prejudice to the normal tasks” of those 
services.306 The inclusion of the latter phrase raises the question of 
what exactly the normal tasks of the Commission are in ENP-
related matters. In the absence of an exhaustive Kompetenzkatalog 
and with the very idea of normality in EU external action having 
shifted dramatically since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
it should come as no surprise that the neutral phrase “normal 
tasks” has been interpreted differently by persons with different 
institutional affiliations.  
With regard to the EU’s ‘foreign policy instruments’ such a 
risk has been foregone by the drawing up of detailed rules 
regarding the planning, programming and implementation of EU 
funds. The ensuing complexity is poignantly illustrated by the 
system put in place to operate the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). Article 9(5) of the 2010 Council Decision 
establishing the EEAS prescribes that:  
any proposals, including those for changes in the basic 
regulations and the programming documents referred to in 
paragraph 3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant 
services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for 
Neighbourhood Policy and shall be submitted jointly with 
the High Representative for adoption by the Commission. 
 
 
                                                        
306  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 
2010 L 201/30. For backgrounds and analysis, see S. Blockmans and C. 
Hillion (eds), EEAS 2.0: A Legal Commentary on Council Decision 
2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service, SIEPS, Stockholm, 2013. With respect to the 
coordination and cooperation between the EEAS and the services of the 
Commission, Art. 3(2) specifically obliges the parties to consult each other 
on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of 
their respective functions, except on matters of CSDP. 
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In turn, Article 9(3) states: 
In particular, the EEAS shall contribute to the programming 
and management cycle for the instruments referred to in 
paragraph 2 [incl. the ENI], on the basis of the policy 
objectives set out in those instruments. It shall have 
responsibility for preparing the following decisions of the 
Commission regarding the strategic, multiannual steps 
within the programming cycle: (i) country allocations to 
determine the global financial envelope for each region, 
subject to the indicative breakdown of the multiannual 
financial framework. Within each region, a proportion of 
funding will be reserved for regional programmes; (ii) 
country and regional strategic papers; (iii) national and 
regional indicative programmes. In accordance with Article 
3 [of the EEAS Council Decision], throughout the whole 
cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the 
instruments referred to in paragraph 2, the High 
Representative and the EEAS shall work with the relevant 
members and services of the Commission without prejudice 
to [the authority of the HR over the EEAS, as laid down in] 
Article 1(3). All proposals for decisions will be prepared by 
following the Commission’s procedures and will be 
submitted to the Commission for adoption. 
The implementation of this particular strand of the obligation of 
sincere cooperation between the EU institutions has been spelled 
out in the “Working Arrangements between Commission services 
and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to 
external relations issues” of 13 January 2012.307  That document 
provides, inter alia, that the Commission services and the EEAS 
will perform their respective tasks throughout the 
programming and implementation cycle in full 
transparency, informing and consulting each other, 
sufficiently in advance, on initiatives or announcements 
that could have an impact on each other’s areas of 
responsibility. This includes an exchange of information on 
preparation of policy and programme documents of both a 
formal and informal nature. It relates to the representation 
                                                        
307 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13 January 2012. 
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of EU positions vis-à-vis recipient countries or other donors 
and related reporting and feedback.308 
In short, whereas the management of the European Union’s ENP 
and adjacent cooperation programmes remains under the 
responsibility of the Commission (Article 9(1) EEAS Council 
Decision), it shares the role of ‘programming’, i.e. designing, 
scheduling, or planning the EU’s external cooperation 
programmes (only an element of the wider concept of 
‘management’), with the EEAS. In fact, the High Representative is 
under a particular obligation to avail her-/himself of these 
instruments to ensure the overall political coordination, unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, 
“without prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and 
of the EEAS in programming”. Thus, the basic prescript, namely 
that during the whole process of planning and implementation 
both parts of the organisation should work together and that all 
proposals for decision have to be prepared through the 
Commission procedures and submitted to the Commission (Article 
9(3)), has remained unchanged, but the advent of the EEAS and 
the ensuing inter-service cooperation has substantially increased 
complexity in the management 
of ENP funds post-Lisbon. Then 
again, this is a small price to pay 
for a comprehensive approach to 
the neighbourhood, and indeed 
the allocation of appropriate 
funding to the ENP. It would be 
far more difficult to argue for the 
latter if all funding for EU external action were brought under one 
budget line. 309  Herein lies perhaps the single-most important 
justification to keep the ENP as a separate policy framework. 
                                                        
308 Ibid., at 15. 
309  A point made by Emma Udwin, Deputy Head of Cabinet of 
Commissioner Hahn, at a public seminar hosted by SIEPS and CEPS on 2 
June 2017 in Brussels. 
Inter-service cooperation increases 
complexity in the management of 
ENP funds – a small price to pay for 
a comprehensive approach to the 
neighbourhood, and the allocation of 
appropriate funding to the ENP. 
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6. CONCLUSION: CLASSIC FOREIGN 
POLICY FOR THE NEIGHBOURHOOD 
“However beautiful the strategy,  
you should occasionally look at the results.” 
Winston Churchill 
 
he Lisbon Treaty was intended to create tools for the 
European Union to develop a more coherent, more effective 
and more visible foreign policy, in particular for relations 
with the neighbours. Yet, while the EU Treaty now contains a 
specific clause (Article 8 TEU) that envisions a peaceful and 
prosperous neighbourhood and provides a legal base for the 
conclusion of agreements to associate the neighbouring countries 
more closely, realities on the ground have moved in the opposite 
direction.  
Whereas the EU cannot be blamed for the dire economic 
outlook, the backsliding of respect for democratic principles, 
fundamental rights and the rule of law, the deterioration of the 
security environment, and other woes that have befallen or been 
generated by the countries in its outer periphery, the 
neighbourhood does constitute one of the most important 
geopolitical tests for the EU. How it deals with its own 
neighbourhood will define not just the Union, but also the 
perception its international partners have of the EU’s role on the 
global stage. 
In this respect, Article 8(1) TEU represents a container 
concept that does not provide the necessary teeth for the Union’s 
paper ENP tiger to survive in the mercurial neighbourhood. 
Moreover, the instruments through which the European 
Neighbourhood Policy has to be implemented have to be 
borrowed from other parts of the treaties, from which Article 8 
TEU is disconnected. There is only so much the hybrid positions 
T
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and bodies created in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty can do to 
paper over the legal cracks of EU primary law and forge an 
integrated European policy towards the neighbourhood. 
When looking at the big picture, the inclusion of a specific 
neighbourhood clause in the Lisbon Treaty is emblematic of the 
overall reactive nature of the EU’s actions in its neighbourhood, 
captured by the maxim ‘too little, too late’. Indeed, the Union’s 
slow and timid response to the dramatic events of the Arab Spring 
of 2011, the war in Syria and the waves of refugees that it 
propelled into Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, illustrate the limits of the 
innovations to the ENP, not just in the sphere of the attribution of 
competences and institutional architecture, but particularly in the 
area of security. Indeed, the policy framework of the ENP does not 
represent the prism through which to seek concrete solutions to 
the daunting security challenges emanating from the EU’s outer 
periphery. Yet the ENP is nowhere if the EU does not get crisis 
management and conflict resolution right. The EU’s response to 
the aggression of Putin’s Russia against Ukraine – a repeat of his 
Georgian playbook in 2008 – is a case in point. Whereas short-term 
political and economic gains may be made through the ENP, the 
‘widgets’ that Russia has created to destabilise the geopolitics of 
much of the Eastern Partnership remain in place. Conceptually 
flawed from the beginning, the ENP is still ill-conceived and badly 
equipped to deal with an unstable environment and the zero-sum 
gaming neighbours of neighbours. Even if crisis response and 
conflict management fall outside the realm of the ENP, a strong 
nexus with the CFSP/CSDP might have been presumed but has 
still not materialised. 
In order to bridge the gap between the rather naive-looking 
ambition stated in the Treaty and the worsening realities on the 
ground, European policymakers had no choice but to instil more 
realism into the implementation of the obligation to tactically work 
towards attaining the goals prescribed by Article 8(1) TEU. One 
year after the Juncker Commission took office, a long-overdue 
review of the ENP was published.310 At the presentation of the 
                                                        
310 JOIN(2015) 50 final. 
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‘new ENP’ with High Representative Mogherini, Commissioner 
Hahn offered a sobering reality check:  
Our most pressing challenge is the stabilisation of our 
neighbourhood. Conflicts, terrorism and radicalisation 
threaten us all. But poverty, corruption and poor 
governance are also sources of insecurity. That is why we 
will refocus relations with our partners where necessary 
on our genuinely shared common interests. In particular 
economic development, with a major focus on youth 
employment and skills will be key.311 
Hahn’s statement encapsulated the essence of the 2015 ENP 
Review: greater emphasis on stability (in security and economic 
terms); more differentiation in relations with neighbours (i.e. doing 
more with ‘partners’); and greater emphasis on shared interests 
rather than on the Union’s own values. 
The ‘old’ ENP was designed for fairer weather, at a time 
when EU confidence was high and the neighbourhood was mostly 
stable. Economically strong and confident about the process that 
was intended to put the EU on a firm constitutional basis and 
serve the reunited halves of the continent, the EU set out a policy 
to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours”. Yet, in the absence of a clear 
membership prospect for ENP countries, the EU’s demands and 
prescriptive methods of harmonising legal frameworks and 
reforming institutions and economies have largely failed to inspire 
the neighbours, especially those who do not share the Union’s 
values. Inadvertently, new borders have now materialised, in 
particular in the south.  
On a more fundamental level, the old ENP did not manage 
to tackle the root causes of the protracted conflicts in the region, 
again mainly in the south: poverty, lack of education, and 
unemployment. The Association Agreements and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the EU, the most 
prestigious form of contractual relations under the ENP, even 
                                                        
311  European Commission, “Review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP): stronger partnerships for a stronger neighbourhood”, Press 
release IP/15/6121, 18 November 2015. 
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ended up inciting violence, as was shown in Ukraine in 2013 after 
President Yanukovych pulled the plug on the conclusion of the 
country’s AA/DCFTA. In spite of a remarkable pro-EU 
revolutionary wave that swept out the ancien regime and managed 
to keep most of the country united in its determination to sign the 
agreement, the ENP – and in particular the Eastern Partnership – 
suffered a serious blow due to the EU’s collective lack of strategic 
foresight about Russia’s belligerence in Crimea and the Donbas. 
With assistance packages and trust funds too small to make a 
difference, the ENP has also had precious little impact in terms of 
longer-term peacebuilding. Arguably, the only successful 
‘Arabellion’ – the one in Tunisia – has been achieved in spite of 
rather than thanks to the increasingly conditional (‘more for more’) 
support introduced in the 2011 review of the ENP. As far as the 
DCFTAs are concerned, the mismatch between the strict terms of 
the agreements (which even blur their level of ambition with that 
laid down in the accords concluded with pre-accession countries) 
and the resistance to and reversibility of change in the power 
structures of EaP countries are unlikely to produce the desired 
levels of administrative, regulatory and economic approximation 
any time soon. 
In light of the above, it comes as no surprise that the 2015 
ENP Review has tried to abandon the enlargement methodology 
in favour of managing relations between the EU and all of its 
neighbours more pragmatically. The Review recognises that “not 
all partners aspire to comply with EU rules and standards” and 
reflects “the wishes of each country concerning the nature and 
scope of its partnership with the EU”. New working methods 
include the abolition of the annual package of country reports to 
measure progress (or the lack thereof) in reforms. Instead, 
(ir)regular reporting has become more tailor-made to the nature 
and working calendar of each relationship. Yet the EU’s priority 
continues to lie in AA/DCFTA partners’ comprehensive 
approximation to the acquis as a means to their gradual economic 
integration into the internal market. As such, the ‘enlargement lite’ 
fiction is kept up. While this ambition transcends the political 
limits of the ENP and contradicts the 2015 Review, the pretence is 
nevertheless symbolic for the ‘European’ states of the EaP that 
aspire to one day meet all EU membership conditions. But it has a 
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rather counterfactual meaning for non-European countries like 
Morocco and Tunisia, with which DCFTA talks have been 
launched. It would seem, therefore, that in the name of flexibility 
both the policy framework and the flagship instruments of the 
ENP are being stretched beyond recognition. 
For partners who cannot or do not wish to pursue the 
preferred model of concluding and implementing an AA/DCFTA, 
the way forward may well lie in the exploration of lighter options, 
going beyond existing preferential or non-preferential trade 
agreements (e.g. Agreements on Conformity Assessment and 
Acceptance (ACAAs), which allow for the free movement of 
industrial products in specific sectors). Such an approach could 
contribute to the long-term goal of a wider area of economic 
prosperity based on WTO rules and sovereign choices by 
neighbouring countries. It could also help in accommodating the 
interests of their neighbours, for instance in striking up relations 
with the Eurasian Economic Union, once it becomes WTO-
compliant. 
Apart from the introduction of a healthy dose of 
differentiation and greater mutual ownership, the European 
Commission and the High Representative put more emphasis on  
political and economic ‘stabilisation’ − a political priority of the 
Juncker Commission. Since 2015 the term ‘stabilisation’ has 
gradually been replaced by the notion of ‘resilience’. The services’ 
adoption of this buzzword reflects the shift in debate about the 
nature of EU engagement with third states, neighbouring countries 
in particular. It de-emphasises the goal of transformation that 
formed the bedrock of the ‘old’ ENP and replaces it with support 
for the ability to withstand systemic shocks and threats at both the 
state and societal level. By prioritising security interests over 
values in increasingly transactional partnerships, the policy now 
takes a more pragmatic approach to improving relations with 
neighbouring countries on a differentiated basis. Whereas the 
fuzziness of the term ‘resilience’ is helpful for diplomats, as it 
allows them to back-peddle when political circumstances change, 
the vagueness of the concept and the flexibility with which policy 
objectives can be (re-)interpreted hinder those who have to 
implement the ENP in the countries concerned, with the 
instruments and budgets at their disposal. Arguably, without the 
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political will to mobilise the necessary security and financial 
resources to tackle the region’s multiple crises, and without a 
strategic vision to guide relations with the neighbours of the EU’s 
neighbours, the ENP remains in suspended animation. 
Moving away from the idealistic goals set out at its launch in 
2004 and codified in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the ENP currently 
represents little more than an elegantly crafted fig leaf that 
purports to be a framework for a comprehensive soft power 
approach to the EU’s outer periphery, but masks an inclination 
towards a more hard-nosed Realpolitik whose heterogeneous 
practice makes it indistinguishable from foreign policy in the 
classic sense of the term. The ‘new’ ENP is neither a complete 
overhaul of the ‘old’ ENP nor a fully fledged strategic (re)vision of 
the EU’s relations with its neighbours. Rather, it continues the 
break-up of former Commission President Prodi’s proverbial ‘ring 
of friends’. 
The 2011 Review had already split the unitary concept of the 
ENP by creating the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the 
Mediterranean. The 2015 Review offers parallel organic forms of 
regional cooperation that will – if implemented – speed up the 
descent into irrelevance of the static formations of countries that 
were artificially lumped together in the EaP and the UfM. The 
stated need to stabilise the ‘ring of fire’ that surrounds the EU 
denotes a realistic approach that will further atomise relations with 
the neighbouring countries, to the point where the EU may want to 
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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
The idealism that engendered the European  Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, later codified in 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, has since been reviewed to adapt to the turbulence that has befall-
en the EU and its neighbourhood. The ENP is now little more than an elegantly crafted fig leaf 
that purports to take a soft power approach to the EU’s outer periphery, argues the author, 
but in effect it inclines more towards Realpolitik. 
By prioritising security interests over liberal values in increasingly transactional partner-
ships, the EU is atomising relations with its neighbouring countries. And without the political 
will and a strategic vision to guide relations with the neighbours of the EU’s neighbours, the 
ENP remains in suspended animation.
“Blockmans offers a refreshingly accessible and provocative account of the EU’s foreign policy to-
wards its ‘near abroad’. Whether or not one agrees with the book’s conclusion that the ENP is in 
‘suspended animation’, this is a highly thought-provoking, detailed and illuminating analysis.”
 Tobias Schumacher, European Neighbourhood Policy Chairholder, 
 College of Europe, Natolin.
“This book’s critical reflections and deep and comprehensive analysis make it a must-read for all 
those concerned with one of the most important issues facing European policymakers today: the EU’s 
relations with its neighbours.”
 Javier Solana, former EU High Representative for CFSP 
 and Secretary General of NATO. 
“With its in-depth analysis of the challenges facing the EU as it rethinks the policy approach towards 
its neighbours, this book comes out at a critical time. It is required reading for all those concerned 
with the future of a liberal world order.” 
 Eka Tkeshelashvili, President of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies, 
 former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.
